Nice outline, Helmut. But I'll quibble with a few terms. For example, your theist claims that 'an intelligent system is a person' while an atheist would never anthropomorphise intelligence in that way.
An atheist might well consider that this 'quasi-Mind' or Mind functions to prevent the 'horror vacui - i.e., to prevent entropic dissipation of matter but this doesn't mean that achieving this result, along with its complexity, requires a supreme intelligence, which is the view of the theist. And Jeff adds evaluative terms, such as 'beauty, goodness and truth' and adds a 'divine character' to its nature. I'm not sure what the latter term [divine character] means and the first three - I think need some clarification, at least, in my view. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Helmut Raulien To: jeffrey.down...@nau.edu Cc: Gary Richmond ; Peirce-L Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 3:28 PM Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking Jeff, list, you wrote: " Whether we call that embodied system of Ideas and Ideals "Nature" or "God" matters little to me--so long as we grow to appreciate the Beauty, Goodness and Truth of its Divine character." I think the same. Somebody wrote some weeks ago, that there is a saying that philosophers spend most of their time not elaborating theories, but discussing about the meanings of terms. I guess, this also applies to theologists, the medieval scholastics too, and that "God" is such a term. I also think, that the discussion between atheists and theists is not about whether God exists or not, but what the term "God" means. And, presuming it means that He is a person, then the discussion perhaps is mostly about the meaning of the term "person": An atheist might say: Nature and evolution are nonpersonal, but nevertheless quite intelligent systems, and a theist might answer: But an intelligent system is a person, so why should I not call it "God". An atheist might claim, that everything is only based on a simple principle: The "Horror Vacui" of nature. Then a theist might answer: The simpler the tools are, that achieve great complexity, the greater must be the intelligence that has invented these tools. I can think of a discussion between an atheist and a theist, like a theater play, and in the end comes out, that both share exactly the same philosophy, just the atheist does not want to say "God", and the theist does. Best, Hlmut 23. September 2016 um 20:32 Uhr "Jeffrey Brian Downard" <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: Hi Gary R., Ben U., List, Yes, with respect to " Ben's "quibble" to the effect that "Peirce said that every mental action has the form of a valid inference, not that every inference is valid as a pattern of inference", the point is well taken. We'll see if any of the critics of the Humble or the larger Neglected Argument want to take up the question raised at the end of the post. For my part, I don't think that Dennett or Dawkins have much to offer by way of a response to the question. Here are two options that are open to a critic: (1) offer an alternate hypothesis that can perform the grand totalizing and synthesizing function that has traditionally be supplied by a conception of a personal God that, in his Ideas and Ideals, embodies and gives life to all of the laws of logic, metaphysics and nature. Or, (2) reject the need for such a grant totalizing and synthesizing hypotheses. One of Peirce's point is that many thoughtful and reflective human beings (such as Plato and Emerson) have recognized the need for the Ideas and Ideals embodied in this sort of hypothesis--and Peirce recognizes the same need. He is asking each of us to reflect on some basic operations of our own feelings, imagination and thought, and then ask ourselves--do we recognize a similar need? Like Schiller, I think that aim of further cultivating our habits of feeling, action that thought does indeed seem to call out for the kinds of Ideas and Ideals that will be sufficient to offer us hope as we seek to bring the conflicting tendencies in our personal and social lives into better harmony. Whether we call that embodied system of Ideas and Ideals "Nature" or "God" matters little to me--so long as we grow to appreciate the Beauty, Goodness and Truth of its Divine character. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Gary Richmond [gary.richm...@gmail.com] Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 10:56 AM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking Ben, Jeff, List, Ben, I think your 'quibble' is well taken, and I agree with your analysis. Jeff, I'm hoping that critics of the 'Humble Argument' as well as the N.A. as a whole will respond to the good question at the end of your post: JD: So, let us ask: does this hypothesis involving the conception of God involve some kind of confusion on our part about the real character of the inference, or does it rest on false premisses? Peirce's essay on "The Neglected Argument" is a sustained effort to show that neither of these is the case. As such, it is a reasonable hypothesis. Is the same true of the alternate hypotheses? Best, Gary R [Gary Richmond] Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 12:48 PM, Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com<mailto:baud...@gmail.com>> wrote: Jeff, Edwina, list, I've just a few quibbles, nothing major. Jeff, you wrote: Every inference is, in one way or another, valid as a pattern of inference, including those that are instinctive. Those that appear to be invalid are patterns of inference that are, themselves, valid, but the appearance of invalidity is really due to the fact that we have misunderstood what kind of inference it is (e.g., we think it is inductive, when it is really abductive). Or, the apparent invalidity is really just a lack of soundness in that something in the premisses involves an error on our part and it is really false. [End quote] Some of that is very close to what Peirce said in his articles in _Journal of Speculative Philosophy_ in 1868, but with a decisive difference. Peirce said that every mental action has the form of a valid inference, not that every inference is valid as a pattern of inference. In "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities," he said: It is a consequence, then, of the first two principles whose results we are to trace out, that we must, as far as we can, without any other supposition than that the mind reasons, reduce all mental action to the formula of valid reasoning. [CP 5.266, W 2:214, http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/conseq/cn-frame.htm ] Yes, invalidity of inference arises from mistaking what kind of inference it is - where "it" refers to the mental action. But saying that every inference is valid as a pattern of inference sounds confusingly like saying that there is no invalid inference. An unsound deduction is unsound by virtue (or should I say 'vice') of a falsehood in the premisses, an invalidity in the deductive form, or both. A valid deduction is unsound if it has one or more false premisses, and is necessarily unsound if there is an inconsistency (a.k.a. necessary falsehood) in a premiss or among premisses. A 'forward-only' deduction can be valid and unsound yet true in its conclusion, e.g., Socrates is a cro-magnon, all cro-magnons are mortal, ergo Socrates is mortal. (A particularly vacuous example, based on a necessarily false conjunction of premisses, is: p&~p, ergo p or ~p.) It's difficult to think of a deduction whose seeming invalidity boils down to the occurrence of something contingently or necessarily false in its premisses, maybe that difficulty is what Edwina was getting at in her reply (I haven't had time to catch up with this thread). Anyway, whether one can explain seeming invalidity as unsoundness in non-deductive inference modes depends I guess on how one defines validity and soundness for them. Best, Ben On 9/21/2016 5:06 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: Hello Jon, List, The argument you are trying to reconstruct could be fleshed out more fully in a number of ways. Here are a few suggestions for filling in some of the details a bit more: Major premiss: Every inference is, in one way or another, valid as a pattern of inference, including those that are instinctive. Those that appear to be invalid are patterns of inference that are, themselves, valid, but the appearance of invalidity is really due to the fact that we have misunderstood what kind of inference it is (e.g., we think it is inductive, when it is really abductive). Or, the apparent invalidity is really just a lack of soundness in that something in the premisses involves an error on our part and it is really false. As a form of inference, every retroductive conjecture that meets certain conditions (e.g., it responds to a question occasioned by real doubt, it is really explanatory, it is possible to deduce consequences that can be put to the test, it is possible to make inductive inferences that will tend to show the hypotheses is confirmed or disconfirmed by observations, the observations that will be used to test the hypothesis are not the same observations that will be used to make the inductive inference, etc.) is a valid abductive inference--and hence has a logical character. Such arguments can, in time, be the subject of further development in arguments that are more fully under our conscious control. As such, they can be made into logical inferences that may rise up to higher levels of assurance, including those of experience as well as form. Minor premiss: The humble argument for the Reality of God is a retroductive conjecture endorsed by instinctive reason. What is more, it has in fact be met with the support of large communities of inquirers at different times and places in human history and culture. In fact, it appears that the core inferential patterns in the argument are prevalent in the thought of virtually all reasonable human beings. Over time, different communities have developed the instinctive hypothesis in a number of different ways, but the core ideas seem to cut across all such communities--including those communities that are quite spiritual in orientation as well as those that claim to be less spiritual in orientation. Setting aside the particularities of how the conceptions have been developed in different human communities, and focusing on the core ideas that appear to be held in common, we can see that those core ideas can be developed into hypotheses that can be affirmed in a responsible and self-controlled manner by those who are deeply infused by the desire to learn and who have a relatively refined sense of how to conduct their inquires according to experimental methods. Conclusion: The humble argument for the Reality of God is logical in all three senses--according to the assurance of instinct, experience and according to the exact requirements of good logical form. We should remember, however, that this is not a claim that the conclusion of the argument is true. Rather, the claim is that the conclusion is plausible. While it may lack something by way of security, it possesses much by way of uberty. In fact, our experience shows that this grand hypothesis--which serves a remarkable totalizing and synthesizing role in the great economy of our ideas--both within the realm of our long growing commitments of common sense and in our most cutting edge inquiries in the special sciences--has shown and continues to show great uberty in the way that it informs the healthy growth of our aesthetic feelings, our ethical practices and in the ongoing logical growth of our thought. So, let us ask: does this hypothesis involving the conception of God involve some kind of confusion on our part about the real character of the inference, or does it rest on false premisses? Peirce's essay on "The Neglected Argument" is a sustained effort to show that neither of these is the case. As such, it is a reasonable hypothesis. Is the same true of the alternate hypotheses? --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354<tel:928%20523-8354> ________________________________________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt [jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>] Sent: Wednesday, September 21, 2016 12:24 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. 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