Von: "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>
Helmut - a concept can be formed by an individual. It doesn't have to be formed by a group. The concept that the two people are using is a dynamic object. Yes, their interaction, if there are two people discussing a common concept, connects them to the wider community.
Edwina
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On Fri 31/03/17 4:26 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
Edwina,The immediate interpretant is internal, but a concept is formed by a society, which the individuals are parts of. So perhaps they have access to what is internal of the society? I mean, when eg. two individuals talk about a common concept, this talk automatically makes them parts of the community, so the sign that is taking place in the community is sort of partially transparent for them, so their two-persons-sign can be connected with the bigger and slower community-sign it is part of?Best,Helmut31. März 2017 um 22:04 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
Helmut - you asked:Do you think, that also an immediate interpretant and a final one may become a dynamical object? My guess is, that immediate interpretants become concepts, dynamical interpretants become material things, and final interpretants become topics that have happened or been in the past (all for DynObjs).
My view is that the Immediate Interpretant is internal and thus, cannot become a dynamic object, which is external. I don't see that an immediate Interpretant is a concept, which is to say, an intellectual construct. It could be an anticipatory form of what will be an objective form that is externalizing to be a Dynamic Interpretant, i.e., similar to an embryo. A dynamical Interpretant could be a material existentiality and also, a conceptual existentiality. I see a final interpretant as not a particular but a general.
Edwina
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On Fri 31/03/17 2:46 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:List,Jeffrey, I too had problems with that. Now I think, that Peirce uses the term "habit" in a broader sense: Usually, when I hear or read "habit" I think of a gradual approximation process. This cannot be the case with conservation of energy, because exact conservation cannot be approached: If in all reactions, physical and chemical, only a little energy was lost or won, then the universe would freeze or explode in an instant, I guess. A similar problem is the fine tunedness of constants. But Peircean habit also may be saltatory, and includes emergences, I guess."Effete" sounds a bit pejatorive to me, I rather think of matter as condensed or precipitated mind, but "effete" I accept for correct of course.Edwina, you wrote, that a dynamical interpretant of one sign may work as a dynamical object for another. Do you think, that also an immediate interpretant and a final one may become a dynamical object? My guess is, that immediate interpretants become concepts, dynamical interpretants become material things, and final interpretants become topics that have happened or been in the past (all for DynObjs).Best,Helmut31. März 2017 um 17:45 Uhr
Von: "Jeffrey Brian Downard"Edwina, Clark, List,
Better, I think, to call the first explanatory principle you quote from Peirce a hypothesis than an axiom. In addition to being a better reflection of what Peirce is doing in introducing these grand explanatory principles into the special sciences from his work in metaphysics, it will also help to avoid the confusion that might be caused for people who think about axioms as fundamental rules that are beyond doubt.
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Edwina Taborsky
Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 8:11 AM
To: Peirce-L; CLARK GOBLE
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the termClark - OK - I'll put in a long comment here on how I see the non-philosophical aspects of Peirce's work. Thanks for your encouragement to do so.
Basic axioms: that our universe operates as energy-transforming-to-matter, or ‘things’ [Peirce used the term ‘things’ often] via semiosic actions.
The emergence of Matter: Peirce: 1.412 “out of the womb of indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the principle of habit there would have been a second flash…..” The point here is that matter emerged as differentiated and also, as then connected by habits and by kinetic interaction.
The origin of Material matter: 1.362 “the starting point of the universe, God the Creator is the Absolute First; the terminus of the universe, God completely revealed, is the Absolute Second; every state of the universe at a measurable point of time is the third……..If your creed is that the whole universe is approaching in the infinitely distance future a state having a general character different from that toward which we look back in the infinitely distance past, you make the absolute to consist in two distinct real points and are an evolutionist”
I consider the term ‘God’ to be a synonym for Mind. See Peirce’s analysis – and I’ll only refer to a few:
“Mind is a propositional function of the widest possible universe, such that its values are the meanings of all signs whose actual effects are in effective interconnection” [ 4.550].
NOTE: I note the term function which to me suggests that Mind is an action and a process. I note also the term signs which to me cannot refer simply to the representamen but to the whole articulated triad.
4.551: “Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world”….But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs. “
Note: Sign is capitalized in the original. And Peirce also suggests being careful lest we set up a “danger that our system may not represent every variety of non-human thought”. I take this to mean that his system is intended to represent every variety of non-human thought – and therefore, one does not require to go FIRST to the study of human thought to understand and use Peircean semiosis in the non-human realm. And I note his comments on protoplasm and crystals etc – which I won’t repeat here as the post would be too long - and it's already long enough!
Therefore, the Absolute First, understood as Feeling, but not the sensational view of that term, but as a primeval Will. [Again- I can find the reference..]
The starting point as Symbol: Certainly, one can define this original Mind as a type of symbol – but not the human understanding of the term which puts it in a mode of Thirdness or art-i-factual, but I understand it as will, or desire to continuity of that material existence without the awareness of this existence; and the nature of this existence is, as evolutionary, open in its _expression_. Therefore it is not an iconic or indexical mode of articulation which would reject diversity and spontaneity of new forms and complexity but symbolic in that the articulation is free and open.
I understand these ‘things’ as having, necessarily FORM. The form, which sets up a differential boundary, sets matter up in a mode of Secondness, which is stabilized by the habits-of-formation of Thirdness.
I won’t go into the many references to Secondness in Peirce’s work - since there are so many – but it is obvious that matter within a mode of Secondness MUST have a differential FORM – or it would be unable to carry out the key action of Secondness, which is – to interact.
The method of this movement from pure Mind [pure energy] to particular Matter – is by the triadic process of the Sign, which I understand as irreducibly triadic.
“I will sketch a proof that the idea of meaning is irreducible to those of quality and reaction. It depends on two main premises. The first is that every genuine triadic relation involves meaning, as meaning is obviously a triadic relation. The second is that a triadic relation is inexpressible by means of dyadic relations alone”. 1.345
Now – with regard to the above, my interpretation is that pure Mind in that mode of Firstness or potentiality – transforming to matter is an ‘act of meaning’. And, Peirce says that such a method of so doing is triadic. It must involve three ‘nodes’ so to speak: the Object-Representamen-Interpretant’. Then, I am aware that many on this list understand the semiosic action as ‘the sign/representamen’ in a relation with the Object and the Interpretant. I reject this interpretation for two reasons. First – the interaction of the Representamen-Object can be and usually is, in a different categorical mode than the relation with the Interpretant. Second – if one does not acknowledge this capacity for modal differences, it reduces the interaction to ‘dyadic relations’.
Therefore, I follow the graph with three tails as outlined in 1.347. This of course enables complex networking, where a Dynamic Interpretant in one triad can function as the Dynamic Object in another triad.
I feel that these basic axioms enable one to explore the physico-chemical and biological realms as complex semiosic processes.
Edwina
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On Thu 30/03/17 5:42 PM , CLARK GOBLE cl...@lextek.com sent:On Mar 30, 2017, at 3:15 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:So- given the make-up of the posters on this list and their interest [in philosophy] then, I don't see the point of bringing up the non-philosophical focus of Peirce's work.I should note that while my own interests are primarily philosophical, my background is actual primarily physics not philosophy. I enjoy the non-philosophical topics quite a bit although I often don’t know enough about the topic to say much. I’ve brought up some of the non-philosophical topics here before too such as the relationship of category theory in advanced physics or mathematics as it relates to Peirce. Not that I know much about category theory, but a few others made comments I learned from.So I am actually pretty interesting in the applied semiotics. Indeed while my interests are primarily philosophical I’ve read a reasonable amount on applies semiotics in various arenas.I seem to remember a discussion a few months ago on political implications of Peirce’s thought. I focused primarily on his more conservative tendencies in his critical common sensism but also the focus on inquiry.Anyway, please comment on the non-philosophical points. Even if I don’t typically comment I frequently read them.----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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