In the technical sense (algorithmic information theory, Shannon, various 
others), information is understood syntactically only, so there is no content 
involved. Content is required for truth or falsity. So the technical notion of 
information has nothing to say about truth or falsity of the information. 
Information is either transferred, or it is not.

On the nature of information flow (transfer), I recommend the book by that name 
by Barwise and Seligman. It is far superior to anything written by or about 
Shannon, but it is based on pre-Shannon work on networks by electrical 
engineers in the 1930s. It is a difficult book, but you can find the basics 
summarised in several of my articles on my web page.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Charles Pyle [mailto:charlesp...@comcast.net]
Sent: Thursday, 29 June 2017 4:35 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information'


I have always been concerned about the implications of false information for 
the definition of information. Is false information information? Is false 
knowledge knowledge? I should think the answer must certainly be "No" for 
knowledge, because to know is a factive verb, meaning that it presupposes the 
truth of its object. I believe in common usage of 'information' in the 
technical sense, as in information theory, false information would be 
information even if it was false,  but information in the ordinary sense of the 
word would not be information if it is false.



If, as I have argued, all signs are of a duplicitous nature, then this would be 
a moot question, or at least a very different question.

On June 29, 2017 at 7:59 AM John F Sowa 
<s...@bestweb.net<mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote:

Jon A, Jeff D, and Gary F,

JA

Why don't we put this on hold for later discussion?

I was about to send the following when your note appeared in
my inbox. It should be sufficient for the word 'information',
but we can discuss other issues later.

JD

I take the following passage to indicate that Peirce changed his use of
"depth" and "breadth" in some respects some time between 1867 and 1896.
The change was a broadening of the use of both terms.

GF

What Peirce wrote in 1893 is that he had broadened the application
of the terms, i.e. the breadth of the propositions involving them.
That does not mean that their depth, or “signification” as Peirce
often called it, changed in any way;

I agree. One example I use is the broadening of the word 'number'
from integers to rational numbers to irrational numbers to complex
numbers to quaternions... That broadens the application of the word,
but it does not make the definitions for its earlier uses obsolete.

For any particular application, the definition can be narrowed
by adding an adjective, such as real, complex, hypercomplex...

JA

BTW, is it really necessary to point out once again that the job
of a lexicographer presenting a survey of significant usages in
common or technical is very different from the role of a philosopher
expounding his or her own conception?

Many of Peirce's definitions for the Century Dictionary or Baldwin's
dictionary include short philosophical essays. They are as significant
for his Opera Omnia as any other publications.

And note his Ethics of Terminology. From EP 2.265:

The first rule of good taste in writing is to use words whose
meanings will not be misunderstood

Implication: For a common word such as 'information', a dictionary
that cites dates for the word senses, such as the OED, would be
sufficient to determine what Peirce had intended. But when he wrote
the definition himself, that's even better: I'm sure he would not
use a word in a sense that was inconsistent with his own definition.

John

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