I hope you are right Edwina! I agree. We live in what some have called an immanent frame. Actually, we do not know everything about lies beyond. But regardless of what we believed if you are reflecting Peirce that is good. I am still wrestling with the notion of universes and categories. I have no problem understanding that thought can be seen as fitting categories. If that is what is meant fine. But if every sequential motion of our minds is continually going 123 this seems to be entirely impossible. Are we talking about thought or are we making clinical observations about how our minds actually work?
amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 6:21 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Jon - then I guess we'll have to do the old 'agree to disagree'. > > I don't agree with your definition of Firstness as outside of the material > world and only as possibility. That makes Firstness some kind of mental > value - even aligned with Thirdness. Possibility would be a form of the two > degenerate Thirdness. > > Firstness is a mode of existence OF the material world, just as > Secondness and Thirdness are also modes of existence of the material world. > As Peirce said, it is a 'state...a state of feeling'..and as such, as > feeling, it functions within the material world. > > Equally, the experience of Firstness does not require consciousness. And > we do function, sometimes, in a state..in its entirely'. > > So- we'll just disagree. > > Edwina > > > > > > > > On Thu 25/01/18 5:14 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Edwina, List: > > "Pure physical sensate matter," "factual reality," and "the material > world" are all primarily (though not exclusively) manifestations of 2ns, > not 1ns. In your own example, the flesh is reacting to the presence of > hot oil, which demonstrates that this is a textbook case of 2ns; pure 1ns > would be the sui generis quality of heat as a possibility in itself, > apart from any relation with anything else (such as oil and flesh). Pure > 1ns thus has no "existential nature" at all, since existence is defined by > reaction (2ns). I am confident that I could dig up various Peirce quotes > that would clearly support these statements, but I do not have time to do > so right now. > > As for your own quotes, I obviously interpret them differently. They are > definitions, not assertions of anything that we actually experience > directly. We cannot have "consciousness which involves no analysis, > comparison or any process whatsoever," since--as Gary R. pointed out--the > phenomenon of time itself is already irreducible to any one Category. We > can only feebly attempt to imagine a "positive quality which consists in > nothing else," rather than attributing that quality to something else that > embodies it. We never find ourselves in "a state, which is in its entirety > in every moment of time as long as it endures." > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 3:43 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Jon - No, I'm not mixing anything up. I'm focusing on the real >> experiences - not the analyses of these experiences. Nothing mental, >> nothing logical. Pure physical sensate matter. >> >> I'm saying that the existential nature of pure Firstness is a reality. >> Consciousness of it - is a second and third step. But we most certainly DO >> experience it - and Secondness and Thirdness couldn't even function without >> its operation in the world. >> >> Think of the pure Firstness of a hot oil on the flesh. This is real - >> and the flesh reacts to it [Secondness]. The flesh isn't reacting to an >> abstraction!! It's reacting to a factual reality....and analysis and even >> consciousness of it - are secondary steps. ...But these require that first >> step. >> >> I gave enough quotes [which you are ignoring] to identify the sensate >> power of Firstness in the material world. >> >> Edwina >> >> On Thu 25/01/18 4:13 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: >> >> Edwina, List: >> >> You seem to be mixing up the distinct cenoscopic sciences of >> phenomenology/phaneroscopy (whatever is present to mind), logic as >> semeiotic (classification of Signs), and metaphysics (modes of being). We >> have no actual experience of a state of pure feeling; we can only >> approximate it by attempting to imagine something like redness in itself, >> apart from any manifestation of it as a quality in something else. Events >> like seeing redness and feeling heat are examples of sensation (2ns), not >> pure feeling (1ns). Similarly, a Rhematic Iconic Qualisign does not exist >> per >> se; it must be embodied in a Sinsign in order to act as a Sign at all >> (cf. CP 2.244). All such attributions of particular modes to the >> correlates and relations involved in semeiosis are strictly a matter of >> analysis carried out for a specific purpose. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 1:49 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> wrote: >> >>> Gary R - are you saying that Firstness is an abstraction??? >>> >>> What about: "By a feeling I mean an instance of that kind of >>> consciousness which involves no analysis, comparison or any process >>> whatsoever, nor consists in whole or in part of any act by which one >>> stretch of consciousness is distinguished from another, which has its own >>> positive quality which consists in nothing else, and which is of itself all >>> that it is, however it may have been brought about; so that if this feeling >>> is present during a lapse of time, it is wholly and equally present at >>> every moment of that time'...1.306 >>> >>> "A feeling is a state, which is in its entirely in every moment of time >>> as long as it endures' 1.307 >>> >>> This would be that pure triad of a rhematic iconic qualisign. Now - my >>> view is that every aspect of the phaneron is triadic but not every aspect >>> contains all three categorical modes. BUT - the entire phaneron must, in >>> its totality, certainly contain all three categorical modes - both in >>> their genuine and degenerate forms. But not all 'instances' of the >>> phaneron, are in themselves, operative in all three categorical modes. >>> Although all instances are triadic [Obejct-Representamen- Interpretant]. >>> >>> That's how I see it. I think it's rather important to have a universe >>> where, in some instances, a category can be pure - right through >>> the semiosic triad; that is - all three relations [O-R-I] can be in a mode >>> of pure Firstness. Or Pure Secondness. Or Pure Thirdness. [see 2.227 for >>> the ten classes]. the only class that has all three modes is the rather >>> important one: the Rhematic Indexical Legisign - a semiosic act of >>> networking, introducing novelty and yet, maintaining some continuity of >>> type. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> On Thu 25/01/18 2:31 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent: >>> >>> Edwina, list, >>> >>> Well, you may disagree with Peirce (and me) that all three are always >>> present in the phaneron, but, (a) a bedrock of Peirce's phaneroscopy and >>> (b) has always been my personal experience. I suppose my phaneroscopic >>> experience is closely linked to my understanding of time as Peirce presents >>> it (I believe yours is different). As has been argued here repeatedly and >>> even recently (and not only by me), for Peirce the instant is an >>> abstraction, while the minimum of time is the trichotomic moment which >>> itself involves all three categories. >>> >>> Having said that, and even while I don't see how one can separate the >>> three categories except analytically, Peirce often--although hardly >>> always--takes up his universal categories in relation to his phenomenology >>> and the practice of that science. I do that as well as a frequent practice. >>> >>> In any event, I see no reason to change my thinking--which, again, is >>> most certainly Peirce's (many passages to that effect)--about the >>> omnipresence of all three categories in every phenomenon. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >>> [image: Blocked image] >>> >>> Gary Richmond >>> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >>> Communication Studies >>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >>> 718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690> >>> >>> On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 2:06 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Gary R - I would question whether all three categorical modes are >>>> operative in all phaneronic experience at the same time. >>>> >>>> For example, in the case of a rhematic iconic qualisign - let's say >>>> that 'feeling of redness' or how about 'a feeling of heat' [I just spilled >>>> hot oil on myself]. No other categorical mode, in this semiosic event, is >>>> operative other than Firstness. >>>> >>>> Now - if I am becoming aware of this triad - then, I am adding both >>>> Secondness [my physical reaction to that feeling]..and possibly later on in >>>> the next few seconds, my thoughts [My god, I have burned myself]. >>>> >>>> But isn't it possible that one never moves beyond that first feeling? >>>> Or moves beyond that reaction - i.e., never moves into analysis or even >>>> awareness beyond the muscular reaction? >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> >>>> On Thu 25/01/18 1:14 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent: >>>> >>>> Stephen, list, >>>> >>>> In reference to this passage: >>>> >>>> CSP: Phenomenology is the science which describes the different kinds >>>> of elements that are always present in the Phenomenon, meaning by the >>>> Phenomenon whatever is before the mind in any kind of thought, fancy, or >>>> cognition of any kind. Everything that you can possibly think >>>> involves three kinds of elements >>>> >>>> >>>> You commented: SR: ". . . the notion that thinking can be limited to >>>> ** things that themselves must somehow be three elements by some sort f >>>> default ** seems to be out of order or maybe just plain wrong." >>>> >>>> I don't understand your confusion here, Stephen, as this passage simply >>>> points to the fundamental tenet of Peircean phenomenology, namely, that in >>>> the phanerson--i.e.,whatsover is before some mind--there will always >>>> be the three categorial elements of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns even if one (or two) >>>> may be dominant in any given phaneronic experience. Given the context, >>>> these three may be given different names, for example: >>>> >>>> 1896 [c.] | Logic of Mathematics: An attempt to develop my categories >>>> from within | CP 1.423 We have already seen clearly that the elements >>>> of phenomena are of three categories, quality, fact, and thought. >>>> >>>> Or: >>>> >>>> 1885 | One, Two, Three: Fundamental Categories of Thought and of >>>> Nature | CP 1.377 >>>> >>>> It seems, then, that the true categories of consciousness are: first, >>>> feeling, the consciousness which can be included with an instant of time, >>>> passive consciousness of quality, without recognition or analysis; second, >>>> consciousness of an interruption into the field of consciousness, sense of >>>> resistance, of an external fact, of another something; third, synthetic >>>> consciousness, binding time together, sense of learning, thought (both in >>>> Commens). >>>> >>>> Again, this triad of universal categories is so basic to Peirce's >>>> thinking throughout cenoscopic philosophy (but, perhaps, especially in >>>> phenomenology and logic as semiotics) that I wonder what prompted your >>>> question. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> Gary R >>>> >>>> [image: Blocked image] >>>> >>>> Gary Richmond >>>> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >>>> Communication Studies >>>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >>>> 718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690> >>>> >>>> On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 11:18 AM, Stephen C. Rose <stever...@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> I don't know what the context of this discussion is exactly but the >>>>> notion that thinking can be limited to ** things that themselves must >>>>> somehow be three elements by some sort f default ** seems to be out of >>>>> order or maybe just plain wrong. For example, I am thinking now as I >>>>> write. >>>>> No numerical sense intrudes. To get to this stage I did not have three >>>>> anythings that I am aware of. If I am simply skirting a context that >>>>> explains this, fine. Par for my course. I miss lots. But if the text >>>>> stands >>>>> as is, how can thinking which is us puzzling as we go be involved in >>>>> anything but a process that ** cannot ** be characterized as the text >>>>> characterizes it. The only time I know when three enters into thinking is >>>>> when I consciously will it in terms of an actual process that has >>>>> definable >>>>> stages. >>>>> >>>>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 8:40 AM, Gary Richmond < >>>>> gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Jeff, Gary f, List, >>>>>> >>>>>> Jeff wrote: " >>>>>> Consider the first part of the passage you quote. I am laying >>>>>> emphasis on the term "possible" and cautioning against the suggestion >>>>>> that >>>>>> only those "things" that are actually before the mind should be counted >>>>>> as >>>>>> phenomena. >>>>>> >>>>>> Phenomenology is the science which describes the different kinds of >>>>>> elements that are always present in the Phenomenon, meaning by the >>>>>> Phenomenon whatever is before the mind in any kind of thought, fancy, or >>>>>> cognition of any kind. Everything that you can possibly think >>>>>> involves three kinds of elements CSP >>>>>> >>>>>> (Jeff's emphasis) >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> JD: >>>>>> The reason I'm taking time to lay emphasis on this point is that I >>>>>> think there is a confusion--at least in my own mind--about the way the >>>>>> term >>>>>> "possible" is being applied in the classification of signs >>>>>> generally, and this is coming to the fore in a number of discussions that >>>>>> are currently taking place on the Peirce-L. >>>>>> >>>>>> Jeff, your comment is problematic for me for two reasons. 1) In the >>>>>> Peirce quote, "Everything that you can possibly think" refers, in my >>>>>> understanding of phenomenology, to everything thing you may actually >>>>>> think. This is to say that for the phenomenologist the phenomenon must be >>>>>> before the mind, not possibly before the mind (i.e., Peirce is >>>>>> saying that all possible thought when thought will involve 1ns, 2ns, and >>>>>> 3ns). >>>>>> >>>>>> 2) It seems to me that your leaping to "the classification of signs >>>>>> generally" in you comment quoted just above, you are seemingly conflating >>>>>> logic as semiotics and phenomenology, a dangerous mixing in my opinion. >>>>>> and >>>>>> your following comments on descriptives, designatives, and copulatives >>>>>> clearly moves this notion of "possible" into the semiotic realm (that is, >>>>>> into a different cenoscopic science). >>>>>> >>>>>> You also wrote: " >>>>>> In addition to the public character of the phenomena >>>>>> . . . " But for the science of phenomenology, what is 'public' seems >>>>>> to me but the invitation of the individual phenomenologist to suggest to >>>>>> another person that she make the same (or similar) observation of the >>>>>> phenomena. But then that would be another individual having the >>>>>> phenomenological experience for herself. What is public is what together >>>>>> we >>>>>> can same about the phenomena we both experienced. >>>>>> >>>>>> This is quite different from the usual scientific experiment which, >>>>>> potentially--and, not infrequently, actually--many could experience at >>>>>> the >>>>>> same time. >>>>>> >>>>>> So to summarize my points above: 1) In the Peirce snippet above that " >>>>>> Everything that you can possibly think involves three kinds of >>>>>> elements >>>>>> " 'possibility' there points, in my opinion, to future actual >>>>>> phenomenological appearances for an individual. to some "is" a phenomenon >>>>>> rather than to some "could be" or "may be" phenomena. In short, for >>>>>> phenomenology itself the phenomenon must be before the mind. That >>>>>> one can later discuss it with others is dependent on their having >>>>>> themselves experienced the same or similar phenomena. >>>>>> >>>>>> And, 2) your argument, if I understand it, seemingly for some sort of >>>>>> *public* phenomenological experience, appears to me (in consideration of >>>>>> your examples) to conflate two different cenoscopic sciences, viz. >>>>>> phenomenology and semiotic. Semiotic will most certainly employ the >>>>>> discoveries of phenomenology, but that's an entirely different matter. >>>>>> >>>>>> Best, >>>>>> >>>>>> Gary R >>>>>> >>>>>> [image: Blocked image] >>>>>> >>>>>> Gary Richmond >>>>>> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >>>>>> Communication Studies >>>>>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >>>>>> 718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690> >>>>>> >>>>> >> > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. 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