Edwina why is Firstness akin to entropy? Isn't Firstness the location of what we might term ontology -- things we make into words that are indeed Wittgenstein's unspeakables. Did Peirce believe that entropy trumped what I would call syntropy? If so did he then believe that logic was entropic?
amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 8:34 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Gary R, Jon, list: > > 1. I don't think that there is an 'end to semiosis', because Firstness, > which is akin to entropy, is as basic to semiosis as Thirdness/habits. Even > a rock will dissipate. Also, I don't think that Mind is ever separate from > Matter and vice versa. > > 2. I consider, as I outlined previously, that the situation with the > mother, child, hot stove, burn etc is not one Sign but a plethora of > Signs. I don't think that a regression analysis is correct here. > Each Sign is triggered from another Sign but I don't think you can regress > to the One Sign. So, I continue to maintain that for the Mother, the Sign > that she reacts to is the cry of the child [a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign]. > The hot stove is almost irrelevant to her. > > 3. I remain concerned about the role of 'quasi-mind'. > > 4. Peirce has multiple and contradictory uses of the term 'Form' and I > certainly don't see it as akin to the formlessness of Firstness. Firstness > is a State and has no structure. > > Edwina > > > > > > > On Mon 12/02/18 10:01 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Gary R., List: > > 1. I am inclined to agree with you on this. As I understand it, the end > of semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the production of > a habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a material substance is a > bundle of habits that are so inveterate, it has effectively lost the > capacity for Habit-change. As a result, it seems to me that the behavior > of such "things" can in most or all cases be adequately analyzed in terms > of dyadic action/reaction, rather than the irreducibly triadic action of > semiosis. In fact, I am leaning toward seeing the latter as requiring a > Quasi-mind (see #3 below), at least to serve as the Quasi-interpreter, even > though "things" can certainly serve as Quasi-utterers (i.e., Dynamic > Objects) of degenerate Signs. > > 2. Something is a Sign by virtue of having a DO, an IO, and an II--not > necessarily a DI, so I do not see the relevance of the mother's inability > (at first) to interpret the Sign (correctly, in my view) as standing for > the hot burner. She would presumably find this out very quickly, of > course, after rushing into the kitchen. The Dynamic Object determines the > Sign--perhaps a neural signal of pain--of which the girl's scream is a > Dynamic Interpretant; and every Sign determines its Interpretant to > stand in the same relation to the Sign's Dynamic Object as the Sign itself > does. Hence both the internal neural signal and the external scream are > Indices > of the hot burner; at least, that is how I see it at the moment. > > 3. Did you mean to say "Quasi-mind," rather than "Quasi-sign"? My > current tentative definition of "Quasi-mind" is a bundle of Collateral > Experience and Habits of Interpretation (i.e., a reacting substance) that > retains the capacity for Habit-change (i.e., learning by experience), and > thus can be the Quasi-utterer of a genuine Sign (since this requires a > purpose) and the Quasi-interpreter of any Sign. > > 4. I addressed this already in the "Aristotle and Peirce" thread. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 7:05 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Jon S, Edwina, list, >> >> For now, just some preliminary thoughts on Jon's several bullet points. >> In response to Edwina, Jon wrote: >> >> 1. It seems like we both struggle, although in different ways, with >> talking about Signs as individual "things"--like "a stone on a sandy >> beach," or "an organism" trying to survive--vs. talking about Signs within >> a continuous process. That is why I find your tendency to use the term >> "Sign" for the entire interaction of DO-[IO-R-II] problematic, and why I >> hoped that when we jointly recognized the internal triad of [IO-R-II] >> some months ago, we would thereafter conscientiously call this (and only >> this) >> the Sign, while always acknowledging that there is no Sign without a DO. >> >> >> My view is that while such an individual thing as a crystal has been >> created by some semiosic process, that the semiosis is (internally) more or >> less complete once the crystal is formed, and this is so even as we can >> analyze aspects of the three categories present in/as the crystal (these no >> longer being semiotic, but rather, phenomenological categories). >> >> John Deely, who introduced the idea of physiosemiosis, did not argue for >> a, shall we say, vital 'process' of physiosemiosis once rocks and the like >> have been formed: "Deely . . . notably in Basics of Semiotics, laid down >> the argument that the action of signs extends even further than life, and >> that semiosis as an influence of the future played a role in the shaping of >> the physical universe prior to the advent of life, a role for which Deely >> coined the term physiosemiosis." >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Deely >> >> As suggested above, I think that it was Peirce's view that what Delly >> termed "physiosemiosis" not only " played a role in the shaping of the >> physical universe prior to the advent of life" but has played one since and >> does so today, and not only in the formation of crystals. But, again, in my >> view, once the crystal is formed the (internal) semiosis ends (yes, it >> continues to have a relation to its environment, and there will be atomic >> and sub-atomic activity necessarily occurring, but I personally have yet to >> be convinced that such activity constitutes a form of semiosis, while some >> physicists have argued that it does). >> >> Living organisms present a more difficult problem. The work of Stjernfelt >> (esp. in Natural Propositions: The Actuality of Peirce's Doctrine of >> Dicisigns), not to mention the whole thrust of the science of >> Biosemiotics holds not only that any living organism, but the organism in >> relation to its environment (its Umwelt) is fully involved in complex >> semiosic activity. I would tend to strongly agree. >> >> >> 2. As I noted in my own reply to Gary, I instead view the DI of the >> child (the utterer) as an external Sign for the mother (the >> interpreter), and its DO is still the hot burner. >> >> >> While I also view the DI of the child as an external Sign for her mother, >> I do not see the DO as the hot burner. The mother, say, who was out of the >> room for the moment of the accident, hearing her child's scream may not >> connect the scream (the Sign) with the stove at all. So then what is the >> DO? I think that rather than the hot burner (as Jon holds) that it's the >> child herself. >> >> 3. Your mind is indeed an individual manifestation of Mind; but again, I >> suspect that Peirce used "Quasi-mind" to accommodate cases that most people >> would not normally associate with "mind." >> >> >> As I've posted now a couple of times, in my opinion the concept >> "Quasi-sign" needs much further discussion, perhaps a thread of its own. I >> would for now merely suggest that while it no doubt does "accommodate cases >> that most people would not normally associate with "mind," that the concept >> includes more ordinary cases as well. >> >> 4. If to you "Form has [parameters] and laws and continuity," then you >> are not referring to the same thing that Peirce called "Form" when he >> contrasted it with Matter in NEM 4:292-300 and EP 2:303-304. >> >> >> At times in this discussion as to the meaning of 'Form', while there >> seems to me that for Peirce 'Form' is 1ns, Edwina's analysis of Form >> seems to me more related to structure--the forms of the organization of >> related elements in a material system, rather than the forms of the >> elements themselves. In that physical system the organization would in many >> if not all cases have "parameters, laws, and continuity." >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> [image: Blocked image] >> >> Gary Richmond >> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >> Communication Studies >> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >> 718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690> >> > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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