Jon S, Gary F, Gary R, List,
I've been thinking about Peirce's explanations of how signs represent objects to interpretants. In this vein, I'd like to ask a straightforward question about the relation of determination and the role it seems to play in his account of semiosis. Some have suggested that the relation of determination seems awfully vague--so much so that it is hard to see how it can do any explanatory work. For my part, I think Peirce is engaging in a strategy of explaining richer sorts of relations and processes, such as representation and signification, by appealing to the relatively simpler relations of determination. The centerpiece of the account, I tend to think, is the explanation of how the object determines the sign, and of how the sign determines the interpretant, so that the object is able to determine the interpretant via the mediation of the sign--and via the relations that the sign bears to the object and interpretant. I find Peirce's explanatory strategy to be quite promising precisely because (1) it offers an account of what is involved in this mediation and (2), this process of mediation does seem to be central in understanding processes of representation and signification. So, let me ask, is Peirce offering a strategy of explaining more complex sorts of relations and processes (i.e., mediation, representation, signification, etc.) by appealing to those that are relatively simpler (i.e., determination)? If so, is there good reason to think this might be a winning strategy? --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .