Edwina, List:
1. We can say two things for sure based on that straightforward pair of
sentences by Peirce--first, that a perfect Sign, whatever else it might be,
is a Quasi-mind; and second, that the Sheet of Assertion of Existential
Graphs is a perfect Sign. We also know, from various other quotes, that
the Sheet of Assertion (or Phemic Sheet) is a Quasi-mind. My current
hypothesis is that a perfect Sign and a Quasi-mind are one and the same,
but Gary F. has challenged this; and if he (or anyone else) provides a
clear counterexample, I will abandon it accordingly and be grateful for the
correction. The alternative, as I see it, is that a perfect Sign and the
Sheet of Assertion are one and the same, but there are also *other *kinds
of Quasi-minds.
In CP 4.550-553, Peirce characterized both Mind ("in one of the narrowest
and most concrete of its logical meanings") and the Phemic
Sheet ("representing the Mind" and "being the Quasi-mind") as "a Seme of
the Truth, that is, of the widest Universe of Reality"; so in that sense,
the Sheet of Assertion is indeed a Rheme. However, he went on to say that
it is, "at the same time, a Pheme of all that is tacitly taken for granted
between the Graphist and Interpreter, from the outset of their discussion";
so in that sense, the Sheet of Assertion is *also *a Dicisign. He also
stated, "We are to imagine that two parties collaborate in composing a
Pheme, and in operating upon this so as to develop a Delome"; so in that
sense, the Sheet of Assertion is *also *an Argument. The reason why it can
be all three Sign classes simultaneously is because *every *Argument *involves
*Dicisigns, and *every *Dicisign *involves *Rhemes.
Since the Sheet of Assertion is both an Argument and a perfect Sign, it
obviously cannot be the case that what Peirce means by "perfect Sign" is a
Rhematic Indexical Legisign. Furthermore, "perfect" in this context does
not necessarily imply the ability to "do everything and anything semiosic,"
although I find it noteworthy that an Argument is the *only *class of Sign
that *involves* all of the others. Again, I strongly suspect that
"perfect" is instead related to *Entelechy*, especially in light of
Peirce's statement elsewhere that "We may adopt the word to mean the very
fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so
identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter
denoted united with the very form signified by it" (EP 2:304; 1904).
2. I obviously cannot read your mind and do not have your experience, so
the only way for me to see how you justify your position--that CP
5.119 is "mere
metaphoric rhetoric"--is if you provide an explanation. Since "thought is
not necessarily connected with a brain" (CP 4.551) and "matter is effete
mind" (CP 6.25), "mental association" is *not *confined to *human
conceptual* semiosis; it can (and does) occur in *any *Quasi-mind. I am
certainly not claiming that a mere "set of molecules" qualifies as a
Quasi-mind; are you?
3. What we are pursuing here is, like all thought, a dialogic process of
inquiry. We propose a definition (Retroduction), explicate its
implications (Deduction), test it against experience (Induction), and
revise/repeat as needed.
Regards,
Jon S.
On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 9:01 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
> Jon -
>
> 1]You are the one who is 'asserting' Peirce's sentence: " Such perfect
> sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of assertion of Existential Graphs"
> (EP 2:545n25).
>
> So- you should be the one explaining how this 'perfect sign' [which still
> hasn't been described as to how it operates'] - is a 'sheet of assertion of
> Existential Graphs'.
>
> I've tried to explain the Rhematic Indexical Legisign as a clear
> tri-relative operation; as a] including laws that adapt and evolve; as b]
> directly connected to its object; and c] as expressing an individual local
> interpretation of that object. Therefore - to me - since it includes the
> utterer and interpreter, so to speak, and all three categorical modes and -
> is that clear tri-relative framework, then, it's the 'perfect sign' and
> can do everything and anything semiosic. ..The rheme's individual
> local interpretation is related to the legisign's general Thirdness and -
> and yet- is grounded by that existential indexical connection to the object.
>
> 2] What do you mean - what is my 'warrant' for interpreting Peirce's
> statement in a certain manner? My mind and logic and experience leads me to
> make this interpretation. Do I need anything else? A higher authority?
>
> As for your statement about the ten classes - you yourself have claimed
> that the symbol is a factor of human conceptualization. [I don't keep
> archives]. Plus - I've provided the definition of the symbol - and it is
> clearly Not iconic which involves a mimetic action and Not indexical which
> involves an existential connection. The symbol is a 'mental association
> 1.372, .."a relation which consists in the fact that the mind associates
> the sign with its object; in that case, the sign is a name or symbol". It
> is a mental act 2.438] . It requires an interpretant [see 2.304]...
>
> Your quoting of 4.551 has nothing to do with the definition of a symbol
> and I don't know why you inserted it. Are you going to claim that molecules
> use symbols in their informational interactions? Because Mind, as law, is
> involved in chemical composition, does not mean that this same set of
> molecules uses its own mental actions to interpret its own nature.
>
> 3] I don't agree that definitions can exist without a clear idea of the
> function of that which is being defined.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Tue 20/02/18 9:08 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> 1. Respectfully, I asked you to make your case for that position, not
> simply reassert it. I honestly do not see how a Rhematic Indexical
> Legisign can be "the sheet of assertion of Existential Graphs"; please explain
> it to me.
>
> 2. What is your warrant for taking Peirce's explicit designation of the
> universe as a Symbol and an Argument to be "mere metaphoric rhetoric"?
> Again, please explain it to me, rather than just asserting it. Since
> "thought is not necessarily connected with a brain" (CP 4.551; 1906), why
> should we treat any of the ten Sign classes as confined to human
> conceptual semiosis?
>
> 3. I have freely admitted a strong bent for abstract analysis, rather
> than the more concrete approach that Gary R. (for example) ably practices,
> and I have also acknowledged its limitations. Such differences are
> precisely why collaboration is such an important aspect of the
> List--genuinely seeking to engage in shared inquiry and learn from each
> other, rather than dogmatically maintaining our pre-established views. I
> am actually very interested in exploring the nature and function of
> perfect Signs and Quasi-minds within concrete semiosis, but for me, coming
> up with clear definitions of those terms is the first step.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 5:34 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, list
>>
>> 1. I see no reason why a rhematic indexical legisign, with its qualities
>> that fit all of Peirce's stated description of a 'perfect sign' cannot
>> fulfill being a 'sheet of assertion of existential graphs.
>>
>> 2. I really don't see Peirce's use of the word 'symbol' or 'argument' in
>> this selection as meaning the same as is meant in the ten classes of signs.
>> I consider his use here as mere metaphoric rhetoric and not as a semiotic
>> analysis of the Universe.
>>
>> If you read his definitions of these two terms as used within semiosis,
>> you will see that the 'symbol' is an intellectual construct, it refers to
>> "the Object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of
>> general ideas, which operates to cause the Symbol to be interpreted as
>> referring to that Object" 2.249.
>>
>> And the same thing with the Argument, which is equally an intellectual
>> construct.[see 2.251-3].
>>
>> Therefore, these two terms refer to human conceptual semiosis and not to
>> physic-chemical or biological semiosis.
>>
>> 3. The problem I have with your approach to these definitions is that
>> they seem purely abstract and theoretical and confined to words; i.e.,
>> substituting one set of words for another set of words.
>>
>> I don't know what you see as the function of these terms; you don't seem
>> interested in examining 'what is a perfect sign' within the semiosic
>> universe and how and why does it even exist and operate.
>>
>> And- ; what is the function of a 'quasi-mind' within semiosis. Why and
>> how does it emerge and function? You don't seem involved in this aspect.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> On Tue 20/02/18 5:59 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> Setting aside our different models of semiosis, and simply looking at
>> Peirce's own words ...
>>
>> 1. "Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of assertion of
>> Existential Graphs" (EP 2:545n25). Are you prepared to claim that a
>> Rhematic Indexical Legisign is the sheet of assertion of Existential
>> Graphs? If so, then please make your case for that position. If not, then
>> a Rhematic Indexical Legisign cannot be what Peirce meant by "perfect
>> sign."
>>
>> 2. "... the universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's
>> purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol
>> must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its
>> Icons of Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these qualities
>> play in an argument that, they of course, play in the universe--that
>> Universe being precisely an argument" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194; 1903).
>> Since Peirce calls the entire universe a Symbol and an Argument, he
>> obviously did not confine Symbols and Arguments to human conceptual
>> semiosis. Why should we?
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 2:27 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> list -
>>>
>>> I think the terms need to be defined, since, apparently, each of us has
>>> different definitions of 'sign'; perfect sign' and 'quasi-mind'.
>>>
>>> Again, my understanding of the Sign is not confined to its function as
>>> the Representamen, but to the semiosic process of DO-[IO-R-II]. The
>>> Representamen, after all, doesn't exist 'per se' but only within that
>>> semiosic process, where the representamen is "a subject of a triadic
>>> relation to a second, called its object, for a third, called its
>>> interpretant, this triadic relation being such that the representamen
>>> determines its interpretant to stand in the same triadic relation to the
>>> same object for some interpretant" [1.541]. This relational, dynamic nature
>>> must be acknowledged.
>>>
>>> Therefore, since I am focusing on the triadic semiosic process, then, I
>>> consider the 'perfect sign' to be the Rhematic Indexical Legisign', for, in
>>> my view, it fulfills all the actions outlined by Peirce : connection to
>>> object [indexical]; aging [within the legisign]; and local individualism
>>> [within the rhematic local interpretation].
>>>
>>> What is the quasi-mind? My understanding is that it is the localization
>>> of Mind, emerging within the dialogic semiosic interaction between Utterer
>>> and Interpreter and thus - such an interaction would have two quasi-minds.
>>> I don't see why this localization of mind, which I see as the quasi-mind,
>>> is ALSO a perfect sign.....unless it is that Rhematic Indexical Legisign
>>> which is, after all, the basic sign class in the ten classes [includes all
>>> three categorical modes].
>>>
>>> In addition, this interaction and quasi-mind is not confined to humans
>>> but, as Peirce points out, one can have a 'community of quasi-minds'
>>> consisting of the chemical liquids in bottles that are 'intricately'
>>> connected. [2.392]. Therefore - I don't see Jon AS's view that the
>>> quasi-mind [if I remember correctly what he wrote] appears as a Symbol and
>>> Argument - which would confine it to human conceptual semiosis.
>>>
>>> I presume that the above would meet with strong disagreement from some
>>> posters - and I think one also has to consider the function of a quasi-mind
>>> and a perfect sign.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
