John, Stephen, list,
John, you wrote:
"He considered graphs as more diagrammatic than any linear notation,
but graphs consist of discrete sets of nodes and arcs. That means
they can never be a perfect way of representing continuity. His
search for many variations of graphs indicates that he was never
completely satisfied with any one of them."
I wonder, is that so, because graphs, as most mathematic symbol language too, does not symbolize time (continuity)? But: Might it not be possible to do that, by inventing symbols for time and its flow?
Stephen, you wrote:
"> If logic is actually universal its universality is not served by locking
> its meanings in mathematical symbols and abbreviations. Universality is
> achieved fallibly by the use of words to form hypotheses and then by
> scientific parsing of the truth or falsity of a hypothesis, to determine
> a fallible but consequential truth."
> its meanings in mathematical symbols and abbreviations. Universality is
> achieved fallibly by the use of words to form hypotheses and then by
> scientific parsing of the truth or falsity of a hypothesis, to determine
> a fallible but consequential truth."
I wonder, is this superiority of language not based on its fallibility, but just on the fact, that it, other than the mathematical language, has terms ready for temporality?
If the answers to both my wonderings are "yes", then it would be so, that both word language and mathematical symbols language don´t have to be different regarding their viability in principle, they are just different existing languages.
What is the "natural language"? Chomsky´s "universal grammar"? Is it the same as logic?
Best, Helmut
Gesendet: Samstag, 14. April 2018 um 22:19 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa" <s...@bestweb.net>
An: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems
Von: "John F Sowa" <s...@bestweb.net>
An: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems
On 4/14/2018 12:57 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
> If logic is actually universal its universality is not served by locking
> its meanings in mathematical symbols and abbreviations. Universality is
> achieved fallibly by the use of words to form hypotheses and then by
> scientific parsing of the truth or falsity of a hypothesis, to determine
> a fallible but consequential truth.
I very strongly agree.
The point I make is that language is *not* based on logic. Instead,
every artificial language, which includes all the artificial notations
of mathematics, logic, chemistry, computer programming... is based on
a disciplined special-purpose subset of natural language.
For example, "2 + 2 = 4" is an abbreviation for "Two and two is four."
The symbol '+' is a simplified '&', which is a way of writing 'et'.
> the notions I have built somewhat on Wittgenstein and even
> Nietzsche are hardly Peircean because my impression is that he may
> have felt there was a correspondence between words and his graphs
> that made them interchangeable
See the article by Jaime Nubiola on the relationships between Peirce
and Wittgenstein:
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/nubiola/SCHOLAR.HTM
Frank Ramsey had read Peirce and was instrumental in shifting
Wittgenstein's position from a Frege-Russell basis to something
that was much closer to Peirce. Following is a paper I wrote
after presenting an earlier version at a conference where Jaime
was also an invited speaker: http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf
> If he elevated graphs of his or any other sort to the exalted position
> of qualifying as a viable conclusion to any practical iteration of
> the pragmatic maxim, I think he is possibly wrong.
He considered graphs as more diagrammatic than any linear notation,
but graphs consist of discrete sets of nodes and arcs. That means
they can never be a perfect way of representing continuity. His
search for many variations of graphs indicates that he was never
completely satisfied with any one of them.
That's a reason why I have been developing a method of including
arbitrary icons -- including continuous images -- inside any area
of an EG. Although Peirce never did so, he explicitly said that
an icon plus an index (for example, a portrait with a pointing
finger or a name) could state a proposition. If so, such a
combination could be included in an EG -- and the EG rules of
inference could be applied to it: http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf
John
-----------------------------
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> If logic is actually universal its universality is not served by locking
> its meanings in mathematical symbols and abbreviations. Universality is
> achieved fallibly by the use of words to form hypotheses and then by
> scientific parsing of the truth or falsity of a hypothesis, to determine
> a fallible but consequential truth.
I very strongly agree.
The point I make is that language is *not* based on logic. Instead,
every artificial language, which includes all the artificial notations
of mathematics, logic, chemistry, computer programming... is based on
a disciplined special-purpose subset of natural language.
For example, "2 + 2 = 4" is an abbreviation for "Two and two is four."
The symbol '+' is a simplified '&', which is a way of writing 'et'.
> the notions I have built somewhat on Wittgenstein and even
> Nietzsche are hardly Peircean because my impression is that he may
> have felt there was a correspondence between words and his graphs
> that made them interchangeable
See the article by Jaime Nubiola on the relationships between Peirce
and Wittgenstein:
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/nubiola/SCHOLAR.HTM
Frank Ramsey had read Peirce and was instrumental in shifting
Wittgenstein's position from a Frege-Russell basis to something
that was much closer to Peirce. Following is a paper I wrote
after presenting an earlier version at a conference where Jaime
was also an invited speaker: http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf
> If he elevated graphs of his or any other sort to the exalted position
> of qualifying as a viable conclusion to any practical iteration of
> the pragmatic maxim, I think he is possibly wrong.
He considered graphs as more diagrammatic than any linear notation,
but graphs consist of discrete sets of nodes and arcs. That means
they can never be a perfect way of representing continuity. His
search for many variations of graphs indicates that he was never
completely satisfied with any one of them.
That's a reason why I have been developing a method of including
arbitrary icons -- including continuous images -- inside any area
of an EG. Although Peirce never did so, he explicitly said that
an icon plus an index (for example, a portrait with a pointing
finger or a name) could state a proposition. If so, such a
combination could be included in an EG -- and the EG rules of
inference could be applied to it: http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf
John
-----------------------------
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