Supp: He said: "Was sich überhaupt sagen läßt, läßt sich klar sagen; und wovon man nicht reden kann, darüber muß man schweigen.“ "What can be said at all, can be said clearly, and what cannot be talked about, must be silent about". Assuming, that a good philosopher usually does not utter tautologies, I take this for an inquiry-block. But I guess he just had a bad day then, but otherwise was a good philosopher too.
John, list,
maybe they just have been angry when saying so? Didn´t Wittgenstein too say something inquiry-blocking like that once? I vaguely recall that he said something like: "About (this or that) you must not speak". I don´t remember, was it about what you cannot define, what you cannot imagine, what you have not experienced, or whatever. I just remember that when I read it, I thought: "No, you don´t tell me when to shut up".
Best, helmut
On 6/2/2018 3:45 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> some of these dualities (e.g.: Nominalism/universalism,
> semantics/semiotics, linguistic turn/cognitive turn,
> empiricism/metaphysics) are not necessarily antinomies, but may
> be regarded for theses/antitheses, that may merge to syntheses,
> dialectically. Isnt that so?
The ones that are complementary, not contradictory, can be the
basis for a synthesis. That's true of many of them. But there
is no synthesis of open-mind vs closed-mind.
A commonality that characterizes Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine,
and the movements of behaviorism and logical positivism is that
they all blocked the way of inquiry. Each one said, in effect,
I do not know how to explore the following topics. Therefore,
thou shalt not ask any question or think any thought about them.
I admit that I learned a lot about logic from them, but I also
learned that their research guidance is toxic to creativity.
I have a deadline to finish, so I won't be able to say more now.
But the article "Signs, processes, and language games" summarizes
the issues: http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf
John
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> some of these dualities (e.g.: Nominalism/universalism,
> semantics/semiotics, linguistic turn/cognitive turn,
> empiricism/metaphysics) are not necessarily antinomies, but may
> be regarded for theses/antitheses, that may merge to syntheses,
> dialectically. Isnt that so?
The ones that are complementary, not contradictory, can be the
basis for a synthesis. That's true of many of them. But there
is no synthesis of open-mind vs closed-mind.
A commonality that characterizes Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine,
and the movements of behaviorism and logical positivism is that
they all blocked the way of inquiry. Each one said, in effect,
I do not know how to explore the following topics. Therefore,
thou shalt not ask any question or think any thought about them.
I admit that I learned a lot about logic from them, but I also
learned that their research guidance is toxic to creativity.
I have a deadline to finish, so I won't be able to say more now.
But the article "Signs, processes, and language games" summarizes
the issues: http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf
John
-----------------------------
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