Gary F., List: GF: Now you admit that the “multiple occasions” are down to two; and those two are both excerpted from manuscript sources which, to my knowledge, have not been published.
More than one is multiple, and manuscript sources that have not (yet) been published are the necessary basis for *many *interpretations of Peirce's views, especially post-1893 since that is as far as the comprehensive Chronological Edition has gotten so far. In any case, you continue to discount the two *explicit *statements that I cited, yet cannot produce even one where Peirce *explicitly *limited IOs to propositions/Dicisigns (or IIs to Arguments). GF: For instance, those “signs” which are designated as “sinsigns” in the 1903 Syllabus (and elsewhere) are excluded from the universe of “signs” in KS, by Peirce’s statement that “In the first place, a sign is not a real thing” (EP2:303). I suppose that is one interpretation, but I find it implausible that Peirce used the word "signs" in this statement--let alone throughout KS--when he really just meant propositions. Consider a larger excerpt. CSP: I now proceed to explain the difference between a *theoretical *and a *practical *proposition, together with the two important parallel distinctions between *definite *and *vague*, and *individual *and *general*, noting, at the same time, some other distinctions connected with these. A *sign *is connected with the "Truth," i.e. the entire Universe of being, or, as some say, the Absolute, in three distinct ways. In the first place, a sign is not a real thing. It is of such a nature as to exist in *replicas*. Look down a printed page, and every *the *you see is the same word, every *e *the same letter. A real thing does not so exist in replica. The being of a sign is merely *being represented*. Now *really being* and *being represented* are very different. Giving to the word *sign *the full scope that reasonably belongs to it for logical purposes, a whole book is a sign; and a translation of it is a replica of the same sign. A whole literature is a sign. If Peirce only had propositions in mind, surely he would have said so, since he began by talking about them; but instead, he *emphasized *that the subject matter of this paragraph (at least after the first sentence) was Signs in general. His examples to illustrate specifically that "a sign is not a real thing" were *not *propositions, but a word and a letter, which (at most) are Rhemes; and then he also referred to a book, a translation thereof, and a whole literature as Signs, all of which are (presumably) Arguments. Only then did he proceed to offer the proposition about Roxana and Alexander that you quoted. I suppose that a case could perhaps be made that Peirce used "signs" to mean *Symbols* here, but that would be glaringly inconsistent with his explication of Signs as Icons, Indices, and Symbols just a few pages later in the very same manuscript (EP 2:306-307). GF: In the context of KS, it’s clear that Peirce has propositional signs in mind in the sentence which begins “Every sign.” It is clear in that particular context *within *KS because the sentence in question does not just begin with "Every sign," but with "Every sign that is sufficiently complete." I am not at all disputing that a Rheme is an *incomplete *Sign, in the sense that it has at least one blank yet to be filled by a subject. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the Object must still *somehow *be represented in the Sign itself, which is precisely the role of the IO. Can you provide a quote where Peirce states explicitly that only *complete *Signs, or only *sufficiently complete* Signs, have IOs? GF: After all, Peirce was a logician, and logicians give most of their attention to propositions and arguments ... Sure, but all Arguments involve propositions, and all propositions involve Rhemes. Even Bellucci implicitly recognizes that all of these Sign types have IOs in his discussion of the proposition, "Cain kills Abel." Like all Symbols, it is Copulative because its (Necessitant) IO is a continuous predicate--"_____ is in the relation of _____ to _____," where the blanks are filled with "Cain," "killing," and "Abel," respectively. FB: The proposition is thus a "designative" with respect to the objects that it directly denotes (Cain and Abel) and a "descriptive" with respect to the object that it denotes by means of characters (the relation of killing). (pp. 337-338) Bellucci thus chooses to assign three different Sign classifications to the proposition itself. My alternative view is that its constituent Rhemes are *themselves *Designatives in the case of "Cain" and "Abel," whose (Existent) IOs are the named individuals; and a Descriptive in the case of "killing," whose (Possible) IO is its definition. The Utterer is presumably familiar with all three of these IOs from previous Collateral Experience, and the Interpreter must likewise be familiar with them from previous Collateral Experience in order for successful communication to occur. GF: Another connection becomes apparent when we consider that Peirce’s division of signs according to their immediate objects produces the trichotomy vague/actual/general. And yet, as Bellucci observed (pp. 338-339), Peirce later *generalized *this trichotomy to Descriptive/Designative/Copulative, such that Vague/Singular/General turned out to be only a special case. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Jun 22, 2018 at 10:46 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Jon, list, > > Jon, I’m well aware that your “understanding is that what a Sign > signifies are certain qualities/characters of its Dynamic Object, which > taken together constitute its Immediate Object.” But I’m only interested in > continuing this dialogue if we can base it on *Peirce’s* definition of > the Immediate Object — not yours. The problem I have with yours is that you > take it as *definitive* of the IO that “every sign” has one — including > rhematic signs. But I have yet to see any text where Peirce refers > explicitly to the immediate object of any *rhematic* sign. As Bellucci > says (even in the paragraph you quoted from him!) only *dicisigns* are > said by Peirce to have immediate objects, because a dicisign has two > objects by definition. > > Please review the Commens Dictionary entry for the IO ( > http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/immediate-object). (That was your > serve, as it were, but I’m now returning it to your court.) Peirce’s > definitions of the IO are stated there quite clearly, and I don’t think I > need to repeat them again. But you’ve apparently paid attention only to the > quotes in that entry that you can interpret as confirmations of your prior > “understanding.” I think that’s a problem when your prior understanding > becomes the basis of your definition. > > Originally you said that “Peirce explicitly stated on multiple occasions > that every Sign has an Immediate Object.” Now you admit that the “multiple > occasions” are down to two; and those two are both excerpted from > manuscript sources which, to my knowledge, have not been published. I > haven’t seen those manuscripts (have you?) to ascertain what context those > quotes were taken out of. I think this matters, because Peirce’s usage of > the term “sign” — and thus of “every sign” — varies with the context in > which he’s using it. > > One obvious case in point is Kaina Stoicheia (KS). For instance, those > “signs” which are designated as “sinsigns” in the 1903 *Syllabus* (and > elsewhere) are excluded from the universe of “signs” in KS, by Peirce’s > statement that “In the first place, a sign is not a real thing” (EP2:303). > Also, KS declares itself to be a “scholium” (EP2:303); and “It is the > Proposition which forms the main subject of this whole scholium” (EP2:311). > In this scholium, Peirce often uses the word “sign” where the reference is > to propositions, as we can see from the examples and the analysis he gives > of these “signs.” For example (EP2:303-4): > > [[ The sentence “Roxana was the queen of Alexander” is a sign of Roxana > and of Alexander, and though there is a grammatical emphasis on the former, > logically the name “Alexander” is as much a *subject* as is the name > “Roxana”; and the real persons Roxana and Alexander are *real objects* of > the sign. Every sign that is sufficiently complete refers to sundry real > objects. ]] > > In the context of KS, it’s clear that Peirce has *propositional* signs in > mind in the sentence which begins “Every sign.” For all we know, the same > may be true of his usage of “every sign” in the two quotes in the Commens > entry where that phrase occurs. After all, Peirce was a logician, and > logicians give most of their attention to propositions and arguments; > Peirce’s “speculative grammar” is a branch of logic as semiotic, and his > taxonomy (including the distinction between dynamic and immediate objects) > is part of his speculative grammar. He quite naturally and often uses the > terms “sign” and “symbol” as shorthand for the kind of sign that logicians > are traditionally concerned with. That’s one reason why it’s unwise to > ignore the context in which Peirce uses the word “sign” — and why there is > no need to cite an “occasion where Peirce stated explicitly that *only* > propositions have IOs.” It’s quite enough to see that everything Peirce *does > *say about IOs is in a context of which the subject is propositions (or > other dicisigns). You’re welcome to give a counter-example to that if you > can. > > Two of Peirce’s important innovations in logic are (1) his division of > objects into dynamic and immediate (1904), and (2) his 1903 recasting of > the term/proposition/argument trichotomy, which was a division of > *symbols*, into the rheme/dicisign/argument trichotomy, where neither > rhemes nor dicisigns are necessarily symbols. These two innovations are not > unrelated. For one thing, they allow Peirce (and Stjernfelt and Bellucci) > to say that not only propositions but dicisigns or “quasi-propositions” > must have immediate objects, because the doubleness of object is built into > the *definition* of the dicisign as well as the proposition. > > Another connection becomes apparent when we consider that Peirce’s > division of signs *according to their immediate objects* produces the > trichotomy vague/actual/general. This appears in the Logic Notebook for > July 7, 1905: “In its relation to its Immediate Object, it is Vagosign if > it represents that Obj[ect) as possible, [it is] Actisign [if it represents > that Object as] existent, [it is] General [if it represents that Object as] > law” (R 339 DDR 247r). But this is prefigured in KS, where Peirce says > (EP2:311) that “the distinctions of *vague* and *distinct*, *general* and > *individual* are propositional distinctions.” Now, in KS Peirce ignores > the dynamic/immediate object distinction (as well as the the > proposition/dicisign distinction); but taking that into account, he is > saying that the distinctions pertaining to the sign’s relation to its > immediate object “are propositional distinctions.” That’s enough for me, > and since you are quite familiar with KS, I don’t see why it wouldn’t be > enough for you. > > All of the above is to question your claim that “every sign,” presumably > including at least the ten types defined in the *Syllabus* (if not the > notorious 66), “has an immediate object.” If you’re going to stick to that > claim, and base your *definition* of the IO on it, then I’m not > interested in prolonging discussion on the matter. I’d prefer to focus on > what Peirce actually says about immediate objects, in the contexts where he > says these things, rather than argue for or against an abstract schema of > sign taxonomy. Just my personal preference, of course. > > Gary f. >
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