Edwina,
Even though you apparently skim-read my post (it took hours to compose, but
minutes for you to respond) and missed, or misrepresented, or distorted
virtually all of my points, I said that I'd give you the last substantive
word. Suffice it to say that I disagree with most all of your
interpretations and am sorry that I apparently wasted my time and effort
(and your time) in responding to your post.
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*
On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 6:02 PM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
> Gary R, list
>
> From what I can gather from your post - you seem to be asserting that
> those who are studying 'logic-as-semiotic' have a specific vocabulary which
> includes not merely Peirce's technical terms but also a transformation of
> various natural language words into technical terms.
>
> But- - please note - when have I ever said that I was discussing
> logic-as-semiotic? Yet, when I use terms such as 'action' and 'interaction'
> when I am referring to what is going on in the semiosis of the biological
> realm - I am chastised for so doing. So- who is mixing up research areas?
> If people working in logic as semiotic want to focus on terminology and
> insist on the singular meaning of not merely technical terms but even
> natural language used in their research - fine, that's their choice. But I
> object to their insistence that such a focus be extended to the rest of
> semiosis. And biosemiotics is NOT a subset of semiotics; it's a basic
> aspect of it - and we can see this in Peirce's outline of protoplasm.
>
> And I repeat: there is 'natural language' and 'scientific language'; i.e.,
> the technical terms used by Peirce such as Firstness, Secondness,
> Thirdness, and the DO, IO etc. But, Peirce did not transform natural
> language into scientific terminology such that one could no longer use
> natural language in discussing semiosis.
>
> And I completely and totally disagree that 'the language of action' is
> confined to the dyadic reaction, interaction. There is such a thing as
> triadic action. And the use of these words does NOT contradict what is
> going on in semiotics.
>
> I also completely disagree with your claim , with reference to Peircean
> terms that " one is most certainly free to use other terminology when
> working in other arts and sciences" The use of Peircean semiosis is not
> confined to 'logic-as-semiotic' and its use in analyzing what is going on,
> semiotically, within the realms of biology, physics, economics etc - i.e.,
> in the real pragmatic world - is not 'other arts and sciences' - which
> suggest somehow that these are not 'genuine semiosis fields'. These other
> areas are an integral part of the whole field of semiosis.
>
> Peircean semiosis is not, in my view, confined to logic-as-semiotic and I
> certainly don't consider this area 'germinal' or seminal.
>
> And to insist on such a restricted use of terms - that is, if one is
> studying Peircean semiosis in linguistics, in biology, in economics -to
> insist that one must consider logic-as-semiotic the germinal base and all
> its terminology - including the transformation of natural language terms
> into specific technical terms - must be followed, seems to me - to be a
> cult-like mode of behaviour.
>
> Again, those who are focused on logic as semiotic - fine, they can deal
> with the restrictions imposed on natural language terms as used within
> that field. But those who are focused on biology as semiotic, or economics
> as semiotic - I think they must be able to use natural language to examine
> those areas.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri 10/08/18 5:21 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List,
>
> I'll make one last attempt at clarifying what my position is in the
> matters we've been discussing. But since we seem not to be making much, if
> any, progress in such matters as the terminology best suited to particular
> sciences, in particular, logic as semeiotic, as well as the character and
> value of that one, distinct science, I'll make a few inter-paragraphical
> remarks and leave it at that. Please do have the last word as I'd be quite
> interested in it if you do care to respond. [I have inserted numbers in
> places in Edwina's comments so I can refer to specific remarks she made in
> my own comments below each of her paragraphs. I have also put logic as
> semeiotic in boldface throughout to make a point which I hope will be
> apparent by the conclusion of this post] Edwina wrote:
>
> ET: 1.To reject the use of natural language in the study and use of Peirce
> 2.confines this study and use to essentially an isolate cult of
> specialists. 3.No-one else can explore Peirce because they will be jumped
> on for 'misuse of terms'. 4.And so- we see how Peircean analysis becomes
> confined and owned by almost an elite set of people who reject open
> exploration of Peircean semiosic research unless and until the discussants
> 'use the correct words'. 5.It becomes almost an insider's cult, where one
> focuses on which term to use, the year it was introduced, the exact
> references and so on. 6.That's not what I like to see. And I don't think
> you want to see that either.
>
>
> 1. as far as I can tell, no one here is rejecting "natural language in the
> study and use of Peirce," and quite the contrary; but you appear to be
> rejecting a technical terminology within that seminal semiotic science, logic
> as semeiotic.
> 2. suggesting that those who are working in--and have stated that they are
> working--in one specific science, as "essentially an isolate cult of
> specialists" is just name calling and hardly appropriate to the culture of
> this forum.
> 3. to find it of the utmost importance that terminology in a given
> science--in the present case, the second normative science of cenoscopic,
> namely, the three branches of logic as semeiotic--that the terminology of
> that particular science ought be well considered, precise, and as well
> defined as it can be to facilitate discussions within that given science,
> seems to me to be at the heart of Peirce's ethics of terminology, something
> he spent considerable time arguing for (and working on).
> 4. one would expect that someone working in logic as semeiotic as Peirce
> conceived it would use the terminology which he worked so hard to develop,
> pioneering the field ("backwoodsman" in it as he once said, but clearing
> the way for future research). Not to do so denies the value of the precise
> technical terminology he found especially necessary for further research
> into this science and would seem to deny the terminological ethics Peirce
> thought essential to each and every distinct science.
> 5. to suggest that the result of exactly following Peirce in employing
> terminology specific to the normative science of logic as semeiotic
> results in Peircean thought being "confined and owned by. . .an elite set
> of people who reject exploration of Peircean semiosic research" in other
> arts and sciences is total nonsense; to speak of those following Peirce's
> terminological lead in attempting to establish a very precise technical
> language for discussions within that one, unique science as a "cult" is,
> frankly, in my opinion, beneath the communication practice of most all
> scientists whom I know or know of.
> 6. what I'd like to see is greater respect for those here who, at least at
> the moment, are doing work in one specific science, the pure theory of logic
> as semeiotic, developing and employing its own terminology, something
> Peirce thought of as essential for optimal communication within that
> science. An important part of this work involves paying close attention to
> how Peirce used terminology within that science, how that terminology
> developed over time, how and where it is vague or contradictory, etc. So,
> you are quite wrong: in that one science which I keep referring to, this
> seems to me to be essential work within that science. So opposed to what
> you may think, I do want to see that terminological inquiry done there.
> For there it seems to me most appropriate, nay, necessary (whereas in other
> arts and sciences it probably is less so or not at all).
>
> ET: 1.There ARE indeed specific technical terms that one has to learn
> within Peircean research - such as the categories [Firstness, Secondness,
> Thirdness and the terms of the parts of the semiosic action [DO, IO, R, II,
> DI, FI]…..2.But to insist that the words we use in basic common natural
> language cannot be used - because in Peirce, they have strictly singular
> meanings, is, in my view, not merely isolationist but 3. inhibits the study
> and use of Peirce.
>
> 1. there more certainly are "specific technical terms" one working within
> logic
> as semeiotic uses, but one is most certainly free to use other
> terminology when working in other arts and sciences. No one here arguing
> for precision in the use of the terminology of the cenoscopic science of logic
> as semeiotic has suggested otherwise.
>
> 2. no one here is "insisting" that all the terminology of the germinal
> science of logic as semeiotic be employed in other disciplines (although
> certain key terms are so being used), nor arguing against using "basic
> common natural language" in discussions within those other disciplines.
> 3. what in my view "inhibits the study and use of Peirce" is the
> insistence on employing natural and idiosyncratic language in a discipline
> which is working hard to establish a technical terminology suited to
> continued research in that particular science, again in this case, logic
> as semeiotic.
>
> ET: After all - to say that the word 'action' cannot be used when one is
> exploring the pragmatics of Thirdness is, I think, unreasonable. It denies
> the FACT that 'something is going on' - and the basic 'something going on'
> IS an action! A particular action within the format of Thirdness. JAS
> informed us that 'what is going on in Thirdness' is a 'manifestation'. But,
> in natural language, a manifestation is AN ACTION!. And yet, we are told
> that we cannot use the term.
>
> The theory of the universal categories is first developed in Peirce's
> phenomenology and later applied to several other sciences in which Peirce
> did extensive work, including logic as semeiotic and metaphysics. It is
> employed somewhat differently in each of the disciplines tricategorial
> analysis is employed. But in consideration of phenomenology itself, Peirce
> went out of his way to repeatedly define 2ns as essentially the category of
> action-reaction, and to bring the language of action (reaction,
> interaction, etc.) into 3ns tends to conflate 2ns and 3ns in a way which,
> in my opinion, can only tend to confuse the nature of the categories,
> really diminishing their potential use in tricategorial analysis in any and
> every domain.
>
> ET: 1.I also reject the isolation of the term 'semiotics' to purely
> intellectual discussions of logic and metaphysica - 2.The field of
> semiosis in my view 3.INCLUDES all the pragmatic examination of its
> functionality in economics, biology, physics, societal. 4.I disagree that
> if one uses the term 'semiotics', then, examples and analysis is confined
> to the purely intellectual and not its pragmatic functionality.
>
> 1.Who here would constrain the discussion of semiotics "to purely
> intellectual discussions of logic and metaphysics"? That certain members of
> this forum have being doing that has been claimed here, but I don't see
> anyone doing it--those claims are false. Working within a specific
> discipline does not at all deny the value of working in another or others.
> 2. Semiosis is not a field while semiotics is. It's a minor point, but in
> the context of the present discussion it suggests to me a kind of slackness
> in the use of terminology.
> 3. There are folks employing semiotics in all the fields you mentioned and
> more. I've remarked, and quite recently, that this is something greatly to
> be desired, and I fervently wish that certain forum members involved in
> those and other fields who are employing trichotomic semiotic (on this
> list some other such fields include linguistics, literary analysis, music
> analysis, engineering, etc.) would initiate threads in this forum.
> 4. No one here that I know of has argued for confining semiotic analysis
> in any way. As argued above, desiring a suitable technical language for the
> seminal theoretical science of logic as semeiotic in no way suggests any
> constraint or limitation of its use in any and every field where it might
> find "pragmatic functionality," to employ your expression. But when doing
> inquiry into a pure theoretical science here and elsewhere, to thrust such
> natural and idiosyncratic language into the discussion which contradicts
> the terminology developed within the field, in my opinion that muddies its
> waters. And to insist on doing so, or to reject work towards establishing
> the optimal terminology for use within that discipline disregards the
> unique character and purpose of that science.
>
>
> ET: My view is that if someone has a particular personal and research
> focus on terminology - fine, that's his focus. But to insist that one
> cannot use natural language in the study of Peirce and must instead move
> natural language out of its meaning and into 'Peircean-only' usage inhibits
> and prevents the use of Peirce in the broader study of what is going on in
> the world. I repeat - I consider the Peircean semiosic framework a powerful
> analytic tool for examining what is going on - in the real world - and I
> think that a 'cultlike hold on language' prevents many people from using
> that framework.
>
>
> To suggest that this is happening is, in my opinion, merely setting up a
> straw dog argument.
>
> And I think that it would behoove all of us in these kinds of
> meta-discussions to avoid the inflamatory use of such language as 'cult',
> 'cultlike', 'elite', 'isolationist', 'confined and owned', 'silly', etc.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
>
>
>
> Gary Richmond
> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
> 718 482-5690
>
>
>
> On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 9:14 AM Edwina Taborsky < tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Gary R, list
>>
>> To reject the use of natural language in the study and use of Peirce
>> confines this study and use to essentially an isolate cult of specialists.
>> No-one else can explore Peirce because they will be jumped on for 'misuse
>> of terms'. And so- we see how Peircean analysis becomes confined and owned
>> by almost an elite set of people who reject open exploration of Peircean
>> semiosic research unless and until the discussants 'use the correct words'.
>> It becomes almost an insider's cult, where one focuses on which term to
>> use, the year it was introduced, the exact references and so on. That's not
>> what I like to see. And I don't think you want to see that either.
>>
>> There ARE indeed specific technical terms that one has to learn within
>> Peircean research - such as the categories [Firstness, Secondness,
>> Thirdness and the terms of the parts of the semiosic action [DO, IO, R, II,
>> DI, FI]…..But to insist that the words we use in basic common natural
>> language cannot be used - because in Peirce, they have strictly singular
>> meanings, is, in my view, not merely isolationist but inhibits the study
>> and use of Peirce.
>>
>> After all - to say that the word 'action' cannot be used when one is
>> exploring the pragmatics of Thirdness is, I think, unreasonable. It denies
>> the FACT that 'something is going on' - and the basic 'something going on'
>> IS an action! A particular action within the format of Thirdness. JAS
>> informed us that 'what is going on in Thirdness' is a 'manifestation'. But,
>> in natural language, a manifestation is AN ACTION!. And yet, we are told
>> that we cannot use the term.
>>
>> I also reject the isolation of the term 'semiotics' to purely
>> intellectual discussions of logic and metaphysica - The field of
>> semiosis in my view INCLUDES all the pragmatic examination of its
>> functionality in economics, biology, physics, societal. I disagree that if
>> one uses the term 'semiotics', then, examples and analysis is confined to
>> the purely intellectual and not its pragmatic functionality.
>>
>> My view is that if someone has a particular personal and research focus
>> on terminology - fine, that's his focus. But to insist that one cannot use
>> natural language in the study of Peirce and must instead move natural
>> language out of its meaning and into 'Peircean-only' usage inhibits and
>> prevents the use of Peirce in the broader study of what is going on in the
>> world. I repeat - I consider the Peircean semiosic framework a powerful
>> analytic tool for examining what is going on - in the real world - and I
>> think that a 'cultlike hold on language' prevents many people from using
>> that framework.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu 09/08/18 11:30 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Mike, Jon, Edwina, List,
>>
>> Mike wrote: "Are not 'binding' and 'sense' expressions of action, both
>> Peirce's words for Thirdness? There are many ways to interpret natural
>> language, including what is meant by the word 'action'."
>>
>> Please offer some context and some textual support for your notion that
>> 'binding' and 'sense' are employed as expressions of action in any of
>> Peirce's discussion of 3ns. I think that this is not only highly unlikely,
>> but actually would contradict most everything he had to say about not only
>> 3ns but also 2ns.
>>
>> Whatever you might mean by "natural language" in the present context, we
>> are concerned here with technical scientific terminology, specifically
>> Peirce's in consideration of his three universal categories.
>> Action-Reaction and Interaction are concepts clearly connected in Peirce's
>> phenomenology and semeiotic to 2ns, so that it seems peculiarly obdurate to
>> suggest that they are not, that they may be associated in any integral way
>> with 3ns. You will certainly have to offer more support for your comment
>> than your mere assertion that it is so.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary
>>
>>
>>
>> Gary Richmond
>> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
>> Communication Studies
>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
>> 718 482-5690
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 7:41 PM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon, Edwina, List,
>>>
>>> Are not 'binding' and 'sense' expressions of action, both Peirce's words
>>> for Thirdness? There are many ways to interpret natural language, including
>>> what is meant by the word 'action'.
>>>
>>> Mike
>>>
>>> On 8/9/2018 6:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>>>
>>> Edwina, List:
>>>
>>> ET: And Peirce referred to cognition, to Thirdness, as an action.
>>> Synthetic consciousness, mediation, is not a passive consciousness [which
>>> is 1ns] but is active. 1.377/8
>>>
>>>
>>> No, he did not; at least, certainly not in the cited passage. In fact,
>>> this is a blatantly inaccurate paraphrase of it, so I will quote it in full.
>>>
>>> CSP: It seems, then, that the true categories of consciousness are:
>>> first, feeling, the consciousness which can be included with an instant of
>>> time, passive consciousness of quality, without recognition or analysis;
>>> second, consciousness of an interruption into the field of consciousness,
>>> sense of resistance, of an external fact, of another something; third,
>>> synthetic consciousness, binding time together, sense of learning, thought.
>>>
>>> If we accept these [as] the fundamental elementary modes of
>>> consciousness, they afford a psychological explanation of the three logical
>>> conceptions of quality, relation, and synthesis or mediation. The
>>> conception of quality, which is absolutely simple in itself and yet viewed
>>> in its relations is seen to be full of variety, would arise whenever
>>> feeling or the singular consciousness becomes prominent. The conception of
>>> relation comes from the dual consciousness or sense of action and reaction.
>>> The conception of mediation springs out of the plural consciousness or
>>> sense of learning. (CP 1.377-378; 1887-1888)
>>>
>>>
>>> Peirce here did not characterize mediation as "active," or even
>>> directly contrast "passive consciousness" (1ns) with "synthetic
>>> consciousness" (3ns) so as to imply that the latter is active. On the
>>> contrary, he also mentioned "consciousness of an interruption" (2ns), and
>>> then went on to call it "dual consciousness or sense of action and
>>> reaction." In other words, it is clearly the latter type of consciousness
>>> (2ns), rather than synthetic consciousness (3ns), that is properly
>>> described as active.
>>>
>>> ET: Thirdness is in my understanding of Peirce a dynamic process, which
>>> is to say, an action.
>>>
>>>
>>> No. For Peirce, anything "dynamic" is associated with 2ns, not 3ns.
>>> This is intrinsic to his analysis of a Sign as having a Dynamic Object
>>> and producing Dynamic Interpretants by means of its actual Instances.
>>>
>>> ET: As such, it mediates, it synthesizes, it generalizes. These are all
>>> actions - powerful actions.
>>>
>>>
>>> Again, no. For Peirce, mediating, synthesizing, and generalizing are
>>> indeed powerful, but they are not actions. They are manifestations of
>>> 3ns, while actions are always and only manifestations of 2ns. As Gary
>>> R. already pointed out, in Peirce's terminology, molding reactions is
>>> not an action; imparting a quality to reactions is not an action; and
>>> bringing things into relation with each other is not an action.
>>>
>>> CSP: It is to be observed that a sign has its being in the power to
>>> bring about a determination of a Matter to a Form, not in an act of
>>> bringing it about. There are several good arguments to show that this is
>>> the case. Perhaps none of them is more conclusive than the circumstance
>>> that there is no such act. For an act has a Matter as its subject. It is
>>> the union of Matter and Form. But a sign is not Matter. An act is
>>> individual. The sign only exists in replicas. (NEM 4:300; 1904)
>>>
>>>
>>> Finally, in my opinion--and, I believe, in Peirce's--someone who is not
>>> interested in terminology is evidently not interested in making our
>>> ideas clear. Carefully selecting and defining the terms that we use to
>>> describe what is going on is not merely an academic exercise for the
>>> seminar room, but pragmatically critical for understanding and
>>> discussing what is actually happening in the real world.
>>>
>>> CSP: Suffice it to say once more that pragmatism is, in itself ...
>>> merely a method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract
>>> concepts. All pragmatists of whatsoever stripe will cordially assent to
>>> that statement. (CP 5.464, EP 2:400; 1907)
>>>
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>
>>> On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 3:17 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> JAS, list
>>>>
>>>> And Peirce referred to cognition, to Thirdness, as an action.
>>>> Synthetic consciousness, mediation, is not a passive consciousness [which
>>>> is 1ns] but is active. 1.377/8
>>>>
>>>> That is, semiosis as a process does not confine action to dyadic
>>>> act-react kinesis between two existential things. Thirdness is in my
>>>> understanding of Peirce a dynamic process, which is to say, an action. As
>>>> such, it mediates, it synthesizes, it generalizes. These are all actions -
>>>> powerful actions.
>>>>
>>>> "Not only will meaning always, more or less, in the long run mould
>>>> reactions to itself, but it is only in doing so that its own being cosists.
>>>> For this reason I call this element of the phenomenon or object of thought
>>>> the element of Thirdness. It is that which is what it is by virtue of
>>>> imparting a quality to reactions in the future" 1.343.
>>>>
>>>> "The third is that which is what it is owing to things between which it
>>>> mediates and which it brings into relation to each other" 1.356
>>>>
>>>> This action, of bringing things into mutual relationships is a frequent
>>>> description by Peirce, of Thirdness.
>>>>
>>>> Now - to me, such is an action... A plural interaction mediating and
>>>> generating the commonalities among separate things
>>>>
>>>> I am not sure if we should continue this discussion, since we both hold
>>>> to different views and are probably boring the list.
>>>>
>>>> Edwina
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> -----------------------------
>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
>>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to
>>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe
>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
>>> .
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
