Helmut, list
I think the modes are 'modes of organization' of the information
being processed within the semiosic act of relations.
But I see your point about the DO and IO. My own view is that the
DO and IO are, in a sense, both on the same side of the epistemic cut
but at different degrees, since to function as a DO, the information
in that external object must already be in a relationship with the
Quasi-Mind Agent. Once 'grabbed' within that quasi-mind's horizons,
so to speak, the information can then be defined as the IO.
Agreed, the DO is not the 'thing itself'.
I don't think your view is that different from that of Peirce - but
- I'm sure others won't agree. As I've said before, we each have to
work through Peirce on our own and come to our own conclusions.
Edwina
On Fri 24/08/18 5:54 AM , "Helmut Raulien" [email protected] sent:
Edwina, List, Yes, I see you are right. So my opinion is not
based on Peirce, but on my own, inspired by Salthe. I see modes as
parts, in contrast to classes as kinds. My view is problematic,
becuse it implies that DO and IO are not object kinds, but parts of
the object, every object consists of. Which implies, that DO and IO
must both be at the same side of the epistemic cut, meaning the DO is
not the thing itself, but also concept, or better, representation
only. Same with the three interpretant parts. I wonder, whether my
view differs too much from Peirces, so I should not call it Peircean,
but my own? Best, Helmut 23. August 2018 um 22:19 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
Helmut, list
Sorry- but I don't see that when Peirce wrote about the degenerate
modes, he also used the term 'form'.
He refers to 'two distinct grades of Secondness and three grades of
Thirdness' [1.365] And refers to s 'degenerate sort' [1.365]
Edwina
On Thu 23/08/18 3:58 PM , "Helmut Raulien" [email protected] sent:
Edwina, List, Yes, but when Peirce wrote about degenerateness, he
mostly used the term in combination with "form": "Degenerate form" of
something. "Form", I would say, is "class". The sign classes is a
classification of compositions. I think the topic of classification
versus composition, and their mixed forms, is quite complicated. Here
is a quote, I dont remember the website I have got it from, in which
Peirce is fighting with the distinction between composition and
classification (though Peirce had not read Stanley N. Salthe:) CP
Principles of Philosophy, III. Phenomenology, 5. Degenerate Cases,
528: "At the same time, it is an idea of which Firstness,
Secondness, and Thirdness are component parts, since the distinction
depends on whether the two elements of Firstness and Secondness that
are united are so united as to be one or whether they remain two.
This distinction between two kinds of seconds, which is almost
involved in the very idea of a second, makes a distinction between
two kinds of Secondness; namely, the Secondness of genuine seconds,
or matters, which I call genuine Secondness, and the Secondness in
which one of the seconds is only a Firstness, which I call degenerate
Secondness; so that this Secondness really amounts to nothing but
this, that a subject, in its being a second, has a Firstness, or
quality. It is to be remarked that this distinction arose from
attending to extreme cases; and consequently subdivision will be
attached to it according to the more or less essential or accidental
nature of the genuine or the degenerate Secondness." Best, Helmut
23. August 2018 um 20:45 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:
Helmut, list
When I am referring to such terms as genuine Secondness and
degenerate Secondness - as I'm sure you know, these are the terms
Peirce used to describe these categories. Nothing to do with a
natural language understanding of the term 'degenerate'.
Edwina
On Thu 23/08/18 12:16 PM , "Helmut Raulien" [email protected] sent:
Edwina, List, you know, one of my favourite topics is that of the
distinction between classification and composition (following Stanley
N. Salthe). In this respect I have come to the conclusion, that
degeneration only is a matter of classification, like in the sign
classes (I write classification subcategories with an oblique, and
composition subcategories with a dot). In classification the first
subcategories are: 1/1, 1/2, 1/3, 2/1, 2/2, 2/3, 3/1, 3/2, 3/3. Like
the sign classes. But in composition, e.g. S, IO, DO, II, DI, FI, or
also in primisense, altersense, medisense, the composition of
consciousness, the first subclasses are: 1.1, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2,
3.3. Because here it is composition, you cannot speak of degeneracy,
is my opinion. Parts are not degenerate, only classes may be. A
cogwheel is not a degenerate gearbox, but a mule may be seen as a
degenerate rodent, because it cannot see very well. Best, Helmut
23. August 2018 um 17:43 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
John, list
Agreed - my point is that the world is more complex than a simple
set of two or even three terms. That's why Peirce expanded his
categories into their genuine and degenerate modes.
I would think that Peirce's top-level would be Mind [pure Mind, 3-3
which is aspatial and atemporal].
Then, one would move into spatial and temporal existentialities...of
rest of the modes [3-2, 3-1, 2-2, 2-1, 1-1]
However - this is an interesting exploration - but, my focus is more
on the pragmatic application of Peircean semiosis...ie. what happens
when an environmental stress requires a species to adapt its
knowledge base and change its mode of existence...
Edwina
On Thu 23/08/18 11:25 AM , John F Sowa [email protected] sent: Jon AS
and Edwina,
JAS
> I am curious--why insist on a dichotomy, when Peirce clearly
advocated
> a trichotomy? Signs and conditional necessity (3ns) are just as
> distinct from pure mathematics and possibility (1ns) as existence
and
> actuality (2ns).
Yes, of course. But if we have that pair signs/reality, we can put
the trichotomy on the left-hand side.
If you call it transcendental/physical, following Wilkins, we
can put pure mathematics, signs, and metaphysics on the left.
But the current ISO proposal (by a philosopher named Barry Smith)
has only one mode of existence. That is why he uses the term
'information artifact'. He can't allow a quantified variable to
refer to information by itself because it doesn't "exist". He
allows tokens, but no types.
The attached diagram bfo_cat.jpg shows the top-level Entity divided
in two branches, Continuant and Occurrent. Everything that exists
must be forced in one of those two branches.
There is no room for mathematics, signs, laws, habits, goals,
purposes,
intentionality -- unless they're forced into some physical instance.
According to BFO, an intention is something inside the brain of some
animal. But a token of the statement of the intention would be an
information artifact.
ET
> What about Peirce's Six Categorical modes: - which makes the world
> a rather complex place.
My goal is to get ISO to approve a new top level with just a simple
two-way split, such as Transcendental/Physical, with the BFO
hierarchy
placed under Physical. As I said before, you can call the pair of
terms Logos/Physis, Dharma/Maya, or Dao/Ten-Thousand-Things. (By the
way, the New Testament in Chinese translates 'logos' as 'dao'.)
Getting that split would open the door to more detailed proposals
for the left-hand side. But the first step to convince people that
such a split is needed. A good pair of terms would be helpful.
John
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