Edwina, list,
I think I agree that the extension is not the DO. I also agree, that, if you look very closely at a rheme, it has no object, is just a feeling, like what Peirce called "primisense".
If you look less closely, but say that rheme is the complete sign, then I would say, that Peirces "altersense" comes into the game, when this feeling picks the connection towards the dog-species and its traits out of the interpreter´s memory, being rather a dicent or proposition then, like: "This feeling indicates to the dog-species and what I know about it:...". When the interpreter starts thinking about the traits of dogs, Peirces "medisense" is used too, and it even becomes argumental, like: "A cat is not a dog, because it does not bark".
So perhaps we are merely quibbling about the boundary of the sign, how closely you look at it, and whether you separate it into subsigns or not.
I think, a specific dog is not the DO of the rheme, but of the dicent the rheme is part of, that would be Buster in "Buster is a dog".
Best,
Helmut
13. September 2018 um 21:55 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
"Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
Helmut, list:
My reference to Platonism was when you suggested that the extension "all existing dogs" would be the DO". I would think that a specific dog is the DO.
The rhematic iconic qualisign is a pure feeling. In your example of, I suppose, a dog being in the room - you might 'feel/smell' something. That's an uninterpreted sensation. You'd have to process this sensation further, using your habits within the Representamen, to interpret those sensual data as 'there's a dog in the room'.
Edwina
On Thu 13/09/18 3:43 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
Edwina, list,I think, that to say the idea transported by the rheme "dog", resp. "is a dog" is not platonic, because in this context "idea" is a secondary thing, out of reflexion, intuition, in any case out of the memory. For Platon, "idea" however had the reverse meaning: Not a secondary, but a primordial thing. A ground, not an effect.Trying to understand your point: Is it so, that a rheme just causes a pure feeling (e.g. doggishness as an unconnected blur) in the sign, and the further connection to the dog-species and its qualities is another sign, a dicent, in which this by-itself-unconnected feeling picks the remembered meaning of doggishness out of the interpreter´s memory?Best,Helmut13. September 2018 um 20:03 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" wrote:
Helmut, listIt depends on what one means by the term 'rheme'. As I understand it, just the term itself refers to the Interpretant in a mode of Firstness. Another meaning is 'a proposition with the subject place left blank'. In both outlines, the key thing is that are no relations - with an Object, with a Subject, with a Predicate. The point is, 'it', as itself is unrelated to anything else. As such it is pure feeling without awareness or meaning. It just IS, it's a state. Isolate.
Therefore, it is not 3-1 or Thirdness in a mode of Firstness. Thirdness, after all, is Mind, is habit, and when it is also in a mode of Firstness, 3-1 is an iconic habit [such as Natural Selection which privileges icon repetitions of its stored habits].
My understanding of the IO is that it is the data - could be in a mode of 1ns or 2ns or even 3ns- as 'contained' or 'accepted' within the Quasi-Mind or Sign-Vehicle. That is, in an example where I hear a loud sound, [I'm the Quasi-Mind or Sign-Vehicle], then the IO is the data-within-my-unique-hearing-capacities. It would be in a mode of subsequent 1ns and 2ns. It is not yet interpreted by the Representamen [my knowledge base], so I don't know yet what that sound is. It could be a clap of thunder, or a car accident, or the kitchen cupboard falling off the wall.
No, I don't think that 'all existing dogs' is the DO in your example. I don't happen to agree with the argument advanced by JAS about 'General Objects'. In my view, in your example, if you replaced the blank space with the dog's name [Buster], then, Buster is the DO. My view is that generalities function only within the mode of Thirdness and only within articulation by individual or particular forms. So, 'dog' as a generality is a reality but doesn't have any reality 'in itself' - for that would be a movement into Platonic Forms. Instead, 'dog' as a generality is a reality as manifested within particular individual material dogs. This is Aristotelian - and Peirce was an Aristotelian.
Edwina
On Thu 13/09/18 12:42 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:Edwina, list,is a rheme pure firstness, so pure feeling, or is it firstness of thirdness, if one might say, that relation (or reference) to an interpretant is thirdness? So, if it was the quality of mediation, the aroused feeling would adress something. Like, if the rheme is the word "dog", or in the correct sense Francesco has explained, the property or predicate (?) of something that might be replaced with a name "is a dog", the feeling of the quality "doggishness" might be the IO, and the real quality at the end of an ideational complete investigation, and / or (not sure) the extension "all existing dogs" would be the DO, I would guess.But perhaps it still is arguable, whether relation to an interpretant is thirdness, or if only the lines but not the columns in the sign classes table are categorial??Best,Helmut12. September 2018 um 22:13 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" wrote:
Helmut, list
I'm a great admirer of the epistemic cut [see Harold Atmanspacher for a good analysis] - but, in the case of a rheme, which is in a mode of pure Firstness, I suggest that there is no epistemic cut. The rheme is a STATE of pure feeling with no distinction between self and other.
So, there is no cognitive interpretation going on..."Aristotle sometimes speaks of sense as prior to reason...and "matter is prior to form; and potency to energy". 6.388.
And therefore, in a sense, no DO or even IO. One must even wonder if it is a Sign, that triad of O-R-I?! Or is it the "nothing of boundless freedom', or potentiality' [6.219] that is somehow connected, in a few seconds - to semiosis [the triadic use of this potentiality] as a source of the potential?
Edwina
On Wed 12/09/18 3:11 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:Supplement: I refer to a text by Joseph Ransdelland I dont understand it, neither that some sign should not have an IO. The DO is what is, the thing itself, and the IO is what it appears to be in the semiosic process, according to Ransdell.If there nothing appears, no IO exists, it is not a sign, is it? A sign is about appearance, isnt it?Further I dont understand, that the IO is a part of the DO, and at the end of complete inquiry both are the same. See the end of the text. Ransdell writes that then the reflexion somehow vanishes. But isnt that a sort of magical thinking? Like if you know everything there is to know about an inkstand, that inkstand materializes out of thin air before you?If the DO is the inkstand, and the IO is as what it appears to be according to the sign, even when this appearance is complete knowledge about it, it still is just immaterial mental knowledge, but not the material thing.I think the epistemic cut is a cut like the cut in the EGs. On one side is the phaneron, on the other the material and energetic world. To mention it is not dualism. The easiest, and for me the only understandable way of dealing with it is to assume, that everything concerning signs is on the phaneron side of it, so the DO too.----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .Francesco, Edwina, Jon, List,to me it seem as if "is mortal" might have a subject, and is quantifiable, if it means "belongs to the set of mortal entities". But does "is mortal" mean "will die" or "may die"? In the first case, bacteria dont belong to the set, in the latter they do. So, if "mortal" is an unclear term, this rheme is not quantifiable. But i´m sure, I have misunderstood it all, and should read Peirce first, so if that is so, just dont answer.Best,Helmut12. September 2018 um 14:29 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" wrote:
Francesco, list
Thanks for the clear and logical analysis.
I would simply say that a rheme is in a mode of Firstness and as such, is a STATE and not an act of cognition or interpretation. As a state [a feeling], it has no component parts and thus, has no IO....or II or DI..etc..
Edwina
On Wed 12/09/18 1:31 AM , Francesco Bellucci bellucci.france...@googlemail.com sent:Jon, ListThanks for the summary.To say that particular/singular/universal is a division of propositions is to say that that which is either p, s, or u is only a proposition, i.e. that only propositions are either p, s, or g. Now Peirce says in 1904–1906 that signs are according to their IO are either p, s, or u. This means that only that which is either p, s, or u is divisible according to the IO (for otherwise Peirce should have said: some signs are divisible according to the IO into p, s, g and some other signs are divisible according to the IO into x, y, z). Now, since only propositions are either p, s, or g and since that which is either p, s, or u is divisible according to the IO, it follows that only propositions are divisible according to the IO.Now, that only propositions are divisible according to the IO ceratinly means that propositions have an IO, but does not exclude that non-propositional signs also have an IO. This I concede. But if one wonders what on earth the IO of a proposition is, that non-propositional signs have no IO becomes evident.For since propositions are divisible according to the IO into p, s, and g, that which constitutes the IO in them is that which allows such division. I see no warrant for claiming that the p-s-g aspect in a proposition is "part" of the IO, as Jon suggests. For in that case Peirce should have made it clear that propositions are divisible according to a part (= the quantificational part) of the IO into p, s, and g. He should have made it clear that the IO does not exhaust the quantificational dimension of propositions, and, I surmise, he should have made it clear that propositions are divisible according to one part of the IO into p, s, and g, and according to another part of the IO into, say, x, y, and z. As far as I know, Peirce never speak of "parts" of the IO, one of which would be the quantificational dimension. I think it is safe to conclude that that which constitutes the IO in a proposition is that which allows the division into p, s, and g.That which allows the division of propositions into p, s, and g is what Peirce calls the "subject" of a proposition: in "All men are mortal", the Peircean subject is "For any x..." while the predicate is "x is either not a man or is mortal"; in "Some men are wise" the Peircean subject is "For some x..." and the predicate is "x is both a man and mortal"; in "Socrates is mortal" the subject is "Socrates" and the predicate "x is mortal". The predicates in these sentences are rhemes. Rhemes do not have "subjects", they are not quantified. Since that which allows the division into p, s, and g is the IO, and since the IO is – in the case of those signs for which it is comprehensible what on earth the IO is – the subject, it follows that lack of a subject involves lack of an IO.In sum:In order for a sign to have an IO, it should be divisible into p, s, and g (this I think is evident from Peirce's claim taht "signs are divisible according to the IO into p, s, and g.)Rhemes are not divisible into p, s, and gTherefore, rhemes do not have an IOFrancescoRhemes do not have Immediate Objects.On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 5:26 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:Francesco, List:To clarify, I do not dispute any of the following.
- Only Dicisigns and Arguments distinctly/separately/specially indicate their Objects.
- Only Arguments distinctly/separately/specially express their Interpretants.
- The Immediate Object is the Object that is represented by the Sign to be the Sign's Object.
- Rhemes are less complete Signs than Dicisigns, which are less complete Signs than Arguments.
- Rhemes cannot be true or false.
- Particular/singular/universal is a division of propositions.
- Quantification is an aspect of a proposition's Immediate Object.
However, I continue to to find the following inferences exegetically unwarranted and systematically problematic.
- Rhemes do not have Immediate Objects.
- Rhemes and Dicisigns do not have Immediate Interpretants.
- Despite being Types and Symbols, propositions can have Immediate Objects that are Possibles (vague) or Existents (singular).
- Quantification is required for any Sign to have an Immediate Object.
It still seems to me that #1 would mean that Rhemes cannot denote their Objects at all, while #2 would mean that Rhemes and Dicisigns cannot signify their Interpretants at all; yet it was already well-established in logic, and explicitly affirmed by Peirce--both early and late--that terms (Rhematic Symbols) have Breadth and Depth. #3 would mean that in his late taxonomy, the trichotomy according to the Immediate Object comes after the one according to the relation between the Sign and Dynamic Object in the order of determination. #4 is an arbitrary restriction that Peirce himself, as far as I know, never imposed.Regards,Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran LaymanOn Sun, Sep 9, 2018 at 2:16 PM, Francesco Bellucci <bellucci.france...@googlemail.com > wrote:Jon, ListJAS: If one holds that only Sign-Replicas distinctly/separately representing their Objects have Immediate Objects, then one must also hold that only Sign-Replicas distinctly/separately representing their Interpretants have Immediate Interpretants. If a Rheme does not have an Immediate Object, then a Rheme or Dicisign does not have an Immediate Interpretant; but Peirce never said or implied this.Peirce said something like this, but before the distinction between different kinds of interpretants had emerged. He said that a proposition does not separately represent its interpretant:CSP: " A proposition is a symbol in which the representative element, or reason [i.e. interpretant, FB], is left vague and unexpressed, but in which the reactive element [i.e. the object, FB] is distinctly [i.e. separately, FB] indicated. [...] An argument is a bad name for a symbol in which the representative element [i.e. interpretant, FB] , or reason, is distinctly expressed.” (R 484: 7-8, 1898)CSP: “[a] Proposition is a sign which distinctly indicates the Object which it denotes, called its Subject, but leaves its Interpretant to be what it may” (CP 2.95, 1902
CSP: "A representamen is either a rhema, a proposition, or an argument. An argument is a representamen which separately shows what interpretant it is intended to determine. A proposition is a representamen which is not an argument [i.e. which separately shows what interpretant it is intended to determine, FB], but which separately indicates what object it is intended to represent. A rhema is a simple representation without such separate part" (EP 2: 204, 1903)CSP “A term […] is any representamen which does not separately indicate its object; […] A proposition is a representamen which separately indicates its object, but does [not] specially show what interpretant it is intended to determine […] An argument is a symbol which especially shows what interpretant it is intended to determine” (R 491: 9-10, 1903).Now, the question is: in light of the later taxonomy of interpretants, what is the interpretant that the proposition does not, while the argument does, separately represent?CSP: … every sign has two objects. It has that object which it represents itself to have, its Immediate Object, which has no other being than that of being represented to be, a mere Representative Being, or as the Kantian logicians used to say a merely Objective Being ... The Objective Object is the putative father. (R 499; c. 1906, bold added)I beg you to notice what Peirce says: he says "has that object which it represents itself to have", which, if my English sustains me, means that the sign has that object which the sign represents itself to have, not that it has the object that the sign represents in its (i.e. the object's) qualities or characters. That is, the immediate object is the object that is represented by the sign to be the sign's object, not the object in the characters that the sign represents it to have.CSP: Every sign must plainly have an immediate object, however indefinite, in order to be a sign. (R 318:25; 1907, bold added)This indeed seems contrary to the claim that only propositions have an immediate object. There is another occurrence of such a claim, in another 1907 writing (a letter to Papini). Now I beg you to notice that since the beginning of this discussion I was talking of the classification of signs of 1904–1906, in which the notion of immediate object first emerged. The two contrary statements are from 1907, and I suspect that after 1907 his notion of immediate object changed. Perhaps the qualification " however indefinite" can help us explain how it changed.But in general, I repeat, I think that often "sign" has to be taken to mean "complete sign" (i.e. "proposition"). If in such apparently contrary statements we adopt this strategy, problems vanish. Peirce says as much:CSP: "a sign may be complex; and the parts of a sign, though they are signs, may not possess all the essential characters of a more complete sign" (R 7: 2).A rheme, though it is a sign, may not possess all the essential characters of a proposition. In particular, while a proposition separately represent its own object (i.e. while it has an immediate object), a rheme does not.CSP: "a sign sufficiently complete must in some sense correspond to a real object. A sign cannot even be false unless, with some degree of definiteness, it specifies the real object of which it is false" (R 7: 3–4).Please note that R 7 was probably composed in 1903, i.e. before the IO/DO distinction had emerged. The sufficiently complete sign must specify, with some degree of definiteness (either singularly, vaguely, or generally) the object, i.e. the DO in the later terminology, this specification, this "hint" ("The Sign must indicate it by a hint; and this hint, or its substance, is the Immediate Objec"), being the IO. He also says that "a sufficiently complete sign may be false" (R 7, p. 4). Rhemes cannot be false, only propositions can, precisely because they indicate an object of which they are false.CSP: The Immediate Interpretant consists in the Quality of the Impression that a sign is fit to produce, not to any actual reaction. (CP 8.315; 1909, bold added)CSP: My Immediate Interpretant is implied in the fact that each Sign must have its peculiar Interpretability before it gets any Interpreter ... The Immediate Interpretant is an abstraction, consisting in a Possibility. (SS 110; 1909, bold added)The second quote affirms that the Immediate Object can be indefinite; i.e., it need not be be distinctly/separately represented. There are various other passages like the third quote, where Peirce discussed the Immediate Object and/or Immediate Interpretant of "a Sign," implying no limitation whatsoever on the classes that he had in mind. In short, I see no warrant at all for claiming that he limited the Immediate Object to Dicisigns and Arguments, or the Immediate Interpretant to Arguments alone.The warrant is a fundamental exegetical claim, emphasized by John Sowa few posts ago: Peirce was a logician, and everything he says about "signs" has to have logical relevance. The 1904–1906 distinction into vague, singular, and general signs is a well-known logical distinction (particular, singular, and universal propositions), and since the immediate object is that which allows us to draw this distinction, I infer that the immediate object is only present where quantification is present. And rhemes are not quantified.bestFrancesco
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