Helmut, list
Could you explain to me the functional difference, to a research
program, whether you define it as cenoscopic [study of the data
already acquired] vs idioscopic [discovers new phenomena]. And what
is 'language-based idioscopic' in biology?
If you are a scientist, working within the scientific method then
this includes both hypothesis construction [idioscopy would fit in
here] and empirical observation [cenoscopic] - So why would you
define your research into one OR the other - when both areas ought to
be part of the research.
Edwina
On Fri 14/09/18 12:23 PM , "Helmut Raulien" [email protected] sent:
Jerry LR Chandler, list, Yes! I both humbly (just pretending?)
and provocatingly ask: Is biosemiotics cenoscopic, and language-based
logic idioscopic? Best, Helmut 14. September 2018 um 18:07 Uhr
"Jerry LR Chandler" wrote:
List: The recent post by Jerry Rhee and Edwina deserve deep
perusal. In spirit , these posts parallel my own feelings.
Semantics alone is merely philosophy abused. Mathematics alone is
not even logic. In my view, CSP focused on language as a path of
syntaxies to arguments that illuminated the natural groundings of
human communication in an extraordinary wide sense. Cheers Jerry
Sent from my iPad
On Sep 14, 2018, at 10:18 AM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
Dear John, list,
My question was a follow-up to your own question on where to place
semiotic in CSPsemiotic.jpg.
Question: Where is semeiotic?
To which, you said,
As a formal theory, it would be classified with formal logic
under mathematics. But semeiotic is also an applied science when
it is used in perception, action, communication...
From what I’ve read, biosemiotic suffers from not being a formal
theory at all.
Rather, it is a science (?) that is still seeking to understand
itself (cf., Kull, Velmezova).
Even when compared to semiotic, which is this blob that hovers over
The Sciences, Philosophical, Mathematical and Empirical, my question
was about biosemiotic, which has a perspective that is different from
semiotic because of its special focus on living systems (biology,
hence biosemiotic).
I would say I have done biosemiotic, and yet, I don’t treat
bacteria as a quasi-mind.
I see it as a thing that my mind treats. I recognize bacteria, how
it is used in sciences and respond to it. Bacteria are grown as
cultures or individually. We study it, we model its behaviors, we
use it to study other things (eg., for cloning in medicine)..
Therefore, your response is strange to me.
Specifically this:
Very simply. Every living thing, from a bacterium on up, has
a quasi-mind with a phaneron that contains the kinds of signs
it recognizes and responds to.
Your discussion of the unconscious..
the even mention of it to my question..
that this is somehow consistent with modern views..
this is all very bizarre.
And I am still left with not having an idea on how to use
CSPsemiotic.jpg to classify biosemiotic. I am sure the image you
created, and devoted much effort to, charts well what may be in the
record of Peirce’s writings, but I still don’t see how it is to
be used to classify anything novel at all. That is, it does not
appear to be adaptable. Perhaps I do not have the proper
perspective. Should I turn it, be over it, twist it, wrap it, fold
it?
I have a similar gripe as Edwina, above.
We should listen to what she’s saying.
Hth,
Jerry R On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
John, list
Agreed - and Pierce was quite specific that you don't need a
conscious and separate Mind to be involved in semiosis.
My point, again, is that I don't see the function of this list's
focus on classification and terminology. How does that, for example,
help us in examining the semiosic processes in a bacterium or in a
meadow, filled with diverse species, or in a hurricane, or in a
societal ideological movement or in artificial intelligence?
And even more deeply - do we want to move out of the seminar room
and into examining the semiosic processes of the outside world?
Edwina
On Fri 14/09/18 8:38 AM , John F Sowa [email protected] [3] sent:
On 9/13/2018 11:27 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
> How do you classify biosemiotic using your scheme?
Very simply. Every living thing, from a bacterium on up, has
a quasi-mind with a phaneron that contains the kinds of signs
it recognizes and responds to.
When Peirce said "present to the mind in any way", he did not rule
out the unconscious. In fact, there are 51 instances of the word
'unconscious' in CP. Following is one of them:
> I am prepared to maintain, operations of the mind which are
logically
> exactly analogous to inferences excepting only that they are
unconscious
> and therefore uncontrollable and therefore not subject to
criticism.
> But that makes all the difference in the world; for inference is
> essentially deliberate, and self controlled. (CP 5.108)
The phrase "logically exactly analogous" implies that the
unconscious
(or at least an important component) involves signs of the same kind
as conscious thought, except for the option of awareness. Dreams,
for example, involve processes similar to conscious thought, but we
have no control over the sequences.
Higher animals may have something similar to human consciousness.
But the phaneron of lower animals, plants, and bacteria is probably
completely unconscious. A continuum rather than a sharp dividing
line is likely.
Re biosemiotic: Peirce mentioned parrots, dogs, and bees. And he
talked about the origin of life as the first non-degenerate
Thirdness.
He also mentioned crystals as a step along the way toward life. So
far, his guesses are consistent with modern views.
Deely and others talked about Jakob von Uexküll as another
important
influence. Uexküll used the term 'Umwelt' for the world that a
living organism perceives and acts in and on. The phaneron of any
living thing would be an essential component of its Umwelt.
John
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