List,
I still dont know, which definiton of "continuous" you were talking about all the time. Was it about continuation, then, ok, obviously a semiosis tends to continue (like I do, like it or not). Or does it mean, that it is a continuum? That would mean that it is blurred. The mathematical concept of continuum means blurredness, no sharp edges, no breaks, steadiness.
Peirce was musing about the continuity term along four periods, at his time, I only want to pick one thing out: Parts consisting of parts, and so on, indefinitely. Ok, but why should this be continuity? Here is a counterexample: The Mandelbrot-set (appleman). You can amplify any part of it, and find that it consists of more parts, looking the same. But is it blurred? No, there is always a clear border (so a discontinuity) between an appleman shape and its surrounding, scale-invariantly.
To investigate about the continuity term it it necessary to take broken dimensions into account, which, of course, Peirce could not. But to honour Peirces work, I think, it is better, to also talk about more modern discoveries too, and to see how good and proper he has anticipitated them with the poor means he has had, instead of only looking at his writings by looking for clear answers and dogmas.
Best, Helmut
Gary R., Jeff, List:
Reviewing Peirce's definition of "material parts," as quoted by Gary R.--which, as Potter and Shields acknowledged, actually comes from near the end of the Kantian period, but anticipates the impending shift to his post-Cantorian conception of continuity--raises an important question.
CSP: Whatever is continuous has material parts ... The material parts of a thing or other object, W, that is composed of such parts, are whatever things are, firstly, each and every one of them, other than W; secondly are all of some one internal nature (for example, are all places, or all spatial realities, or all spiritual realities, or are all ideas, or are all characters, or are all relations, or are all external representations, etc.); thirdly, form together a collection of objects in which no one occurs twice over and, fourthly, are such that the Being of each of them together with the modes of connexion between all subcollections of them, constitute the being of W. (CP 6.174; 1906)
My current working hypothesis is that all Signs as Types are material parts, at least in accordance with the second and third criteria--they "are all of some one internal nature," and they "form together a collection of objects in which no one occurs twice over." But what then is W? As we have been discussing, semiosis seems like an obvious candidate; but it is a process, not "a thing or other object." Perhaps that is why John Sowa found the terminology of "continuous semiosis" objectionable, despite his acceptance of "the continuity of semiosis."
Consistent with some of my other recent posts, I suggest that W is instead the entire Universe as a Sign. In accordance with the first and fourth criteria, what would this require?
- The Universe is composed of Signs, each and every one of which is other than the Universe.
- The Being of all Signs together with their modes of connection constitute the Being of the Universe.
Besides EP 2:303-304 (1904) as quoted at the end of my last post, three other passages by Peirce come to mind that strike me as supporting this interpretation.
CSP: ... the entire universe--not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as "the truth"--that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs. (CP 5.448n1, EP 2:394; 1906)CSP: There is a science of semeiotics ... and one of its theorems ... is that if any signs are connected, no matter how, the resulting system constitutes one sign ... (R 1476:36[5-1/2]; c. 1904)
CSP: ... the sign's mode of being is ... such that it consists in the existence of replicas destined to bring its interpreter into relation to some object ... It is in causing the interpretation that the being of the sign consists. (NEM 4:297; 1904)
The entire Universe is composed of Signs as continuous Types, and its Being consists in the existence of their Instances as discrete Tokens that are determined by Dynamic Objects to determine Dynamic Interpretants as occurrences. In other words ...
CSP: The very being of the General, of Reason, consists in its governing individual events. So, then, the essence of Reason is such that its being never can have been completely perfected. It always must be in a state of incipiency, of growth ... So, then, the development of Reason requires as a part of it the occurrence of more individual events than ever can occur ... This development of Reason consists, you will observe, in embodiment, that is, in manifestation. (CP 1.615, EP 2:255; 1903)
Moreover, Peirce continued his discussion of "material parts" as follows.
CSP: But the term "material parts" may, without confusion (if a little care be exerted), be used in a somewhat looser sense. Namely, if the Being (generally, a Concept) of an object, T, essentially involves something C which prevents it from having any material parts in the strict sense, and if there be something, W, which differs from T only in the absence of C and of any other such hindrances, so that W has material parts, then the material parts of W may loosely be termed material parts of T; but in such case the concept of W so derived from T is nearly or quite always somewhat vague, so that either the material parts will be so too, or else they must be conceived as merely the parts of some state of it, and very likely of an instantaneous state that is an ens rationis closely approximating to the nature of a fiction. (CP 6.174; 1906)
I suggest that an example of T is "the universe of existents," since its Being essentially involves discrete things, which prevent it from having material parts in Peirce's strict sense. Nevertheless, the material parts of W as the entire Universe--Signs as Types--may loosely be termed material parts of T as the universe of existents, but they must then be conceived as merely the parts of some instantaneous state that is an ens rationis; namely, an Instance of a Sign.
I suspect that this all comes across as more settled in my mind than it actually is. Feedback is welcome, both on this post and on my previous one.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
