Auke, List: According to the second long quote that I provided below from Peirce, "man" and "homme" are one and the same Sign, consistent with his statement elsewhere that "a sign is not a real thing" (EP 2:303; 1904). I understand his emphasis here to be on "thing" (Brute Actuality), rather than "real." My question remains whether "man" and "homme" are *also *one and the same Type, or two *different *Types of the same Sign.
Again, I now lean toward the latter. The three-letter sequence, m-a-n, is "a definitely significant Form" that an individual Token must embody (at least approximately) in order to serve as an actual Instance of the Type in written English. The five-letter sequence, h-o-m-m-e, is "a definitely significant Form" that an individual Token must embody (at least approximately) in order to serve as an actual Instance of the Type in written French. To me, these different specifications for Instances imply different Types. Thanks, Jon S. On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 10:22 AM Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl> wrote: > JAS, List, > > > > I am referring to aspects of signs when I am using terms like token, type > and symbol. It is not the same sign, it is of the same type, symbol > combination, ruled by the symbolic aspect, not the token, qualisign > aspects. A habit of interpretation Is involved. Whether or not something(s) > is the same sign (what for the qualisign/token aspects?) is a complicated > question. > > > > So I would substitute on aspect level. > > > > Best, > > > > Auke van breemen > > > > *Van:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *Verzonden:* donderdag 24 januari 2019 16:51 > *Aan:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Onderwerp:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances > > > > Auke, List: > > > > It is comforting to learn that I am not alone in wrestling with this > question. Based on your analysis below, would you characterize the written > versions of "man" and "homme" as two different Types of the same Sign, or > two different _____ of the same Type? If the latter, what term fills the > blank? Again, I am not referring here to actual individual > Instances/Tokens, but to the one word "man" in written English and the one > word "homme" in written French. > > > > Thanks, > > > > Jon S. > > > > On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 8:45 AM Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote: > > JAS, list, > > > > I have been considering the same question. My conclusion is that a type > originally is based on similarity. From an evolutionary point of view this > probably is the first form. But If symbols are around that are based on the > same type although the tokens that gave rise to the type differ, we may > have imposed in our interpretation habit similarity to those different > type/tokens. Thus, although at first sight the types differ, our habit of > interpretation takes them as the same. From some point of view this is a > similarity relation. For instance already all those different letter types > handwritten, printed or on the screen, regarded as the same, already pull > in the direction of a tolerant way in dealing with similarity. > > > > Best, > > > > Auke van Breemen > > > > *Van:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *Verzonden:* donderdag 24 januari 2019 15:15 > *Aan:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Onderwerp:* [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances > > > > List: > > > > At the risk of initiating the kind of terminology-focused discussion that > has prompted complaints from certain quarters in the past, I am seeking > input on a specific issue that has been causing me some mild > consternation. The following passage provides what I consider to be > Peirce's clearest definitions for Type, Token, and Instance. > > > > CSP: A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a MS. or printed > book is to count the number of words. There will ordinarily be about twenty > the's on a page, and of course they count as twenty words. In another sense > of the word "word," however, there is but one word "the" in the English > language; and it is impossible that this word should lie visibly on a page > or be heard in any voice, for the reason that it is not a Single thing or > Single event. It does not exist; it only determines things that do exist. > Such a definitely significant Form, I propose to term a *Type*. A Single > event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one > happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any > one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as > occurring just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a > single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to > call a *Token *... In order that a Type may be used, it has to be > embodied in a Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the > object the Type signifies. I propose to call such a Token of a Type an > *Instance > *of the Type. Thus, there may be twenty Instances of the Type "the" on a > page. (CP 4.537; 1906) > > > > Peirce's illustrative example here (and elsewhere) is "the," which is both > *one > *word in written English as a Type and *twenty *words on a printed page > as Instances; i.e., Tokens of the Type. Now, consider what he wrote a few > years earlier about a "representamen," which at that time he explicitly > defined as a generalization of "sign," writing a few months later that "A > *Sign > *is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant" (CP 2.273, EP 2:273; > 1903). > > > > CSP: The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of > repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications corrupt > good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or > any other language, and every time it is thought of, it is one and the same > representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is the same > with a physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are different signs, > it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of the air. A > representamen which should have a unique embodiment, incapable of > repetition, would not be a representamen, but a part of the very fact > represented ... "Evil communications corrupt good manners" and *Φθείρουσιν > ἢθη χρήσθ' όμιλίαι κακαί* are one and the same representamen. (CP 5.138, > EP 2:203; 1903) > > > > According to this passage, the *same *Sign can be written, spoken, or > thought in a *given *language; and it can also be written, spoken, or > thought in *different *languages. For example, the written, spoken, and > thought versions of "man" in English and "homme" in French are six *distinct > *ways of embodying the same Sign. The many individual occasions when and > where each is *actually *written, spoken, or thought are clearly > Instances of a Type--but are they all Instances of the *same *Type, or > Instances of six *different *Types of the same Sign? > > > > I previously thought the former, but now find myself inclined toward the > latter--which would entail that many of my recent posts require careful > revision accordingly. A Sign itself is indifferent to *how *it is > embodied, but Peirce described a Type as "a definitely significant Form," > which suggests to me a certain set of characters that something must > possess in order to serve as an Instance of the Type *within *a > particular Sign System. In written English, the recognizable three-letter > sequence m-a-n is required for any Instance of "man" as a Type, even though > aspects such as font, size, and color can (and do) vary widely. > > > > The alternative is to say that the written, spoken, and thought versions > of "man" in English and "homme" in French are six different _____ of the > same Type. What would fill the blank here? As far as I can tell, Peirce > never coined any such term. > > > > Regards, > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > >
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