Jon AS,

the subject matter here is not limited to logic as the science
of Symbols--it is semeiotic as the science of all Signs.

In the quotations below, logic is "another name for semiotic."
All theories, including every version of logic and semiotic, are
stated in symbols, but symbols can be used to define, refer to,
or state any theory about anything.

A pure Index denotes something without signifying anything, which
means that it neither is nor has a predicate.

Yes.  But Peirce's definition of 'seme' implies that it is a term,
and his definitions of 'term' imply that it is a predicate.
See the quotations below.

The conclusion:  term/proposition/argument is equivalent to
predicate/proposition/argument.

John
_____________________________________________________________________

Quotations that relate logic and semiotic:

CP 2.227:  "Logic, in its general sense, is, as I believe I have
shown, only another name for semiotic (σημειωτική), the quasi-
necessary, or formal, doctrine of signs."

1904, MS [R] 693:188-190: "The study of languages ought to be
based upon a study of the necessary conditions to which signs
must conform in order to fulfill their functions as signs. I have
gradually been led to conclude that it is best to identify logic
with this study."

1909, MS [R] 634:15:  "…it would seem proper that in the present
state of knowledge logic should be regarded as coëxtensive with
General Semeiotic, the a priori theory of signs."

I also checked the Commens definitions for 'term'.  It seems that
Peirce defined the word 'term' in a way that is identical with
'predicate'.  That is not the way that 'term' is defined by modern
logicians.  But it implies that predicate/proposition/argument would
be the best modern replacement for seme/pheme/delome.

1901-1902, Baldwin's Dictionary:
"A term appears, in the general algebra of logic of Peirce, as well
as in the logical graphs of the same logician, as a symbol which
does not definitely and separately show its object, or more clearly
speaking, as a proposition in which blanks are left for some or all
of its subjects; as ‘– is a man,’ ‘– loves –.’"

Note: ‘– is a man’ is a monad (monadic predicate) and ‘– loves –’
is a dyad (dyadic predicate).

1903, On Existential Graphs, MS [R] 491:9
"A term […] is any representamen which does not separately indicate
its object; as ‘kills’, ‘digs’, ‘endowed by nature with rich gifts of
person and mind, and a really great poet, but vicious and egotistical’."

The first two (‘kills’ and ‘digs’) are dyadic predicates, and the
long one "endowed ... egotistical" is a monadic predicate.
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