Helmut, List: Just to clarify, the quote about the three forms of propositions is from Atkins, not Peirce; and it presumably follows Aristotle's original order, which is why it is not the same as the order of Peirce's Categories.
Thanks, Jon S. On Tue, Feb 12, 2019 at 10:34 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon AS, list, > > you wrote: > > "JAS: Recalling Peirce's 1908 trichotomy for the Mode of Being of the > Dynamic Object, that Subject will be *Abstractive *for a hypostatically > abstracted quality, *Concretive *for a concrete existent, or *Collective *for > a general class; and these obviously correspond to "possesses the character > of," "is identical to," and "belongs to the class of," respectively." > > > I agree, and also the sequence, as fitting to the categories. I think it > is correct, and Peirces assignment is not: > > *"RKA: .... S is P actually takes three forms. The first is that S is > identical to P. The second is that S is a member of the genus P. The third > is that S has the accident P. (p. 31)".* > > Your assignment reminds me of my categories-assignment of systems > hierarchies (1. composition, 2. power, 3. classification). I wonder, maybe > "mode of being" is a systems hierarchy between the universe (biggest > possible system), and a subject. "Posesses the character of" would mean, > that a subject is composed of its (universally valid) qualities, "is > identical to", that its identity is defined by the universe´s power, and > "belongs to the class of" natural (not artificial) classification... Maybe > in this respect, "power" I should replace with "definition" (in my text > www.signs-in-time.de, which I have not looked at a long time now), I dont > know. > > Best, > Helmut > > > 12. Februar 2019 um 04:43 Uhr > "Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected]> > > List: > > Despite having already had much to say earlier today, I would like to add > a couple of follow-up comments. First ... > > > JAS: ... in 1908 Peirce introduced the concept of the Continuous > Predicate as what remains when everything else is instead thrown into the > *subject*--specifically, everything that requires Collateral Experience > on the part of the interpreting Quasi-mind in order to be understood. > > > This highlights the distinguishing feature of a Proposition--the > Continuous Predicate, the logical *form of relation* among the various > Subjects, is the *only *new information that it is capable of providing > to an interpreting Quasi-mind. The latter must *already *be acquainted > with each of the Subjects by means of Collateral Experience. In other > words, "everything that can be thrown into the subject" constitutes the > (Immediate) *Object *of a Proposition, leaving the Continuous Predicate > alone as its (Immediate) *Interpretant*. > > > CSP: Its Interpretant is all that the Sign conveys: acquaintance with its > Object must be gained by collateral experience. (EP 2:480; 1908) > > > CSP: The person who interprets that sentence (or any other Sign > whatsoever) must be determined by the Object of it through collateral > observation quite independently of the action of the Sign ... All that part > of the understanding of the Sign which the Interpreting Mind has needed > collateral observation for is outside the Interpretant ... But by > collateral observation, I mean previous acquaintance with what the Sign > denotes ... All that is collateral observation and is no part of the > Interpretant. But to put together the different subjects as the Sign > represents them as related,--that is the main of the Interpretant-forming > ... I think by this time you must understand what I mean when I say that no > sign can be understood,--or at least that no *proposition *can be > understood,--unless the interpreter has "collateral acquaintance" with > every Object of it. (EP 2:493,494,496; 1909) > > > I believe that this is another reason why Peirce called his 1908 analysis > "proper" and "ultimate." Second, and more directly relevant to the thread > topic ... > > > JAS: Recalling Peirce's 1908 trichotomy for the Mode of Being of the > Dynamic Object, that Subject will be *Abstractive *for a hypostatically > abstracted quality, *Concretive *for a concrete existent, or *Collective *for > a general class; and these obviously correspond to "possesses the character > of," "is identical to," and "belongs to the class of," respectively. > > > As Atkins discusses in his book, these correspond (in different order) to > the three Aristotelian functions of the copula, which served as Peirce's > starting point for "A New List of Categories." > > > RKA: .... S is P actually takes three forms. The first is that S is > identical to P. The second is that S is a member of the genus P. The third > is that S has the accident P. (p. 31) > > > However, Peirce ultimately deviated from these a bit, settling instead on > reference to a ground, reference to a correlate, and reference to an > interpretant as the bases for the Categories of quality, relation (later > reaction), and representation (later mediation), respectively. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > >
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