Jerry C., List: JLRC: Thus, I find your various assertions (wordplays?) used to interpret CSP meanings (of “everything”) to be of little irrelevance to logical analysis.
"Everything" is my own shorthand, which I was trying to clarify; I am not a logician, so please forgive my imprecision. Peirce was quite clear about the scope of "everything" in his own statements, and also provided helpful examples. CSP: ... *I regard everything to which the assertion relates and to which reference can be removed from the predicate*, although what is referred to be a quality, relation, state of things, etc. *as a Subject* ... Thus, in the assertion "Some roses are red," i.e. possess the color redness, the color redness is one of the Subjects; but I do not make "possession" a Subject, as if the assertion were, "Some roses are in the relation of possession to redness," because this would not remove relation from the predicate, since the words "are in" are here equivalent to "are subjects of," that is, are related to the relation of possession of redness. For to be in relation to X, and to be in relation to a relation to X mean the same thing. If therefore I were to put "relation" into the subject at all, I ought in consistency to put it in infinitely many times, and indeed this would not be sufficient. It is like a continuous line: no matter what one cuts off from it a line remains. So I do not attempt to regard "A is B" as meaning "A is identical with something that is B." I call "is in the relation to" and "is identical with" Continuous Relations, and I leave such in the Predicate. The Predicate is that part of the assertion which is signified as the logical connexion between the Subjects. (R 611:8-10[13-15]; 1908, bold added) CSP: A proposition can be separated into a predicate and subjects in more ways than one. But the proper way in logic is to take as the subject whatever there is of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the proposition itself, but collateral experience on the part of its interpreter is requisite ... The result is that *everything in a proposition that possibly can* *should be thrown into the subjects*, leaving the *pure *predicate a mere form of connection, such as 'is,' 'possesses (as a character),' 'stands in the dyadic relation _____ to _____ ,' 'and' = 'is at once _____ and _____ ,' etc. A *Pure Predicate *should be '*continuous*' or 'self-containing' as '*A* is coexistent with *B*' = '*A* coexists with something that coexists with *B*,' and '*A* possesses the character *ρ*' = '*A* possesses the character of possessing the character *ρ,*' and '*A* stands in the relation *λ* to *B*' = '*A* stands in the relation of being in the relation of standing in it to the relation *λ* to the relation of a relation to its correlate to *B*,' etc. (NEM 3:885-886; 1908, bold added) CSP: When we have analyzed a proposition so as to *throw into the subject everything that can be removed from the predicate*, all that it remains for the predicate to represent is the form of connection between the different subjects as expressed in the propositional *form*. What I mean by "everything that can be removed from the predicate" is best explained by giving an example of something not so removable. But first take something removable. "Cain kills Abel." Here the predicate appears as " kills . " But we can remove killing from the predicate and make the latter "_____ stands in the relation _____ to _____." Suppose we attempt to remove more from the predicate and put the last into the form "_____ exercizes the function of relate of the relation _____ to _____" and then putting the function of relate to the relation into another subject leave as predicate "_____ exercizes _____ in respect to _____ to _____. " But this "exercizes" expresses "exercizes the function." Nay more, it expresses "exercizes the function of relate," so that we find that though we may put this into a separate subject, it continues in the predicate just the same. (SS 72; 1908, bold added) Which of my "multitudes of assertions about the nature of [my] interpretations of CSP’s assertions" do I specifically need to clarify further by constructing some examples? Obviously "all of them" would not be a helpful response. JLRC: In this context, CSP asserted that his was a ‘logic of proper names’ (legisigns). Where did he ever make such an assertion? I can find no instance of "logic of proper names" in his writings, and not all Legisigns are *proper *names; that is just one variety of *Indexical *Legisigns. CSP: An indexical word, such as a proper noun or demonstrative or selective pronoun, has force to draw the attention of the listener to some hecceity common to the experience of speaker and listener. (CP 3.460; 1897) CSP: But the proper name so nearly approximates to the nature of an Index, that this might suffice to give an idea of an informational Index. (CP 2.320; 1903) CSP: A proper name, when one meets with it for the first time, is existentially connected with some percept or other equivalent individual knowledge of the individual it names. It is then, and then only, a genuine Index. The next time one meets with it, one regards it as an Icon of that Index. The habitual acquaintance with it having been acquired, it becomes a Symbol whose Interpretant represents it as an Icon of an Index of the Individual named. (CP 2.329; 1903) CSP: I define an Index as a sign determined by its dynamic object by virtue of being in a real relation to it. Such is a Proper Name (a legisign) ... (CP 8.335; 1904) CSP: As to Proper Names, there might perhaps be a difference of opinion, especially if the Tokens are meant. But they should probably be regarded as Indices, since the actual connection (as we listen to talk), of Instances of the same typical words with the same Objects, alone causes them to be interpreted as denoting those Objects. (CP 4.544; 1906) Perhaps what you mean is that CSP's logic was a logic of *Subjects*, as I am now employing that (capitalized) term; in which case, I obviously agree. CSP: Thus, we have stated "all men are mortal" in such a form that there is but one index. But we may also state it thus: "Taking anything, either it possesses not humanity or it possesses mortality." Here "humanity" and "mortality" are really proper names, or purely denotative signs, of familiar ideas. Accordingly, as here stated, there are three indices. (CP 3.462; 1897) CSP: The expressed subject of an ordinary proposition approaches most nearly to the nature of an index when it is a proper name which, although its connection with its object is purely intentional, yet has no reason (or, at least, none is thought of in using it) except the mere desirability of giving the familiar object a designation. (CP 2.357; 1902) CSP: Take, then, any assertion whatever about a number of designate individuals. These individuals may be persons, material objects, actions, collections of things, possible courses of events, qualities, abstractions of any kind, and, in short, of any one nature or of any several natures whatsoever; only each of them must be well-known and rated by a proper name, and each must belong to some universe, or total aggregate of things of the same wide class, and the assertion must be such that if any one of the individuals did not really occur in its universe, independently of whether you, I, or any collection of men or other cognoscitive beings should opine that it did or that it did not, then that assertion would be false. (CP 4.354; c. 1903) CSP: Putting the admissions together, you will perceive that the pragmaticist grants that a proper name (although it is not customary to say that it has a meaning), has a certain denotative function peculiar, in each case, to that name and its equivalents; and that he grants that every assertion contains such a denotative or pointing-out function. (CP 5.429; 1905) Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Feb 12, 2019 at 10:51 AM Jerry LR Chandler < [email protected]> wrote: > Jon, List: > > On Feb 11, 2019, at 3:40 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Jerry C., List: > > When Peirce talked about throwing "everything" into the subject, he was > referring to *logical analysis* of a proposition; and what he meant by > "everything" was "everything that can be so thrown." It is not possible to > throw *absolutely *everything into either the subject or predicate, and > still have a proposition. Since the boundary between them can be > arbitrarily drawn anywhere within two extremes, where it falls ultimately > depends on the *purpose *of the analysis. > > From my perspective of logical analysis of a proposition, the historical > notion that logical propositions are formed such that they are, in simple > cases, either true or false, and in more perplex cases, multiple choices, > 3,4,5,… may exist. > *The critical issue in forming a proposition is that a conclusion is > possible*. Of course, as a scientist, CSP went further, he sought > generalized descriptions to represent scientific representations of facts > (indices). > > Secondly, if a logician uses the term “every” (or everything), the reader > damm well better consider that the author knows a little bit about logic > and the keenly critical role that the terms “all” “some” and “none” play as > foundational in determining the truth or falsehood of a proposition . > > Thus, I find your various assertions (wordplays?) used to interpret CSP > meanings (of “everything”) to be of little irrelevance to logical analysis. > > Thirdly, the history of logic is braided into linguistics and meaning of > sentences. Logicians may assert whatever they wish about the meaning of > their symbolic expressions, attempting to remove the words or symbols from > the braid. It appears to me that all such attempts to remove logical > expressions from sentential expressions fail. I believe that this failure > is a consequence of the foundational cultural role of sentences in human > symbolic communication. > > Finally, as I have previously noted, concrete examples of sentences that > express the content of abstract hypotheses are essential if the author is > to communicate with the reader. Of course, concrete examples only open the > mind of the reader to the author’s meaning. The further step of the > reader’s “dynamic” interpretation is to ask “Is this example of this > abstraction meaningful to the science of logic?” Another further step of > the reader is to ask the question: Even if this concrete example has some > sort of meaning, is this abstract logical hypothesis compelling? > > In this context, CSP asserted that his was a ‘logic of proper names’ > (legisigns). Since proper names are abundant in ordinary speech and > dictionaries, I would conjecture that if an interpretation of a CSP text is > meaningful, then an abundance of examples are readily available. > > Please construct some examples of your multitudes of assertions about the > nature of your interpretations of CSP’s assertions. > Your readers have begged you in the past, are begging you now, and will > continue to beg you for such examples. > > Without examples, other informed readers and I can not draw any > conclusions about the significance of your very interesting works. > > Cheers > > Jerry >
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