Gary R., List: As Gary F. recently (and astutely) observed, I have a strong inclination toward attempting to *regularize *Peirce's terminology. It is part of my general process of seeking to understand his ideas better by trying to arrange them into a systematic framework--not necessarily *Peirce's *own, but one that is legitimately and recognizably *Peircean*.
With that in mind, I am already on record as currently thinking that the Categories and Universes are *not *different names for the same concept, although admittedly I have gone back and forth on that question over time. I now tentatively see them as corresponding respectively to precission and (subjectal/hypostatic) abstraction, predicates and subjects, Semes and Propositions, Percepts and Perceptual Judgments, presentations and urgings. As for whether the Universes are first/best located in Normative Logic as Semeiotic or in Metaphysics, I suspect that the answer at least partially depends on whether we take the following three sets of Signs to denote the same set of Objects. 1. The three Universes of Capacities, Actualities, and Tendencies in R 300 (early 1908). 2. The three Universes of Experience in "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" (mid-1908). 3. The three Universes of Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants in the draft letters to Lady Welby (late 1908). #1 sounds like Metaphysics, but appears within a discussion of Existential Graphs (Logical Critic). You said below that the context of #2 also suggests Metaphysics, but the article specifically addresses the validity of Retroduction, Deduction, and Induction (Logical Critic) before going on to claim that the hypothesis of God's Reality is precisely the kind of instinctive explanatory conjecture that properly launches *any *scientific inquiry (Speculative Rhetoric or Methodeutic). #3 explicitly corresponds to Peirce's divisions of all Signs according to the six correlates and four relations (Speculative Grammar). In summary, at the moment it seems to me that all three varieties of Universes belong within Normative Logic as Semeiotic. However, if Peirce was right that "Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of being" (CP 1.487; c. 1896)--and I believe that he was--then the distinction may not need to be drawn too sharply anyway. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 12:01 PM Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Gary F, Jon, John, list, > > I have just recently returned from a trip abroad where I had little > Internet access, and so I have only today read through once all the posts > in this thread. I have found yours, Jon's and John's of particular > interest. Your post today was especially valuable in helping to clarify for > me some of the matters concerning EGs about which I've had some > considerable confusion. In particular, I found these comments of yours > especially helpful. > > GF: The “Bedrock” draft seems to represent the end of this process, where > Peirce finally had to admit that modalities could not be *iconically* > represented > in the EG system, especially if *cuts* and the *areas* inside them had to > represent *both modality and negation*. The problem with cuts as > modalities is the same as the problem with Selectives, that they were > symbolic rather than iconic: their interpretation had to be guided by > explicitly verbalized rules and conventions rather than the nonverbal > iconicity which was supposed to be the main advantage of of Existential > Graphs over other notation systems. From 1908 on, as far as I can tell, his > presentations of EGs used the cuts for negation only, and dropped the issue > of modality altogether. > > > and > > GF: As you can see, Peirce introduces this argument with a reference to > “failure of Selectives to be as analytical as possible,” but it goes deeper > than that: it shows the failure of *the scroll*, or cut within a cut, to > be as analytical as possible. But it was from the scroll that the > interpretation of cuts as negations was derived. This implies that the > cuts, as a feature of EGs, were themselves neither as analytical nor as > iconic as Peirce had thought they were in 1903. They are symbolic, in that > it has to be stipulated that they should be read as negations, as this is > not visually (or in an optico-muscular way) evident to anyone who looks at > them. It is not surprising, then, that EGs underwent no further development > after this point (although Peirce continued to recommend them, for instance > to Lady Welby, as useful for the purpose of logical analysis). > > > At the moment I will only remark that it is is becoming increasingly clear > to me from just the above comments (most especially the first, and the > Peirce quotes you were commenting on there) that Peirce would necessarily > have had to abandon EGs for his attempted *proof of pragmatism*. After > all, isn't it very much concerned with modality? > > One other matter which I also haven't had much time yet to reflect on has > to do with a distinction Jon's been making for some time now between the > three Universal Categories (1ns, 2ns, 3ns) discovered in Phenomenology and > three Universes of Experience mentioned near the opening of "A Neglected > Argument. . ." In a note yesterday to the members of a NYC philosophy club > I belong to, I wrote: > > One matter being considered in that discussion [i.e., this thread], and > which I'd be interested in your thoughts on at our next meeting, is whether > the Three Universal Categories are transmuted into Three Universes of > Experience in sciences further down in Peirce's Classification of Sciences, > or whether (by "the principle of principle") Phenomenology is but providing > a trichotomic principle to other sciences [further down in the > classification]. Also, if Peirce does intend to establish three Universes > of Experience in some sense [significantly] different from the categories, > are these first located in Logic as Semeiotic [as Jon seems to be saying] > or are they best located in Metaphysics (suggested by Peirce's using that > phrase in the Neglected Argument). Or both? > > > In any event, I for one am finding this on-going discussion both of > interest and value. > > Best, > > Gary R > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >
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