BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R - I can't, of course, speak for Stephen, but I'm not sure if
his comment pertained to 'scientific intelligence' but instead,
refers to the difference between, let's say, a 'scientific
intelligence' and 'intelligence' just on its own. The former operates
within pragmaticism while the latter includes - well, just about all
rhetoric and even 'idle chatter'.
Edwina
On Sat 09/03/19 1:37 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
Stephen, list,
You wrote: There is an inherent flaw or contradiction in Peirce's
distinction between the words scientific and intelligence. To be
scientific requires a mentality which is quite clear to those who
possess it but not to those who do not.
In the context of discussing "Logic, in its general sense [but]
another name for semeiotic," Peirce remarks that 'a "scientific"
intelligence' is "an intelligence capable of learning by experience"
(CP 2.227, 1897). So, it would appear that possessing a scientific
intelligence is, for Peirce, not an extraordinary thing.
Admittedly, he's discussing "abstractive observation" and "positive
science" here, but, rereading his definition out of context for a
change (it's a rather frequently quoted fragment, so I've read it any
number times as it succinctly outlines logic as semeiotic, including,
for example, its division into "pure grammar," "logic proper,"
[critical logic], and "pure rhetoric"), since the only intelligence
Peirce singles out as not potentially capable of "learning by
experience" (which includes the observation of signs) is God's,
since, he remarks, God "should possess an intuitive intelligence
superseding reason," it occurred to me that Peirce's definition
doesn't preclude at least some animals--perhaps even some
plants--from possessing a "scientific" intelligence. That sounds
strange at first, but note that Peirce puts "scientific" in scare
quotes in his definition. In that sense, all of biological nature is
capable of learning, evolving.
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication StudiesLaGuardia
College of the City University of New York
On Sat, Mar 9, 2019 at 11:18 AM Stephen Curtiss Rose wrote:
There is an inherent flaw or contradiction in Peirce's distinction
between the words scientific and intelligence. To be scientific
requires a mentality which is quite clear to those who possess it but
not to those who do not. Intelligence must cover a wide but accurate
realm consisting of most sentient beings. We could call it universal
in a way none would apply to the idea of scientific intelligence.
Peirce must have been flummoxed by this distinction as I believe he
had universal themes in mind such as the end of things as agape.
Surely this was not limited to the very exclusion he implicitly and
perhaps abhorred in Christian orthodox theology. Pragmaticism was and
remains a universal methodology for all not the province of those who
can deal with graphs and formulae.
I shall not expect a reply and need none. You know what I think and
it has no apparent landing place in this environment. And no I do not
wish an argument. What I say is either correct of not.
amazon.com/author/stephenrose
On Sat, Mar 9, 2019 at 10:31 AM < g...@gnusystems.ca [2]> wrote:
Jon, Gary R, John, list,
JAS: … Semeiotic as a generalization of normative logic to
encompass all kinds of Signs, not just Symbols; i.e., Speculative
Grammar. Again, it is normative because it studies "what must be the
characters of all signs used by a 'scientific' intelligence, that is
to say, by an intelligence capable of learning by experience" (CP
2.227; c. 1897, emphasis in original).
Peirce emphasized “must be,” but he does not refer to
“normative” science at all in the passage you quote. You put the
“normative” label on what Peirce says here, and when you do that
— especially in the phrase “Normative Logic as Semeiotic” —
you water down the signification of the word to the point where it
almost evaporates. A normative science for Peirce (and as far as I
know, for anyone who uses the word regularly) is one whose essence is
to make dualistic judgments distinguishing good from bad, true from
false, right from wrong, etc. What Peirce is referring to here is not
normative science but, more broadly, positive science (as opposed to
mathematics, which deals with hypothetical objects and thus does not
learn from experience of the actual world). Here’s the context:
[[ Logic, in its general sense, is, as I believe I have shown, only
another name for semiotic (σημειωτικη), the
quasi-necessary, or formal, doctrine of signs. By describing the
doctrine as “quasi-necessary,” or formal, I mean that we observe
the characters of such signs as we know, and from such an
observation, by a process which I will not object to naming
Abstraction, we are led to statements, eminently fallible, and
therefore in one sense by no means necessary, as to what must be the
characters of all signs used by a “scientific” intelligence, that
is to say, by an intelligence capable of learning by experience. ]
CP 2.227]
Logic as Semeiotic is Logic in this broad sense. Logic as normative
, i.e. logical Critic, is one of three branches of that, as Peirce
explains:
[[ The speculative rhetoric that we are speaking of is a branch of
the analytical study of the essential conditions to which all signs
are subject,— a science named semeiotics, though identified by
many thinkers with logic. In the Roman schools, grammar, logic, and
rhetoric were felt to be akin and to make up a rounded whole called
the trivium. This feeling was just; for the three disciplines named
correspond to the three essential branches of semeiotics, of which
the first, called speculative grammar by Duns Scotus, studies the
ways in which an object can be a sign; the second, the leading part
of logic, best termed speculative critic , studies the ways in which
a sign can be related to the object independent of it that it
represents; while the third is the speculative rhetoric just
mentioned. ] EP2:326 ]
Belluci quotes a similar passage in which logic (in the narrow
sense) is named as a “department” of semeiotic:
[[ it will be necessary for the present and for a long time to come
to regard logic, not as a distinct science, but as only a department
of the science of the general constitution of signs,— the
physiology of signs,— cenoscopic semeiotics. For if we roughly
define a sign as a medium of communication, a piece of concerted
music is a sign, and so is a word or signal of command. Now logic has
no positive concern with either of these kinds of signs, but it must
concern itself with them negatively in defining the kind of signs it
does deal with; and it is not likely that in our time there will be
anybody to study the general physiology of the non-logical signs
except the logician, who is obliged to do so, in some measure. ] R
499 ISP 17-19, 1906 ]
Peirce says here that it is up to logicians to study cenoscopic
meneiotics — not that semeiotics replaces logic, but that it
supervenes on logic. Thus it is quite misleading to claim that in
Peirce’s classification, Semeiotic replaces Logic as a normative
science. It is more accurate to say that Logic in the broad or
“general” sense is coterminous with Semeiotic, and Logic in the
narrow sense (Critic) is the normative part of that. None of the
passages that you have quoted in defense of that claim even mention
“semeiotic”, or any variant spelling of it, or any equivalent
term such as “theory of signs,” in connection with Logic as a
normative science. “Normative Logic as Semeiotic” is a chimera of
your own invention, Jon.
Gary f.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 8-Mar-19 22:30
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [4]
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism
John, List:
JFS: Formal semeiotic is an application of logic to semeiotic.
That application establishes for phenomenological categories of 1ns,
2ns, 3ns and their use in analyzing any whatever for the purpose of
mapping the results to logic.
I agree with the first sentence, but not the second. The Categories
are established by applying formal/mathematical logic to phenomena as
we observe them in their 1ns, as they appear. Once we begin studying
phenomena in their 2ns, in relation to ends, we are engaged in
Normative Science rather than Phenomenology. Every Sign has an
end--to represent something--so applying formal/mathematical logic to
Signs is the first branch of Semeiotic as a generalization of
normative logic to encompass all kinds of Signs, not just Symbols;
i.e., Speculative Grammar. Again, it is normative because it studies
"what must be the characters of all signs used by a 'scientific'
intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence capable of learning
by experience" (CP 2.227; c. 1897, emphasis in original).
…
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