John, list,
You said: ‘Any ontology that is not designed for some purpose or intention has no purpose.’ I must then ask: Why do you say, ‘The conclusion that a Seme could be a subject is not just false, it is horribly false. It contradicts and undermines Peirce's entire system of semeiotic.’ That is, how is ‘Seme as not-subject’ related to Peirce’s purpose or intention, if at all? With best wishes, Jerry R On Sat, Mar 30, 2019 at 2:10 PM John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > Pat C, Matthew, Phil M, and Jon A, > > Basic issue: How do we determine whether two things that we > experience on different occasions (or that we describe in > different ways) are "the same"? > > For example, suppose we describe something as a vase, and somebody > else describes it as a lump of clay. Are they referring to the > "same thing"? > > Or suppose we meet John Doe on one occasion and his "identical" twin > Jimmy Doe at a later date. Even if Jimmy tells us that he's not > "the same" as John, we can't observe the earlier stages. His words > are our basis for talking, reasoning, or acting about the difference. > Even if we get more records or testimony from independent sources, > they are just words or photos. We can't observe the continuity. > > And Pat raises an even more complex example: > > PC > > one can refer to a “quantity of a substance” as a “PhysicalObject” > > (mass, location, composition). In the (very common) case where one > > has a quantity of some mixture of substances (a 14-K gold ring, e.g.) > > there is a quantity of “gold” and a quantity of “copper”. There is > > no reason I can think of not to be able to refer to the gold in > > that ring as an object separate from the copper – that is logically > > coherent. As long as the ring exists, those two quantities of > > substance will have the same spatio-temporal location. > > You can only answer this question with a question: Why do you ask? > > As a somewhat simpler case, suppose you go to IKEA and buy a box of > parts for a table. Those parts were spatially very close from the > moment they were packed in Sweden, shipped to the store, brought > to your garage, and taken out of the box. For a while, they were > separated by a short distance, mixed with yourself and some tools, > and finally assembled as a table. What are the identity conditions > for that "thing"? > > MW > > if you find two objects with the same spatio-temporal extent, then > > they are the same thing. Essentially that means that if (and only if) > > they occupy the same space over the whole of their life, they are the > > same thing. > > But what do you mean by "the whole of their life"? Are the parts in > the box a different "thing" or are they part of the life of the table? > > PM > > the 4-D model for objects seems at odds with how humans actually > > experience and understand the things, beings, and processes around > > them, regardless of changes in state and changes in characteristics > > over the course of their existence. > > Yes. Although I have a strong sympathy for the 4D view, it isn't > sufficient by itself. Intentions are critical to explain our ways of > talking, thinking, and acting. You might say that the table wasn't > "born" as a table until the parts were assembled in your garage. But > then you might discover that getting the table from the garage to your > basement, up a flight of stairs to the kitchen, and then to the dining > room was a challenge. > > At that point, you wouldn't disassemble the whole table. You could > just remove the four legs, ask a friend to help, carry the table top > to the dining room, go back for the legs, and attach them where you > want the table. > > While the legs were in the garage and the top was being moved, > the parts were separated by a greater distance than they had been > since they were packed in the box in Sweden. How can we describe > the various stages of the table (or the vase or the gold ring) in > a systematic way that is faithful to the way we talk and the way > we translate our talk to some version of logic? > > PC > > Does the notion of “identity” as implying “identical spatio-temporal > > location” require that we do the impossible, of tracing an object > > back to the origin of the universe? How does one preserve that > > notion of identity and deal with the problem of co-location, within > > some meaningful and accessible time interval? > > The 4D definition requires a "God's eye" view of the universe. You > could say, along with Heraclitus and my namesake John the Evangelist, > "In the beginning was the Logos, all things (panta) that came to be > (gignomai) came to be through (dia) or according to (kata) that Logos." > > St. John added "the Logos is God". Spinoza was more faithful to > Heraclitus by identifying God and Nature (i.e., pantheism). But that > answer got him in trouble at the local synagogue. > > But whether you prefer theism, pantheism, or atheism, you can talk > about a system of laws (Logos) as explanations of how all things > (including people) behave and interact. > > The laws are a compact statements. They include the precisely > formulated laws of science and engineering and the more complex > intentions of people and other living things. > > Most laws of science are simpler when stated in a 4D coordinate > system. But ordinary language is usually simpler with a system > of 3D plus time. But any observations (data) stated in one > language or notation can be translated to and from any other. > > Richard Coyne, as cited by Jon Awbrey > > Architecture is a practical and pragmatic discipline, and a study of > > Peirce emphasises architecture as a practice, and a practice grounded > > in the materiality of the world. > > > > Unlike other thinkers headlined in the Routledge book series Thinkers > > for Architecture (my book is number 15 in the series), there is no > > “Peircean architecture” as such, and no particular movement, style or > > body of work that demonstrates allegiance to him. But in so far as > > any practitioner, educator or critic claims to be pragmatic, they owe > > a debt, however indirectly, to Peirce’s thinking... > > > > Peirce speaks to mathematicians, logicians, those systems theorists > > who seek orderly methods for solving the world’s problems, and those > > of the Design Methods Movement who seek orderly, mathematical and > > logical procedures for designing buildings. > > > > Peirce’s influence extends to digital practitioners and programmers > > in architecture, and more recently those interested in big data, and > > responsive architecture that copies biological processes and forms > > (biomimesis). > > That is Coyne's own summary of his book. For more, see > https://richardcoyne.com/2019/03/30/architectures-pragmatic-turn/ > > For a brief (12 page) intro to Peirce's theory of signs and its > application to ontology, see http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf > > My answer to the original question: Any statement in any language > or logic is always intended for some purpose in some context. That > is just as true for the most abstract theories of philosophy and > science as it is for ordinary life. > > The only way to answer a question about the Ship of Theseus or Pat's > golden ring is to respond with another question: Why do you ask? > > The way the US army answered the question about rifles is the only > general principle that can end the chain: Assert some officially > specified identity conditions: Two rifles are "the same" if and > only if they have the same serial number on their stock. > > This is one of many reasons why I keep saying that Part I of the > proposed ISO standard is worthless as a guideline for specifying > or evaluating ontologies. > > Any ontology that is not designed for some purpose or intention > has no purpose. > > John >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
