Helmut, list
I actually include the DO within the semiosic function, because the
IO couldn't exist without that DO.
I can send you some of my publications.
Edwina
On Tue 16/04/19 4:05 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
Edwina, list, That looks very reasonable to me. I think I have to
get concerned about mathematic symbolization. How do I write "A is the
function of B for C", and so on. In "R(O)=I", is O and I only the
immediate O and I? Can I look somehow on some of your papers? Best,
Helmut 16. April 2019 um 20:13 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:
Helmut, list - I agree with you that the Sign [the full triad of
O-R-I] is a function. I've been giving conference papers and
publishing on just that for many years.
But I don't think that the Sign-as-Function operates by addition,
which would reduce the actions to arithmetic, but by multiplication.
That is, the function formula is: f{x}=y. Where 'f' is the R or
mediating Representamen; 'x' is the input data from the Object; and
'y' is the interpreted information of the Interpretant.
This is not a mechanical or addition process but a transformative
process where the input data of the Object is transformed by the
mediative actions of the Representamen to produce the
Interpretant[s].
Edwina
On Tue 16/04/19 1:28 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
Supplement: But I prefer, that the term "functional composition"
means, that a function of something is composed of the functions of
other things for the something, so it would be ok to say "a sign
functionally consists of S,O,I". It means, that f(S) = f(S) + f(O) +
f(I). I think it is always so, that a general function of a specific
function is the specific function, like: f(f1(A)) = f1(A). f(S) is the
general function, so it is S (because S is a function too). The other
three functions are specific (for S). So, very correctly, it would
be: f(S) = S = fS(S) + fS(O) + fS(I). List, To solve this
problem with "whole" or "composed of", I propose three kinds of
composition: C. from traits (1ns), spatiotemporal c. (2ns), and
functional composition (3ns). The kind of composition we are talking
about is functional c.: The function of something is composed of
the functions of... . I think that a sign is a function itself, as
well as its object (though this is not completely clear), and its
interpretant, so instead of saying "The function of a sign is
composed of...), maybe we can say: "A sign is functionally composed
of the functions of itself, its object and its interpretant", or even:
"A sign is functionally composed of itself, its object, and its
interpretant". But maybe, regarding the spatiotemporally external
characters, like DO, DI, FI, we must say: "A sign is functionally
composed of itself, and the functions of its object and its
interpretant". To avoid more problems, I think, that in functional
composition, a thing may be composed of itself plus other things
(other than in spatiotemporal composition). I call this re-entry, and
it is like a computer program code saying "Let A = A + B + C". This
is not a contradiction to "relation": While "relation" is something
objectively viewed, "function" is is the relation as it is viewed
from the function for which the relation is a function, in this case
the sign. Best, Helmut 16. April 2019 um 13:32 Uhr
g...@gnusystems.ca Jeff,
Even if we take your view that a sign (e.g. an argument) is a whole
composed of three parts, and that the parts are the correlates of a
genuine triadic relation, you can’t say that the whole is that
triadic relation — which, I take it, is what you were trying to
show — unless you are giving an entirely new meaning to the word
“relation.” You can say that there is a relation internal to the
sign, but it makes no sense to say that that relation IS that sign.
The relation is abstracted from the internal structure of the sign,
not identified with it.
Moreover, once you have analyzed an instance of semiosis into the
three correlates (sign, object and interpretant), the correlates are
not continuous with one another, because they are not of the same
kind. The analysis itself has the same effect as marking a point on a
continuous line: it interrupts the continuity (CP 6.168). Semiosis is
a continuous process but the object-sign-interpretant relation is
not continuous.
That’s how I see it, anyway.
Gary f.
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Sent: 15-Apr-19 23:35
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Genuinely triadic relations, laws and symbols
Jon S, List,
First, let me point out that I believe a number of arguments were
offered in the post. The simplest argument was a mere colligation of
separate points. The richer argument, I think, was explanatory in
character. Having said that, let me try to comply with your request.
Please be forewarned that the quote offered will not, by itself
settle the matter. Rather, I provide a quote and ask how it might be
interpreted.
In "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories
from within", Peirce says:
Genuine triads are of three kinds. For while a triad if genuine
cannot be in the world of quality nor in that of fact, yet it may be
a mere law, or regularity, of quality or of fact. But a thoroughly
genuine triad is separated entirely from those worlds and exists in
the universe of representations. Indeed, representation necessarily
involves a genuine triad. For it involves a sign, or representamen,
of some kind, outward or inward, mediating between an object and an
interpreting thought. Now this is neither a matter of fact, since
thought is general, nor is it a matter of law, since thought is
living. CP 1.480
Let's consider an example of a thoroughly genuine triadic relation.
The example Peirce gives is an argument. Here is one such example:
All men die;
Enoch is a man;
Therefore, Enoch dies.
If we classify this sign according to the system in NDTR as a
symbolic, argument, legisign, then what are its parts? Here are two
different ways of thinking of the matter.
*The premisses are a sign and the conclusion is the interpretant
of those premisses.
*The argument as a whole is a sign which may be interpreted in
light of a further argument of which this is a part.
Either way, we should be able to answer the following questions:
a. Do symbolic arguments have parts?
b. If they do, how are the parts related to make a whole?
Normally, we think of individual things as having parts. My body,
for instance, is a whole composed of several organs. My heart is in a
particular location relative to my intestines. Are general things,
like laws or symbols, wholes that consist of parts? Peirce's answer,
I think, is yes. In fact, he felt a need to provide a much more
general account of the relations between parts and whole just so that
he could address such questions.
He says:
"I begin by defining a part of any whole, in a sense of the [term]
much wider [than] any in current use, though it is not obsolete in
the vocabulary of philosophy. In this broadest sense, [it] is
anything that is (1) other than its whole, and (2) . . . such that if
the whole were really to be, no matter what else might be true, then
the part must under all conceivable circumstances itself really be,
in the same 'universe of discourse,' though by no means necessarily
in the same one of those three Universes with which experience makes
us all more or less acquainted. Thus, light is a part of vision . .
. . CP 7.535 Fn 6 Para 1/2 p 319
Note that the example he offers can be understood in a general way:
light in the visible spectrum, generally understood, is a part of the
process of vision, understood as a sort of law that governs all
things having this capacity.
The reading of the texts that I was exploring in the earlier email
draws on this general account of how parts relate to wholes. In doing
so, we get an understanding of how arguments are composed of
propositions that serve as premisses and conclusions, and of how
propositions are composed of terms. The predicate "terms" in the
propositions are rhematic and are composed, in some sense, of iconic
legisigns. The subject terms are composed, in some sense, of
indexical legisigns. How far does this sort of analysis go? Peirce, I
believe, takes a striking position when he asserts the following:
The easiest of those which are of philosophical interest is the idea
of a sign, or representation. A sign stands for something to the idea
which it produces, or modifies. Or, it is a vehicle conveying into
the mind something from without. That for which it stands is called
its object; that which it conveys, its meaning; and the idea to
which it gives rise, its interpretant. The object of representation
can be nothing but a representation of which the first representation
is the interpretant. But an endless series of representations, each
representing the one behind it, may be conceived to have an absolute
object at its limit. The meaning of a representation can be nothing
but a representation. In fact, it is nothing but the representation
itself conceived as stripped of irrelevant clothing. But this
clothing never can be completely stripped off; it is only changed for
something more diaphanous. So there is an infinite regression here.
Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another representation to
which the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it
has its interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series. CP 1.339
We've considered this passage before. I remain interested in the
portion that I've emphasized in boldface type. If symbolic legisigns,
such as the argument above, are composed of parts that are, in
themselves, general in character, then how should we understand the
part-whole relationship in this case. Peirce suggests that the
relationship works in a special way when we are considering
something, like a symbol, whose parts are continuous, one with
another. The argument has this character. On the one hand, we can
consider it as an abstract general. In reality, though, the symbol
lives as a habit of thought for the community of inquirers who have
such beliefs about Enoch. As a living symbol, the argument is not
made up of 10 symbolic terms. Rather, it is an embodied system of
habits of thought that lives in a community. The parts of that system
are continuous in their relations to each other and to the whole.
How are the parts of a continuous thing related to a whole? This
works differently than it does for those things that are aggregates
of discrete parts. In the same footnote quoted above, he says:
"A perfect continuum belongs to the genus, of a whole all whose
parts without any exception whatsoever conform to one general law to
which same law conform likewise all the parts of each single part.
Continuity is thus a special kind of generality, or conformity to
one Idea. More specifically, it is a homogeneity, or generality
among all of a certain kind of parts of one whole. Still more
specifically, the characters which are the same in all the parts are
a certain kind of relationship of each part to all the coördinate
parts; that is, it is a regularity. CP 7.535 Fn 6 Para 2/2 p 319
Having considered these points, let us consider another general idea
that is developed in "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop
my categories from within". In the discussion of genuine triadic
relations, he provides an account of genuinely triadic relations of
quality in which two or more qualities (e.g., colors) are governed by
a general law of quality (e.g., Newton's law of colors). Next, he
provides an account of genuinely triadic relations of fact. The first
laws that he considers are the laws of logic insofar as they govern
facts in an objective manner, and then he considers the general laws
of metaphysics and the law of time. Let us ask, how does the general
law of logic govern facts? Peirce tells us that there are three
clauses to the general law of logic, just as there are three clauses
to the general law of metaphysics and the general law of time.
The three clauses for the general law of logic can be separated as
follows:
a. The monadic clause is that fact is in its existence perfectly
definite. Inquiry properly carried on will reach some definite and
fixed result or approximate indefinitely toward that limit. Every
subject is existentially determinate with respect to each predicate.
b. The dyadic clause is that there are two and but two possible
determinations of each subject with reference to each predicate, the
affirmative and the negative. Not only is the dyadic character
manifest by the double determination, but also by the double
prescription; first that the possibilities are two at least, and
second that they are two at most. The determination is not both
affirmative and negative, but it is either one or the other. A
third limiting form of determination belongs to any subject [with
regard] to [some other] one whose mode of existence is of a lower
order, [the limiting case involving] a relative zero, related to
the subjects of the affirmation and the negation as an inconsistent
hypothesis is to a consistent one.
c. The triadic clause of the law of logic recognizes three elements
in truth, the idea, or predicate, the fact or subject, the thought
which originally put them together and recognizes they are together;
from whence many things result, especially a threefold inferential
process which either first follows the order of involution from
living thought or ruling law, and existential case under the
condition of the law to the predication of the idea of the law in
that case; or second, proceeds from the living law and the inherence
of the idea of that law in an existential case, to the subsumption of
that case and to the condition of the law; or third, proceeds from the
subsumption of an existential case under the condition of a living
law, and the inherence of the idea of that law in that case to the
living law itself. Thus the law of logic governs the relations of
different predicates of one subject.
Why three clauses? Are these the only general laws of fact that have
three clauses? Or is Peirce offering these as examples that illustrate
how every law operates in terms of three such clauses? The fact that
the general law of quality also has three clauses leads me to
hypothesize that, on Peirce's account, the latter may be the case.
Working on that assumption, why are there three clauses for any of
these general laws? When it comes to the manner in which general
law-like things operate in the realm of genuine triadic relations,
Peirce distinguishes in NDTR between three different sorts of lawlike
things:
Triadic relations are in three ways divisible by trichotomy,
according
as the First, the Second, or the Third Correlate, respectively, is a
mere possibility, an actual existent, or a law. These three
trichotomies, taken together, divide all triadic relations into ten
classes. These ten classes will have certain subdivisions according
as the existent correlates are individual subjects or individual
facts, and according as the correlates that are laws are general
subjects, general modes of fact, or general modes of law . CP 2.238
Once again, I've used boldface to highlight the relevant passage. I
think it is plausible to suppose that the general law of logic has
three clauses because the first clause governs general subjects
(which in turn govern individual subjects), while the second clause
governs general modes of fact (which in turn govern individual facts)
and the third clause governs general modes of law (which in turn
govern more specific laws that are part of a system of laws). As
such, the classification of genuine triadic relations supplies part
of the basis of a system of genuine triadic relations that can be
used to explain how general laws govern individual subjects and facts
in relation to the regularities in the possible qualities that each
might come to possess.
(Side note: please understand that I am not going through these
steps for no reason. Rather, I’m developing a line of
interpretation of the classification of relations that can be used,
for instance, in metaphysics to understand the explanations Peirce
offers in his metaphysical writings such as “The Law of Mind” and
“Man’s Glassy Essence”).
Let me try to summarize these points. How do laws govern the changes
in the properties of individual objects? The manner in which laws
appear to work on this Peircean account is not simple. That is, it is
not simply a matter of having a law as one correlate of a triadic
relation that governs the relations between two other correlates
which consists of either (a) the properties of two individual objects
or (b) the properties of objects involved in two individual facts. In
some sense, that is what laws do--but they don't operate so simply.
Rather, the first clause of the law of logic governs the regularities
of general objects. The second clause governs the regularities of
general facts. The third clause in the law governs the regularities
of general laws. Those laws of general modes of subjects, general
modes of facts and general modes of laws, in turn, govern existing
individuals and the possible characteristics they might come to
possess--and any changes in the laws that govern those individuals
and their properties as the laws themselves evolve over time.
So too, I think, when it comes to the way the representations of the
laws of logic in thought might govern symbolic arguments that are
subject to higher degrees of self-control as embodied in the habits
of living communities of inquirers. Spelling that out would take some
work. I'll stop here to see if there are questions about the general
line of interpretation I'm offering of the three clauses that are
parts of the general laws listed above.
As before, I recognize that there may be more than one way to
interpret these texts. Having said that, I'm trying to explain what I
find attractive in an approach that takes symbols to have, as the
first correlate of a thoroughly genuine triadic relation, internal
parts that are themselves genuinely triadic in character, and so on
for the parts of those parts without end.
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
-------------------------
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Monday, April 15, 2019 2:55:36 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce Monument
Jeff, List:
Please provide specific quotes from "The Logic of Mathematics" (or
other writings of Peirce) to support your claim that "any sign that
is general in character ... have the nature of genuine triadic
relations." If that were the case, then what would be the three
correlates of such relations? Instead, my understanding is that the
triadic relation is that of representing or (more generally)
mediating.
CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of
being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it
is both determined by the object relatively to the interpretant, and
determines the interpretant in reference to the object, in such wise
as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through
the mediation of this "sign." (EP 2:410; 1907)
This is reflected by the first EG in the attachment. As Peirce
stated here, there are also dyadic relations between the Object and
the Sign, and between the Sign and the Interpretant--namely, that of
determining--but the triadic relation cannot be reduced to these.
The second EG in the attachment is my initial attempt to diagram
this--in accordance with the dyadic relations, "the flow of
causation" is from Object to Sign to Interpretant; but although the
Object also determines the Interpretant, it does so only through
the mediation of the Sign.
JD: You have focused on the first three clauses. What is implied in
the 4th and fifth? ... For any interpretant that has a general nature,
it will itself be a genuine triadic relation in its nature.
I do not see anything in any of the five clauses from CP 2.242 to
warrant treating either a Sign or an Interpretant as a triadic
relation, rather than a correlate of such a relation. On the
contrary, clause 1 states plainly that "A Representamen [such as a
Sign] is the First Correlate of a triadic relation," and clause 4
states just as plainly that "the possible Interpretant is determined
to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same
Object" (emphases added).
JD: In the process of representation, correlate A functions as a
sign in relation to some real interpretant C, where that interpretant
C, in turn, serves as a sign in relation to some further object D [to
some] interpretant E. What does interpretant C represent to E as a
sign? For one thing, it represents object B is the same object as D
(or B corresponds to D in some way).
My reading is instead that Interpretant C simply has B as its
Object, just like Sign A; there is no need to posit "some further
object D." The difference is that Interpretant C is determined by
Object B through the mediation of Sign A. Likewise, Interpretant E
has B as its Object, but Interpretant E is determined by Object B
through the mediation of Interpretant Sign C. This is reflected by
the third EG in the attachment.
JD: What is more, the kind of genuine triadic relation that
interpretant C embodies ...
Signs are embodied in their Replicas (1903) or Instances (1906), but
where did Peirce ever say that a relation can be embodied?
JD: Thus far, I've argued that all legisigns, and a fortiori, all
symbols have the character of being, themselves, genuine triadic
relations. What is more, I've argued that all symbolic signs are, in
themselves, thoroughly genuine triadic relations.
You have offered these assertions, but so far I am frankly not
seeing any arguments for them. Again, CP 2.242 seems quite explicit
that Signs and Interpretants are correlates, not triadic relations,
genuine or otherwise.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[2]
On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 10:40 AM Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
Hello Jon S, List,
Does the sign itself constitute a triadic relationship? You say, No.
It is the first correlate of a triadic relation, but it is not itself
a triadic relation. Let me adopt the other side of the argument and
see what points I can marshall in its favor.
First, I'd like to point out that any sign that is general in
character: (i.e., all legisigns, and therefore all symbols) have the
nature of genuine triadic relations. Legisigns have that nature in
themselves. Symbolic legisigns have that nature in themselves and in
the relation that holds between sign and object. That much follows
from the account of genuine triadic relations offered in a number of
places, including "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my
categories from within."
Furthermore, consider the following definition of a sign offered in
NDTR:
A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the
Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third
Correlate being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation
the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of
the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible
Interpretant. A Sign is a representamen of which some interpretant is
a cognition of a mind. Signs are the only representamens that have
been much studied. (1903 - C.P. 2.242)
Let's separate the clauses:
*A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation,
*the Second Correlate being termed its Object,
*and the possible Third Correlate being termed its Interpretant,
*by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is
determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to
the same Object,
*and for some possible Interpretant.
You have focused on the first three clauses. What is implied in the
4th and fifth? For those interpretants that really are general signs
in relation to some further object and interpretant, what is the
character of such a sign? For the sake of the argument, let's set to
the side interpretants that are, in themselves, mere possibles or
mere existents. For any interpretant that has a general nature, it
will itself be a genuine triadic relation in its nature.
Let me ask: why is this important for the sake of offering
explanations of how signs and interpretants function in the process
of semiosis? As we try to answer this question, let us shift the
focus of our attention from the anatomy to the physiology of signs
and explain what is essential to their proper functioning. In the
process of representation, correlate A functions as a sign in
relation to some real interpretant C, where that interpretant C, in
turn, serves as a sign in relation to some further object D
interpretant E. What does interpretant C represent to E as a sign?
For one thing, it represents object B is the same object as D (or B
corresponds to D in some way). What is more, Peirce suggests, C
represents the relation that A holds to B to interpretant E. C cannot
really serve the function of representing such features about A and B
to E without itself being genuinely triadic in character.
What is more, the kind of genuine triadic relation that interpretant
C embodies is not a genuine triadic relation of quality (i.e., what he
calls a law of quality) or a genuine triadic relation of fact (i.e., a
law of fact). Rather, it is what Peirce calls a thoroughly genuine
triadic relation. These sorts of relations are special in that the
general character of C, in serving the function of both an
interpretant in relation to A and as a sign in relation the further
interpretant E, is not a mere law. That is, it is not simply a rule
having some sort of generality or some sort of necessity. Rather, as
a representamen, C has the character of a living general--one that
has life and is capable of growth. This is something that C itself
possess as a sign.
Thus far, I've argued that all legisigns, and a fortiori, all
symbols have the character of being, themselves, genuine triadic
relations. What is more, I've argued that all symbolic signs are, in
themselves, thoroughly genuine triadic relations. One reason they
must have this character is that it is essential for serving, in
turn, the function as a symbolic sign in relation to some further
object and interpretant.
What should we say of signs that are, in their nature, iconic
qualisigns (tones) or indexical sinsigns (tokens)? Without arguing
the point, I would like to point out that they are always capable of
serving as parts of larger inferences. I'll leave it at that.
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354 -----------------------------
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