Gary and Jon,
I agree that Gary has done a very good job in moderating Peirce-L
for the past 10 years. I realize that it takes a lot of time and
effort, and we should all be thankful for his long service.
I'll also say that Jon has done a good job in gathering evidence
from a wide range of sources, both publications and unpublished MSS.
I have found many of his selections quite helpful.
But scientific progress -- and Peirce insisted on treating philosophy
as a science with the same degree of rigor as math & physics -- must
always be considered a never-ending dialog with people debating pro
and con about every controversial issue.
The enemy of science is unchallenged cherry-picking of favorable
tidbits while ignoring evidence to the contrary. That kind of bias
is the most insidious block to the way of inquiry -- because on the
surface it can look like research.
GR
I disagree that I "frequently take Jon's side"--I am more interested
in stopping offense than defending anyone.
I'll get back to this point later. First I'll start with the kind
of comment Jon makes that instantly raises red flags:
JAS: There is nothing random about my words, and they were not
intended to "clarify or explain anything about [Peirce's] paragraph"
taken by itself. Instead, they constitute my attempt to combine
specific ideas from Peirce's various writings into a coherent synthesis.
That phrase "coherent synthesis" is the focus of my complaint. I admit
that Jon's words are not random. They are cherry pickings from diverse
MSS by Peirce. But the synthesis is not Peirce's. Even when it may
look like a good synthesis, no one can claim that Peirce would approve.
Please compare the three paragraphs below. The first, from CP 4.7,
states "thinking always proceeds in the form of a dialogue... between
different phases of the ego." The second, from R 280, discusses that
dialog as a "make-believe" which produces "the icon or emblem of a
mental state of things." The third is Jon's paragraph, which contains
many cherries from scattered sources, and only a few from R 280.
Deleting passages from R 280 is tampering with the evidence. As Jon
said, those passages were distractions from the focus of his claim.
But in a court of law or of science, all evidence must be preserved,
and any party may pick any cherries they like.
In a law court, the judge and jury decide. But in science, every
decision is fallible. Anyone, at any time, can reopen any case.
For a "coherent synthesis" of Peirce's writings, there is only one
judge who could make any decision, and he died in 1914. Just look
at the literature about Plato, Aristotle, Jesus Christ, or any great
author of the past. The case is never closed. Nobody has a right to
claim that their coherent synthesis is what the author had intended.
GR
Here's a recent sampling of such insulting snippets taken from
the archives:
JS: That is the most anti-Peircean dogma imaginable.
JS: "anti-Peircean" and "dogmatic"
JS: If you're willing to do that, I'll offer to help...
I admit that the first two statements are a bit strong, and I
should be more diplomatic. But I could justify my point that
the issues in question violated Peirce's methodeutic.
As the example below shows, Jon cherry-picks items from various MSS
to support his own preconceived agenda. That violates everything
that Peirce wrote about reasoning in the sciences of discovery
(which include philosophy). Jon refuses to back down or revise
his claims in long threads in which various people show evidence
to the contrary. That is dogmatic.
The third point is a friendly offer of assistance. Jon is not a
logician. He may have taken a course in logic at one time or another.
But he has not done any research or advanced applications of logic.
There is nothing insulting about making an offer to help.
Gary's remarks are a bit strong: "I learn virtually nothing in your
critique of Jon's argumentation and methodeutic." "I find most all
of your critique baseless and misleading."
Thank you for adding the qualifier: "While I may most certainly be
wrong in this." But I have no animus whatsoever to Jon as a person.
My only objection is to Jon's picking isolated cherries from disparate
MSS to make a point that is often very far from anything that Peirce
said explicitly. But proving that point requires a detailed analysis
and comparison of many MSS. Any outside observer who isn't following
every last detail and checking every citation can't see that point.
Recommendation: To avoid endless bickering, we should avoid any
strong claims about what Peirce might have meant or intended.
Any claim about Peirce or his philosophy that is not a verbatim
quotation is a tentative, fallible hypothesis.
John
-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semeiosis and Experience
Date: Sun, 16 Jun 2019 23:49:08 -0400
From: John F Sowa <[email protected]>
Thanks for the more complete quotation. The deleted parts show that
Peirce was talking about a mental dialog between two "phases" of the
same ego. If you search CP for 'dialog', you'll find 36 occurrences
of 'dialogue' or 'dialogical'. Following is a typical example:
thinking always proceeds in the form of a dialogue -- a dialogue
between different phases of the ego -- so that, being dialogical,
it is essentially composed of signs, as its matter, in the sense in
which a game of chess has the chessmen for its matter. (CP 4.6)
Given this quotation, note that the full paragraph talks about two
parties in a "make-believe". In this case, the interpreter does not
have a name. But CP has eight occurrences where the two parties
are named Graphist and Grapheus. Since both of them are "phases" of
the same "ego", there is no real partitioning of the SA. In fact,
this paragraph does not mention any restriction on the immense surface
where the Graphist or the interpreter may scribe or move graphs.
CSP: Two parties are, in our make-believe, feigned to be concerned
in the scribing of graphs; the one called the Graphist, the other
the interpreter. Namely, although the sheet that is actually employed
may be quite small, we make believe that the so-called sheet of
assertion is only a particular region, or area, of an immense surface;
namely, the former is that part of the latter that falls within the
field of view of the interpreter. Upon the great surface the Graphist
alone has the power to scribe any graph; while he scribes what he sees
fit. The interpreter, for his part, has the power, with more or less
effort, to move the graph-instances about as he pleases, so long as
he keeps them separate from one another, so that no two shall touch.
In particular, he can move such ones as he likes and as many as he
likes into his field of view, the sheet of assertion; or he can move
them away. We further conceive that this feigned sensible state of
things is the icon or emblem of a mental state of things. Namely, the
immense surface with the graphs scribed upon it is the image of the
interpreter’s experience, while the sheet of assertion, his field of
view is the image of his field of attention. His experience is forced
upon him, while he attends to what he pleases, if he puts forth
sufficient effort. The Graphist must be regarded as corresponding to
the “Plastic Nature” of Cudworth, or else to the Artifex of Nature.
(R 280:82-83[29-30])
Now compare this paragraph to the commentary that Jon made about it.
Note that there is no recognition of the dialog between the two
"parties" of the same "ego", and the pattern of words is unrelated
to the subject matter of the paragraph.
JAS, note of June 7: My Experience is forced upon me as a continuous
stream of Perceptual Judgments, often subconsciously, like EGs that
the Graphist perpetually scribes anywhere on the immense surface.
A discontinuity in the flow of perception tends to draw my attention
to it involuntarily, such that the EG for that Perceptual Judgment
appears on the Sheet of Assertion. If I choose to attend to it
further--perhaps because it conflicts with my current beliefs as
derived from previous Perceptual Judgments, causing the irritation
of doubt that motivates all inquiry--then it serves as a premiss for
my subsequent deliberate reasoning; i.e., transforming that EG along
with previously scribed or transformed EGs. If truth is the end in
view, then this ought to be done in accordance with the logical
leading principles for Retroductive, Deductive, and Inductive
Arguments; in the case of necessary reasoning with EGs, the rules
for erasure and insertion.
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