Helmut, List: Remember, in Peirce's late writings, existence is *reaction* (2ns). Accordingly, my current understanding is that every *Dynamic *Interpretant exists as an *actual *effect of an *Instance *of a Sign; but it may or may not conform to the *Final *Interpretant of the Sign *itself*, which is the effect that an Instance of it *would *have under ideal circumstances. This Final Interpretant is *Real*, because it is as it is regardless of what any individual mind or finite group of minds thinks about it; and if the Sign would be affirmed in the Ultimate Opinion resulting from infinite inquiry by an infinite community--i.e., if its Dynamic Object is Reality--then its Final Interpretant is *Truth*.
As for your example, I suppose that any *actual *outcome (shooting a hare, shooting a tree stump, etc.) loosely corresponds to a *Dynamic *Interpretant, while the *ideal *outcome (shooting a hare) loosely corresponds to the *Final *Interpretant. The hunter will *tend *to shoot hares, especially with more practice; but he might also shoot a few tree stumps along the way, and perhaps some other things. However, again, I am using *telos *in the sense of "final cause"--which is not limited to the notion of an aim, intention, or purpose. CSP: It is, as I was saying, a widespread error to think that a "final cause" is necessarily a purpose. A purpose is merely that form of final cause which is most familiar to our experience. The signification of the phrase "final cause" must be determined by its use in the statement of Aristotle that all causation divides into two grand branches, the efficient, or forceful; and the ideal, or final. If we are to conserve the truth of that statement, we must understand by final causation that mode of bringing facts about according to which a general description of result is made to come about, quite irrespective of any compulsion for it to come about in this or that particular way; although the means may be adapted to the end. The general result may be brought about at one time in one way, and at another time in another way. Final causation does not determine in what particular way it is to be brought about, but only that the result shall have a certain general character. (CP 1.211; ) Likewise, I see the Final Interpretant as a *general *tendency of the Sign that brings about the *individual *Dynamic Interpretants of its Instances, but not in a prescriptive or deterministic way. Different Types have different Immediate Interpretants, different Tokens have different Tones, and different Collateral Experience produces different Interpretative Habits. Consequently, different Instances of the same Sign can (and often do) have different *Dynamic *Interpretants, even though they all have the same *Final *Interpretant. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Jul 24, 2019 at 7:05 PM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > Supp-supplement: Sorry, this example did not suit the problem. I try > again: Is his aim the hare he just now mistakes the tree-stump for, or is > it the hare of the future, he will eventually successfully shoot, after he > has shot the tree-stump and some other, hopefully not human things? > Supplement: I want to correct my last question: Is the aim the thing that > is aimed at now, or is it the thing that will be hit or failed to hit in > the future? Eg., if a hunter mistakes a tree-stump for a hare, and points > his gun at it, is his aim the tree-stump or the imagined hare? > Jon, list, > > I very much agree with your "real as a would-be". This is how I can > understand the final interpretant concept. But the quotes in the Commens > dictionary of the catchword "final interpretant" seem to undermine this > understanding. To show what I am meaning, I try to construct an > either-or-question: > > 1. Is the final interpretant the existence of a reality of a would-be > truth, or > > 2. Is there a reality of a would-be true final interpretant, which itself > is not the FI? > > The above mentioned quotes seem to corrobate No. 2. But I could better > understand it, if it was like No.1. That is, because the FI is existing as > a part of the sign here and now, in my understanding. > > Language is inaccurate, I suspect: What is Telos or an aim? I aim the > point you are aiming at, or is aim the act of aiming? > > Best, > Helmut >
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