Edwina, List:
At this point, I have to wonder why I bothered spending so much time and
effort explaining myself (again, and again, and again) to someone who is so
obviously determined *not *to understand, or perhaps is simply *incapable *of
understanding. Frankly, I am not sure which of these is the more
charitable alternative.
I sincerely hope that others reading along have benefited from this
otherwise apparently fruitless exchange.
Cheers,
Jon S.
On Sun, Aug 11, 2019 at 7:45 PM Edwina Taborsky <edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>
wrote:
> JAS
> You still haven’t defined ‘objective idealism’.!!!!! Incredible. It isn’t
> the same as the contents of a string quartet....and your descriptions don’t
> explain ‘objective idealism’.
>
> And you state that ‘something has to be primordial’. Really? Why? I
> disagree. Nothing has to be primordial. Peirce’s cosmological outline in
> 1.412, which you declare that Peirce rejected - despite its similarity to
> 6.191 etc posits no primordial mind but ‘the utter vagueness of completely
> undetermined and dimensionless potentiality’ 6.193
>
> “The very first and most fundamental element that we have to assume is a
> Freedom, or Chance or Spontaneity by virtue of which the general vague
> nothing-in-particular-ness that preceded the chaos took a thousand definite
> qualities. The second element we have to assume is that there could be
> accidental reactions between these qualities” 6.200
>
> I don’t see any mention of primordial Mind in the above, - and it is
> similar to the cosmological outline of 1.412 which you reject.
>
> “By this I mean is, that all there is, if First, Feelings; Second,
> Efforts; Third, Habits - all of which are more familiar to us on their
> psychical side than on their physical side; and that dead matter would be
> merely the final result of the complete induration of habit reducing the
> free play of feeling and the brute irrationality of effort to complete
> death” [6.201]
> Nothing primordial. All modes are ‘basic and fundamental’ and required in
> this ‘objective’ [ie actualization] of mind and matter.
>
> The statement of ‘iron is metal’ can’t be set up as a universal logical
> template that would enable you to conclude that the statement ‘matter is
> effete mind’ functions in the same template. Oh - and remember, the next
> part of Peirce’s statement is ‘inveterate habits becoming physical laws’.
> So, using your template, that would put ‘physical laws as basic and
> primordial.
>
> No - acorns becoming oak trees does not mean that the acorns existed
> first; my awareness of these two is that the acorn doesn’t emerge without
> that oak tree to produce it. Perhaps you have a different biological
> outline of seeds and plants.
>
> But being open to persuasion doesn’t mean accepting an interpretation with
> which one disagrees! You haven’t persuaded me of the validity of your
> interpretation that ‘objective idealism’ means that, like pure idealism,
> ‘mind is primordial’. You have still not defined the meaning of ‘objective’
> in the phrase of ‘objective idealism’. And you ignore Peirce’s cosmology -
> which rejects the primordiality of Mind. I’ve provided texts - some of
> which you reject [1.412] and other texts which outline the same thing - so,
> again, you haven’t provided any argument that ‘mind is primordial’ - other
> than your saying that ‘objective idealism’ means that ‘mind is primordial’
> - and I not only don’t see that but such an interpretation goes against his
> cosmology.
>
> Edwina
>
> Sent from my iPad
>
> On Aug 11, 2019, at 8:11 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET: To say that ‘objective idealism’ is a ‘form’ of idealism, without
> outlining the differences from idealism -means that you consider them as
> having the same meaning. You haven’t differentiated the two despite my
> frequent requests and you still haven’t differentiated between the two.
>
>
> Seriously? It is as if you never actually read anything that I write, no
> matter how many times I repeat myself--including the very post to which you
> replied. It remains appended below so that you can study it further, if
> you are sincerely seeking my answer to your "frequent requests."
>
> Suppose that an author defines "quartet" as "an ensemble of four musical
> instruments," and then a few sentences later the same author defines
> "string quartet" as "two violins, a viola, and a cello." Based on those
> two definitions, would you have trouble understanding the notion that
> according to this author, a string quartet is a *form *of quartet,
> distinct from *other *forms of quartet such as wind quartets and brass
> quartets--but nevertheless, still a quartet? Would you insist that "string
> quartet" must mean either *exactly *the same thing as "quartet" or
> something *completely *different from "quartet"? Would you claim that
> the author's view was that "string quartet" *does not* refer to "an
> ensemble of four musical instruments"?
>
> ET: I am saying that his objective idealism puts neither as primordial
> but that his definition of objective idealism in 6.25 as ‘matter is effete
> mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws’ - means that neither is
> primordial and that both are co-evolving as actualities in this universe.
>
>
> Remember, "primordial" does not *only *mean "temporally first"; in this
> context, it *also *means "basic and fundamental." Accordingly, there is
> no meaningful difference between calling *neither *primordial and calling
> *both
> *primordial, especially in conjunction with the claim that "both are
> co-evolving." After all, *something *has to be primordial; would you
> prefer to suggest a third candidate?
>
> Regardless, in CP 6.24 Peirce recognized *no alternative* in which
> neither matter nor mind is primordial, so it is straightforwardly
> *impossible *to attribute such a view to him accurately. Either they are
> *both *primordial (neutralism), *matter *is primordial (materialism), or
> *mind *is primordial (idealism). According to the text, unless one opts
> for dualism, one must choose from these three options--and Peirce went with
> (objective) idealism.
>
> ET: The first part of the definition has ‘matter’ as subject and the verb
> ‘is’; there’s nothing primordial; the second part has ‘mind as subject’ and
> becoming as verb. To me - that shows their entanglement in actualization -
> and says nothing about anything primordial.
>
>
> When someone says, "iron is metal," which of the two is he calling more
> basic and fundamental? Metal, obviously; there is metal that is not iron,
> but there is no iron that is not metal. Likewise, saying "matter is
> (effete, specialized, partially deadened) mind" means that mind is more
> basic and fundamental; there is mind that is not matter, but there is no
> matter that is not mind. Therefore, mind is primordial, while matter is
> derived and special.
>
> When someone says, "acorns becoming oak trees," which of the two must have
> existed first? Acorns, obviously. Likewise, saying "inveterate habits
> becoming physical laws" means that habits--i.e., psychical laws--must have
> existed *before *physical laws. Therefore, psychical laws are primordial
> (temporally first), while physical laws are derived and special--*precisely
> *Peirce's definition of idealism in CP 6.24.
>
> ET: Just once, consider that we are all rational people on this list; we
> all have some credibility as scholars; and any disagreements can only be
> met with discussion - but not authoritative judgment by any individual.
>
>
> *Rational *people are open to persuasion, rather than dogmatically
> maintaining their predetermined views regardless of the evidence. *Credible
> *scholars ground their opinions about a past author in what his texts
> actually say, rather than projecting their predetermined views on him. I
> *always
> *encourage others to draw their own conclusions after evaluating the
> various arguments.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Sun, Aug 11, 2019 at 5:10 PM Edwina Taborsky <edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> JAS, list
>>
>> You are playing with words. To say that ‘objective idealism’ is a ‘form’
>> of idealism, without outlining the differences from idealism -means that
>> you consider them as having the same meaning. You haven’t differentiated
>> the two despite my frequent requests and you still haven’t differentiated
>> between the two.
>>
>> The fact that Peirce’s ‘explicit definition’ that idealism makes mind
>> primordial to matter does NOT mean that ‘objective idealism’ has the SAME
>> meaning. What does ‘objective’ mean within this phrase?
>>
>> And I do not say that ‘objective idealism’ means that both mind and
>> matter are BOTH primordial. I have explicitly rejected this. So please
>> stop claiming that I am doing so. I am saying that his objective idealism
>> puts neither as primordial but that his definition of objective idealism in
>> 6.25 as ‘matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws’ -
>> means that neither is primordial and that both are co-evolving as
>> actualities in this universe. The first part of the definition has ‘matter’
>> as subject and the verb ‘is’; there’s nothing primordial; the second part
>> has ‘mind as subject’ and becoming as verb. To me - that shows their
>> entanglement in actualization - and says nothing about anything primordial.
>>
>> And now - do you think that just once, could you refrain, just once, -
>> try it — from adding your own personal judgment that another person’s
>> interpretation ‘is INVALID or ‘surreal’ or ‘absurd’. Just say that you
>> disagree; that your interpretation is very different - and don’t go on to
>> the next step of Judge and Jury. Just once, consider that we are all
>> rational people on this list; we all have some credibility as scholars; and
>> any disagreements can only be met with discussion - but not authoritative
>> judgment by any individual.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> Sent from my iPad
>>
>> On Aug 11, 2019, at 4:05 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> ET: But I didn't interpret these terms to mean that Peirce's 'objective
>> idealism has the same meaning as 6.24. That was my whole point - I said
>> that it was a form of idealism but very different from 6.24/c, which sets
>> up mind as primordial to matter.
>>
>>
>> The absurdity of these back-to-back statements borders on the surreal.
>> First of all, my argument has *never *been that "objective idealism" is
>> *synonymous
>> *with "idealism"; on the contrary, I have maintained *all along* that
>> "objective idealism" is a *form *of "idealism," which is what you denied
>> until very recently. Now that you *admit *that "objective idealism" is
>> a form of "idealism," you nevertheless still insist that it is "very
>> different from 6.24/c, which sets up mind as primordial to matter." But
>> the latter is Peirce's *explicit definition* of "idealism"--"the
>> physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as
>> primordial"'! Within the context of CP 6.24-25, *any *metaphysical
>> doctrine that is a form of "idealism," *including *"objective idealism,"
>> conforms to this definition.
>>
>> In other words, if "objective idealism" in CP 6.25 is a form of
>> "idealism" at all, then it is a form of "idealism" as Peirce had just
>> defined it in CP 6.24. This is not "my interpretation" as opposed to "your
>> interpretation," it is what the text *explicitly states*. There is no
>> warrant for the bizarre claim that "idealism" in CP 6.25 means something
>> *completely
>> different* from what it means in CP 6.24, just because it has the word
>> "objective" in front of it.
>>
>> ET: After all - why would Peirce use a different term [objective
>> idealism] rather than just the term [idealism ] he used in 6.24/c????? You
>> are ignoring that Peirce used a different term - of 'objective idealism'
>> rather than 'idealism' - and there's a reason for that. They do NOT have
>> the same meaning...and the use of different terms IS a warrant for their
>> different meanings.
>>
>>
>> I have addressed this over and over. Peirce did not use a *different *term,
>> he used *exactly the same* term ("idealism") and simply added an
>> adjective ("objective") to distinguish his *specific form* of idealism
>> from others--"objective idealism," rather than "subjective idealism,"
>> "absolute idealism," etc.
>>
>> ET: And therefore, with the introduction of the term of 'objective' to
>> 'idealism - I stand by my interpretation that Peirce puts neither mind nor
>> matter as primordial but that both co-evolve together.
>>
>>
>> Dogmatically stand by it all you want, it is an objectively *invalid
>> *interpretation,
>> since Peirce stated plainly in CP 6.24 that "placing the inward and outward
>> aspects of substance on a par," and thus "render[ing] both primordial," is
>> *not
>> *idealism but *neutralism*. Again, this is not "my interpretation" as
>> opposed to "your interpretation," it is what the text *explicitly states*
>> .
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Sun, Aug 11, 2019 at 7:33 AM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> John, JAS, list
>>>
>>> JAS, you wrote:
>>>
>>> 1] What I have claimed, and do insist upon, is that some interpretations
>>> are invalid--for example, the "reading" that "objective idealism" as
>>> Peirce defined it in CP 6.25 is somehow not a specific form of
>>> "idealism" as Peirce defined it in CP 6.24. That directly contradicts what
>>> the text itself clearly states. There is simply no warrant for taking
>>> "idealism" in CP 6.25 as not having the same meaning that it does in CP
>>> 6.24.
>>>
>>> ET: But I didn't interpret these terms to mean that Peirce's 'objective
>>> idealism has the same meaning as 6.24. That was my whole point - I
>>> said that it was a form of idealism but very different from 6.24/c,
>>> which sets up mind as primordial to matter. After all - why would Peirce
>>> use a different term [objective idealism] rather than just the term
>>> [idealism ] he used in 6.24/c????? You are ignoring that Peirce used a
>>> different term - of 'objective idealism' rather than 'idealism' - and
>>> there's a reason for that. They do NOT have the same meaning...and the use
>>> of different terms IS a warrant for their different meanings.
>>>
>>> And therefore, with the introduction of the term of 'objective' to
>>> 'idealism - I stand by my interpretation that Peirce puts neither mind nor
>>> matter as primordial but that both co-evolve together.
>>>
>>> 2] And by the way - you also wrote:
>>>
>>> JAS: I have never claimed, let alone insisted, that my interpretation
>>> is the only valid one. What I have claimed, and do insist upon, is
>>> that some interpretations are invalid
>>>
>>> Actually - you do insist on your own validity of interpretation. The
>>> point is not your phrases of the 'only' valid one' vs the 'some are
>>> invalid'. The point is that you are insisting that your interpretation is
>>> valid while another person's is invalid - rather than declaring that your
>>> interpretation, which you hold strongly, is very different from that of
>>> this other person - and leaving it up to the 'community of scholars' to
>>> make a judgment.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>
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