Jeffrey- thanks for your comments and the article. It certainly
describes two different cosmological hypotheses - and - we don't know
which is valid!
Interesting - that Hawking proposed a cosmology where the universe
emerged 'out of nothing'. This seems similar to the outline of Peirce
in 6.217 - the nothing that is 'absolutely undefined and unlimited
possibility - boundless possibility. There is no compulsion and no
law. It is boundless freedom". And see also 1.409-412, where "there
was no law but mere indeterminacy" and this changed, via "there would
have come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call
a flash. Then by the principle of habit there would have been a
second flash..."
My point here is that Peirce seems to focus on the so-called
'original Nothing' [and original is probably not a good term although
Peirce does refer to 'the original chaos, therefore, where there was
no regularity, was in effect a state of mere indeterminacy, in which
nothing existed or really happened" 1.411]. ] Then - this changed
via the operation of all three categorical modes: 1ns, 2ns, 3ns.
"According to this, three elements are active in the world: first,
chance, second, law; and third, habit-taking" [1.409]
Indeed, in this section, Peirce seems to describe not merely a Big
Bang [of course he does not use the term] but uses a 'flash of
Firstness' - but he also describes multiple universes, "so many
different worlds which would know nothing of one another". The
possibility of multiple universes - also argued by physicists and
cosmologists - is yet another theme in modern physics and cosmology.
Peirce rejects Hegel's view which privileges mind, where Hegel says
"If there is any sense in philosophy at all, the whole universe and
every feature of it, however, minute, is rational, and was
constrained to be as it is by the logic of events, so that there is
no principle of action in the universe but reason" 6.217. Peirce, of
course, also includes chance and individual actuality ie 1ns and 2ns
and doesn't privilege any of them [6.218.]. As he says, 'where
freedom was boundless nothing in particular necessarily resulted"
6.218 - ie, "there cannot be a necessary consequence of abstract
being" 6.218. As he says, in 6.268 "all mind more or less partakes of
the nature of matter".
Again - thanks for the interesting article and the outline of the
two cosmological theories. We simply don't know which is the
scientific truth - and our own opinions become reduced to personal
choice and our own readings and decisions.
Edwina
On Fri 23/08/19 12:46 PM , Jeffrey Brian Downard
[email protected] sent:
Jon S, Gary F, John S, List,
Peirce engages in inquiries that fall under the headings
"cosmological metaphysics" and "cosmological physics." (see, for
example, CP 6.213, As we know, he is drawing on a number of
resources including mathematics, phenomenology and semiotics for the
sake of directing the inquiries in cosmological metaphysics. In
turn, those philosophical inquiries are being put to the test in
physics.
Both the metaphysical and the physical inquiries in cosmology are
attempting to address many of the same basic types of questions. What
is the origin of the universe? What explains the historical
development of the cosmos? One of the big differences between the
two types of inquiries is that metaphysics draws on the common
observations of ordinary experience, while physics draws on special
observations in order to put its theories to the test.
As far as I am able to see, most cosmologists--ranging from
Aristotle and Leibniz to Einstein and Hawking--draw on both
philosophical and physical resources when framing the key questions
and giving shape to their leading ideas. For the purposes of a
science of review, Peirce thinks it is important to separate the two
types of inquiry. Otherwise, we will run the risk of getting things
out of order in ways that might bias and prejudice our inquiries.
Having said that much, I agree with John S in thinking that most of
Peirce's explanations in his metaphysical and his physical inquiries
in cosmology have the character of tentative hypothesis. What is
more, Peirce often seems to be considering a wide range of
hypotheses, many of which appear to be competing with each other.
Some of the metaphysical hypotheses fit better with the best physical
science of his day, but he is well aware that those theories were
filled with vague ideas, had enormous gaps, and would likely be
amended or replaced with better theories as inquiry proceeded. We
might try to rate the key explanations he offers in his metaphysical
and physical cosmological theories. For this purpose, we might employ
the rating system he used in his inquiries in speculative grammar.
With respect to the conceptions employed and conceptual divisions
made in the hypotheses under consideration at his time, we could
label them in the following way:
i. {d} for
{délos}), clear apprehension of some,
ii. {s} for
{schedon}, almost clear,
iii. {m} for
{metrios}, and a tolerable but not thoroughly tried conception of
others
iv. {ch} for
{chalepös} hardly better than {a}).
v. {a} for
{adélos}an unsatisfactory and doubtful notion of others,
For my part, I would put a mark of a, ch, m or s to most of the
conceptions that figure prominently in the hypotheses he offers, I
and would put a mark of d to only a small number--at least as far as
my own understanding of those conceptions goes.
If we compare Peirce's cosmological hypotheses to those that are
under consideration today, then we have our work cut out for us. As
far as I am able to tell, there appear to be a remarkable diversity
of cosmological hypotheses that have been put forward for
consideration by the community of physical cosmologists. In fact,
there are so many that rest on such widely differing conceptions
(e.g., of the nature of space and time), that it is hard to sort out
the metaphysical assumptions implicit in the competing hypotheses.
As such, let's focus our discussion here on two hypotheses: (a) the
idea that the origin of the universe is in a singularity that changed
abruptly at an event called the Big Bang and (b) the idea that the
origin of the universe involves no such singularity and that the
evolution of the cosmos from its origins involved a relatively smooth
expansion of space over time. Let us call (a) the Hawking-Penrose
abrupt change hypothesis and (b) the Hartle-Hawking smooth change
hypothesis. Here is a popular summary of the two.
https://www.quantamagazine.org/physicists-debate-hawkings-idea-that-the-universe-had-no-beginning-20190606/
Quanta Magazine www.quantamagazine.org A recent challenge
to
Stephen Hawking’s biggest idea — about how the universe might
have come from nothing — has cosmologists choosing sides.
For those who are interested, the summary provides a link to the
paper in which Hartle and Hawking formulated (b).
For the sake of comparing Peirce's cosmological hypotheses to (a)
and (b), I'd be interested in looking more closely at the
metaphysical explanations developed the last lecture of RLT. In this
lecture, Peirce draws on mathematical conceptions of continuity as
they are developed in the topology of his time for the sake of
examining questions about the possible evolution of the dimensions of
space and time from the early origins of the universe. Peirce
formulates a hypothesis that the number of dimensions of the
universe in its origins may have been infinite. Over time, the number
of dimensions decreased to those we have today.
How does Peirce's hypothesis compare to (a) and (b) above on the
question of the possible change in the number of dimensions of the
universe as space evolved over time? One interesting suggestion I
have seen in a journal article (that I am not able to locate at
present) is that the differences between (a) and (b) might not be as
big as they as might appear at first glance. What might appear to be
a discontinuity in (a) as the singularity erupts in a big bang in a
relatively lower-dimensional space, would, in the framework of a
relatively higher-dimensional space and time, be a continuous process
of change.
That gives rise to an interesting question: if there is a change in
the number of dimension of space and time from the origins of the
universe to the present time, what might explain the general
direction of those changes?
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
-------------------------
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Friday, August 23, 2019 8:42 AM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang Gary F.,
List:
As I have already stated, I do not see how Peirce's synechistic and
hyperbolic cosmology is compatible with the hypothesis of a
singularity (discontinuity) at the beginning of the universe,
especially since he affirmed more than once that time began
"infinitely long ago" as whatever preceded it--whatever that could
mean--"gradually and continuously developed into time" (NEM 4:149;
1898). Moreover, the Big Bang theory is not testable by means of
physical observations, since it rests on an untestable assumption
that the laws of nature have remained essentially unchanged ever
since almost immediately after the beginning of the universe--which,
again, Peirce denied in accordance with his "thorough-going
evolutionism."
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer,
Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Fri, Aug 23, 2019 at 9:29 AM wrote:
Jon, John, List,
I don’t see how Peirce’s cosmology, which is essentially
metaphysical (i.e. based on logical principles), has any bearing on
the Big Bang theory, which is strictly a physical hypothesis testable
only by means of physical observations. I suppose Peirce as physicist
would have had something to say about the Big Bang, but I don’t
think it would necessitate a modification of his cosmology, nor would
his cosmology imply a denial that the Big Bang happened at the
beginning of the physical universe as we know it.
Gary f.
Links:
------
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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