Jeff, Jon, List,
It’s true that my suggestion of a radical split between the universes of
discourse of physics and metaphysics oversimplifies the issues, as it tends to
ignore not only the variety of metaphysical assumptions among physicists but
also the variety and tentativity of Peirce’s own cosmological hypotheses. I’m
looking forward to further inquiry along the lines Jeff has proposed.
Right now the only suggestion I can contribute is that a concept of time as a
true topological continuum would be independent of scale, while any concept of
historical time does have a fixed scale, which assigns the origin of the earth
to around 5 billion years ago, the Big Bang to about 13.8 billion years ago,
etc. You can’t have a scale in a temporal continuum without marking events in
it and comparing the length of time between events, and those marks appear as
discontinuities. To visualize an explanation of why we can’t locate the origin
of “the universe” in continuous time, I sometimes use the analogy of “zooming
in” on a representation of the Mandelbrot set: you can zoom in on any region
forever (or you could if you had infinite computing power) without reaching an
(“innermost”) end. (I wonder how the possibility of fractal dimensions would
affect Jeff’s idea about the reduction of dimensions over time.)
I haven’t read the Quanta article yet and have a busy weekend ahead so this
very rough sketch is all I can offer for awhile.
Gary f.
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>
Sent: 23-Aug-19 12:46
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang
Jon S, Gary F, John S, List,
Peirce engages in inquiries that fall under the headings "cosmological
metaphysics" and "cosmological physics." (see, for example, CP 6.213, As we
know, he is drawing on a number of resources including mathematics,
phenomenology and semiotics for the sake of directing the inquiries in
cosmological metaphysics. In turn, those philosophical inquiries are being put
to the test in physics.
Both the metaphysical and the physical inquiries in cosmology are attempting to
address many of the same basic types of questions. What is the origin of the
universe? What explains the historical development of the cosmos? One of the
big differences between the two types of inquiries is that metaphysics draws on
the common observations of ordinary experience, while physics draws on special
observations in order to put its theories to the test.
As far as I am able to see, most cosmologists--ranging from Aristotle and
Leibniz to Einstein and Hawking--draw on both philosophical and physical
resources when framing the key questions and giving shape to their leading
ideas. For the purposes of a science of review, Peirce thinks it is important
to separate the two types of inquiry. Otherwise, we will run the risk of
getting things out of order in ways that might bias and prejudice our inquiries.
Having said that much, I agree with John S in thinking that most of Peirce's
explanations in his metaphysical and his physical inquiries in cosmology have
the character of tentative hypothesis. What is more, Peirce often seems to be
considering a wide range of hypotheses, many of which appear to be competing
with each other. Some of the metaphysical hypotheses fit better with the best
physical science of his day, but he is well aware that those theories were
filled with vague ideas, had enormous gaps, and would likely be amended or
replaced with better theories as inquiry proceeded. We might try to rate the
key explanations he offers in his metaphysical and physical cosmological
theories. For this purpose, we might employ the rating system he used in his
inquiries in speculative grammar.
With respect to the conceptions employed and conceptual divisions made in the
hypotheses under consideration at his time, we could label them in the
following way:
i. {d} for {délos}), clear
apprehension of some,
ii. {s} for {schedon}, almost
clear,
iii. {m} for {metrios}, and a
tolerable but not thoroughly tried conception of others
iv. {ch} for {chalepös} hardly
better than {a}).
v. {a} for {adélos}an
unsatisfactory and doubtful notion of others,
For my part, I would put a mark of a, ch, m or s to most of the conceptions
that figure prominently in the hypotheses he offers, I and would put a mark of
d to only a small number--at least as far as my own understanding of those
conceptions goes.
If we compare Peirce's cosmological hypotheses to those that are under
consideration today, then we have our work cut out for us. As far as I am able
to tell, there appear to be a remarkable diversity of cosmological hypotheses
that have been put forward for consideration by the community of physical
cosmologists. In fact, there are so many that rest on such widely differing
conceptions (e.g., of the nature of space and time), that it is hard to sort
out the metaphysical assumptions implicit in the competing hypotheses.
As such, let's focus our discussion here on two hypotheses: (a) the idea that
the origin of the universe is in a singularity that changed abruptly at an
event called the Big Bang and (b) the idea that the origin of the universe
involves no such singularity and that the evolution of the cosmos from its
origins involved a relatively smooth expansion of space over time. Let us call
(a) the Hawking-Penrose abrupt change hypothesis and (b) the Hartle-Hawking
smooth change hypothesis. Here is a popular summary of the two.
https://www.quantamagazine.org/physicists-debate-hawkings-idea-that-the-universe-had-no-beginning-20190606/
<https://www.quantamagazine.org/physicists-debate-hawkings-idea-that-the-universe-had-no-beginning-20190606/>
<https://www.quantamagazine.org/physicists-debate-hawkings-idea-that-the-universe-had-no-beginning-20190606/>
Quanta Magazine
www.quantamagazine.org <http://www.quantamagazine.org>
A recent challenge to Stephen Hawking’s biggest idea — about how the universe
might have come from nothing — has cosmologists choosing sides.
For those who are interested, the summary provides a link to the paper in which
Hartle and Hawking formulated (b).
For the sake of comparing Peirce's cosmological hypotheses to (a) and (b), I'd
be interested in looking more closely at the metaphysical explanations
developed the last lecture of RLT. In this lecture, Peirce draws on
mathematical conceptions of continuity as they are developed in the topology of
his time for the sake of examining questions about the possible evolution of
the dimensions of space and time from the early origins of the universe. Peirce
formulates a hypothesis that the number of dimensions of the universe in its
origins may have been infinite. Over time, the number of dimensions decreased
to those we have today.
How does Peirce's hypothesis compare to (a) and (b) above on the question of
the possible change in the number of dimensions of the universe as space
evolved over time? One interesting suggestion I have seen in a journal article
(that I am not able to locate at present) is that the differences between (a)
and (b) might not be as big as they as might appear at first glance. What might
appear to be a discontinuity in (a) as the singularity erupts in a big bang in
a relatively lower-dimensional space, would, in the framework of a relatively
higher-dimensional space and time, be a continuous process of change.
That gives rise to an interesting question: if there is a change in the number
of dimension of space and time from the origins of the universe to the present
time, what might explain the general direction of those changes?
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
_____
From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com
<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >
Sent: Friday, August 23, 2019 8:42 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang
Gary F., List:
As I have already stated, I do not see how Peirce's synechistic and hyperbolic
cosmology is compatible with the hypothesis of a singularity (discontinuity) at
the beginning of the universe, especially since he affirmed more than once that
time began "infinitely long ago" as whatever preceded it--whatever that could
mean--"gradually and continuously developed into time" (NEM 4:149; 1898).
Moreover, the Big Bang theory is not testable by means of physical
observations, since it rests on an untestable assumption that the laws of
nature have remained essentially unchanged ever since almost immediately after
the beginning of the universe--which, again, Peirce denied in accordance with
his "thorough-going evolutionism."
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
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