Auke, List: AvB: At what place does Peirce relegate religion to methphisics in his writings on the architectonic of the sciences?
I am not suggesting that religion is part of metaphysics in Peirce's classification of the sciences. On the contrary, he places it under "the Ethnology of Social Developments" along with "customs, laws, ... and traditions," as well as under "History of Social Developments" along with "law, slavery, manners, etc." These are respectively the first branch of "Ethnology," which is the third branch of "Classificatory psychics," and the third branch of "History," which is the third branch of "Descriptive psychics" (CP 1.200-201, 1902; cf. CP 1.264, 1902). Of course, "The Psychical Sciences" form the second branch of "Idioscopy" or the special sciences (CP 1.187&189, 1902). My point is rather that Peirce identifies the second branch of "Metaphysics" as "Psychical, or Religious, Metaphysics, concerned chiefly with the questions of 1. God, 2. Freedom, and 3. Immortality" (CP 1.192, 1902). Elsewhere he characterizes "the question of a future life and especially that of One Incomprehensible but Personal God, not immanent in but creating the universe" to be among "those metaphysical questions that have such [human] interest" (CP 5.496, EP 2:420-421, 1907). In other words, ascertaining the reality and attributes of God falls firmly within the domain of metaphysics, even though it obviously has bearing on religion. Regards, Jon S. On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 4:19 AM <a.bree...@chello.nl> wrote: > Jon Alan, > > JAS: Understood, although I consider the subject matter of my > previous post to be metaphysics rather than religion. > > As I pointed out elsewhere our representative interpretants differ > considerably. For me theology is the study dealing with God. It is one of > the special sciences. Religious belief being a matter pertaining to man as > an individual. And the remainer of interest to sociologists and > psychologists. > > At what place does Peirce relegate religion to methphisics in his writings > on the architectonic of the sciences? > > Auke > > Op 20 april 2020 om 3:05 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com>: Auke, List: > AvB: I will not respond to the content of your words since my aim was not > to start a discussion about religion. > > Understood, although I consider the subject matter of my previous post to > be metaphysics rather than religion. > AvB: By the way, I like this one most: > > I will simply point out that Peirce is not identifying those "immensely > superior" beings with God, since they would still be *finite*; he is > stating that the being of God would not rule out the possibility of such > beings. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sun, Apr 19, 2020 at 4:39 AM < a.bree...@chello.nl> wrote: > > Jon Alan, > > Thanks for your response. I will not respond to the content of your words > since my aim was not to start a discussion about religion. In general I > skip mails on the list on that subject. But by our communication on > semiotics being in a cul-de-sac kind of state I started wondering if the > cause could reside here. With our respective views on the final > interpretant I think it does. > > By the way, I like this one most: > > This statement excludes a finite god; although the Being of God would > not, as far as I see, necessarily exclude that of a whole race of beings > immensely superior to ourselves, such, for example, that the whole visible > universe might be no more than a nucleolus in a single cell of the body of > one of them. > > Best, > > Auke >
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