Edwina, List,
EDWINA: I don't see that Peirce promoted any of these views, ie, 'that life is
predetermined in the universe ' nor that the existence of man is
predetermined...and after all, Peirce's cosmology does begin with chance'.
Note that I did not use the term "predetermined." Neither did Monod in the
passage I cited.
Is there some reason that you decided to reframe the assertions Monod made and
the questions I was raising in terms of the conception of what is or isn't
"predetermined"?
Yours,
Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
________________________________
From: Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
Sent: Sunday, May 24, 2020 2:21 PM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To
put an end ...)
Jeff, list
I'm not here to defend or promote Monod - but I think that your description of
him differs greatly from my own interpretation and use of him in my own work in
semiotics.
1] You write:
JEFF: "Here is an example of the kind of position Monod is putting forward:
"The universe is not pregnant with life nor the biosphere with man...Man at
last knows that he is alone in the unfeeling immensity of the universe, out of
which he emerged only by chance." (180)
It is hard to pin down what Monod is really saying. As far as I can see, Peirce
entertains each of the assertions as hypotheses and rejects each as
implausible. "
EDWINA: I don't see that Peirce promoted any of these views, ie, 'that life is
predetermined in the universe ' nor that the existence of man is
predetermined...and after all, Peirce's cosmology does begin with chance'.
1.412.. I think it's fairly obvious that Monod is rejecting predetermined
morphologies, ie, the predetermined actualities of life. Instead, he posits
self-organized evolution based on chance, freedom, choice and collaboration
[ie, agapistic evolution].
...which means...that the laws are evolving and self-organized rather than
predetermined. That is, he includes chance within his notion of evolutionary
freedom where a regulatory molecule "need bear no resemblance to the substrates
or products of the enzyme {Kauffamn; , S. The Origins of Order. 1993; 11]. He
includes functional self-regulation which produces novel molecules which,
however, fit into the current infrastructure and permit functional rather than
deviant adaptation.
It seems to me, from my reading and use of Monod - that he's quite similar to
Peirce's agapasm! You are reducing him to tychism and anacasm but I disagree.
Edwina
On Sun 24/05/20 3:44 PM , Jeffrey Brian Downard jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:
Edwina, Helmut, Robert, Jon, List,
The primary purpose of my post was to point out that there are good
methodological reasons for avoiding the temptation of importing metaphysical
claims into the discussion of the normative theory of semiotics.
Monod's philosophical views in metaphysics, logic and ethics are hard to make
out based on what he says in Chance and Necessity. He does a lot of hand waving
and gesturing towards various sorts of positions as he tries to locate his view
within the larger conceptual landscape. I find it difficult to bridge the many
gaps in what he says about the larger philosophical questions in metaphysics,
logic and ethics because he is covering so much ground so quickly.
Here is a link to a digital version of the text in case anyone is interested in
looking more closely his monograph:
https://monoskop.org/images/9/99/Monod_Jacques_Chance_and_Necessity.pdf
Here is an example of the kind of position Monod is putting forward: "The
universe is not pregnant with life nor the biosphere with man...Man at last
knows that he is alone in the unfeeling immensity of the universe, out of which
he emerged only by chance." (180)
It is hard to pin down what Monod is really saying. As far as I can see, Peirce
entertains each of the assertions as hypotheses and rejects each as implausible.
Teleological explanations and causes involve pretty broad conceptions that have
a long history. As a person who regularly teaches Plato and Aristotle, I tend
to start there in my discussion of the nest of questions that typically surface
in discussions of these large ideas. Setting aside all of the details that
would be needed to make sense of how Peirce's metaphysical hypotheses fit into
the larger historical story, my sense is that one central question that Monod
seems largely to be ignoring is the following: what kind of explanation can be
given for the laws of physics, chemistry and biology? Why do the laws that
appear to govern these natural systems take the shape that they do at this
point in the evolution of the cosmos? Peirce's answer, of course, is that the
laws of nature are themselves evolving.
Is the evolution of these natural laws adequately explained by saying they came
about as a matter of chance? No. Is the evolution of these laws adequately
explained by saying that they are the result of mechanical and necessary
processes? No. Is the evolution of these natural laws adequately explained by
saying they came about in virtue of a combination of the operation of chance
and natural necessity? No, not according to Peirce. I agree with him on these
questions.
As far as I can tell, Monod is not asserting the third kind of explanation.
Rather, he does not offer much if any explanation of the evolution of the laws
of nature themselves. Rather, he thinks it is enough to explain the evolution
of the populations of the individuals that comprise the systems that are
governed by such laws. He attempts to explain the evolution of physical,
chemical and biological systems by appealing to a combination of chance and
natural necessity.
How might we classify Monod's explanatory strategy? Here are five types of
positions that Peirce considers:
Possible relations between law and chance in explaining the cosmos.
A holds that every feature of all facts conforms to some law. A 's being the
persons who admit the least arbitrariness. Most everything is governed by law.
Nothing happens by chance. Does A also hold that every feature of every law is
governed by some further law of
B holds that the law fully determines every fact, but thinks that some
relations of facts are accidental.
C holds that uniformity within its jurisdiction is perfect, but confines its
application to certain elements of phenomena.
D holds that uniformities are never absolutely exact, so that the variety of
the universe is forever increasing. At the same time we hold that even these
departures from law are subject to a certain law of probability, and that in
the present state of the universe they are far too small to be detected by our
observations.
E's being those who admit the most arbitrariness (most everything happens by
chance. Nothing is governed by law. (Variety and Uniformity, CP 6.90)
The position that Peirce is developing fits the mold of D. The position that
Monod is developing seems to fit somewhere between B and C.
Does Peirce formulate explanations that are teleological in character when he
explains the evolution of law? Yes, I think he does. Does Peirce appeal to
teleological explanations in explaining self-controlled processes of reasoning.
Yes. Do I agree with Peirce on these matters? Broadly speaking, yes. I tend to
think that his hypotheses concerning the evolution of the laws of nature and
the systems that are governed by these laws are more plausible than those that
fit the models of A-C and F.
Hope that helps.
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
________________________________
From: Helmut Raulien
Sent: Sunday, May 24, 2020 10:34 AM
To: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard
Subject: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate
Opinion (was To put an end ...)
Edwina, Jon, Robert, Jeff, List,
I am wondering about the difference between Telos and Purpose: Is it so, that
Telos is a Purpose, but not one of the individual´s mind, but of a mind of a
system on another classificational level, or, speaking with Salthe, at another
subsumption level? Then the individual is acting according to this telos or
purpose of the mind of e.g. its culture, species, genus, life as a whole, or
universe as a whole, and the telos is inherited. A super-telos of evolution is
individuation, meaning, that instructions for acting shall not only come from
such super-systems´ minds , but from the individual´s mind, meaning, that telos
is more and more substituted by purpose, and evolution provides the means
therefore, like brain, thinking-in-symbols-capacity, language-capacity, etc.?
Best,
Helmut
Sonntag, 24. Mai 2020 um 15:10 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:
Jeff, list
I'm going to quibble with you that Peirce and Monod have entirely different
views - on metaphysics or otherwise. I consider them compatible.
I've used Monod in my own work in semiosis and for a reason - I felt he
supported Peirce's agapistic view of the development of not merely biological
evolution but also the development of thought and knowledge. . I no longer have
a copy of Monod's work in my library - but - my recollection and quotes from
old papers is that Monod most certainly was not what one might term a
'neo-Darwinist', ie, anancastic or mechanical necessity that is without thought
- with 'thought' understood as the operation of Mind. That was exactly his
point - that 'thought' was an integral part of evolution. And as Peirce said,
these actions are based on 'what is reasonable'. This means that interactions -
as Monod suggests - are not mechanical or haphazard but chosen for their
positive functionality
I strongly disagree that Peirce's evolutionary theory is teleological; there is
no predetermined agenda or identity; all that we find is Mind-as-Matter, moving
into ever more complex and varied morphologies. This is indeed 'purposive' "the
purpose being the development of an idea' 6.315 - but - this idea is not akin
to an ideal [ie, as is a Platonic Form] but is an
open-to-variation-and-adaptation-and-interaction morphology. ie, the
'rationalization of the universe' 1.590 and 'reasonable 5.433. And above all,
the maintenance of 'Mind-as-Matter'. This is compatible with Monod's rejection
of teleology and to permit both chance and transformation. .."nature is
objective and not projective' [1971;3] and self-regulating.
Edwina
On Sun 24/05/20 3:55 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:
Robert, Jon, List,
It is clear that Monod and Peirce are offering competing sets of metaphysical
hypotheses. They seem to agree that biological evolution proceeds, in some
sense, from random variations. From this common starting point, the positions
differ on a number of points, including the following:
Peirce holds that, in addition to chance variation, there is a seed of potency
for order to grow that is leaven, so to speak, in the dough of creation. By the
time living organisms evolve in the history of the cosmos, the seed has been
sprouting as the laws of physics, inorganic chemistry and organic chemistry
have evolved. One considerable advantage of Peirce's set of hypotheses over
those of Monod is that he offers an explanation of the origin and of the
ongoing evolution of the laws of nature themselves.
On a pragmaticist view, we should resist the temptation of formulating
hypotheses in semiotics about the grounds of logical validity while in the
grips of a metaphysical theory. Instead, common sense tells us that the
normative requirements for the conduct of inquiry involve the idea of conduct
that is self-controlled. If such conduct did not have a purpose, then it would
not be self-controlled. Peirce's normative theory of logic is teleological in
orientation because it is based on the idea that the conduct of inquiry
involves purposes and principles that may be reviewed, criticized, and
reformed. Monod, drawing on the existential writings of Camus and Sartre, seems
to agree with these common-sense ideas concerning the purpose-driven character
of the conduct of inquiry.
Having said that, Monod seems to go further. Drawing on the kinds of
assertions that are found in Sartre's writings, he seems to hold that the
deepest human purposes and principles must ultimately be consciously selected
by each individual in a radically free act of choice. Otherwise, the purposes
and principles are not authentic.
Drawing on a critical common sense perspective, Peirce disagrees with these
radical (i.e., existential and humanist) assertions about the origins of
meaning for human life. The wisdom behind our logical and moral principles has
been evolving for many centuries. What is more, this wisdom is possessed by the
larger human community and not by any one individual.
The contrast between Peirce's and Monod's positions in ethics can help us see
some of the reasons for thinking that a normative theory logic rests on
principles drawn from a theory of ethics. For my part, I think that Peirce is
on a more fruitful track when it comes to the question of what should be taken
as the data for a normative theory of logic. The data should be arguments that
the larger community holds to be valid--especially those that have stood the
test of time. It would be a mistake, I think, to take as our data a set of
arguments that some select individual takes to be valid--even if the evaluation
of those arguments is taken to be "authentic" because the underlying purposes
and principles are based on a radically free act of choice by that individual.
As such, I think there are good methodological reasons for rejecting the sorts
of data that existentialists like Sartre and Monod seem to offer for the sake
of developing a philosophical theory of ethics or a theory of logic as
semiotics.
Yours,
Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
________________________________
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Saturday, May 23, 2020 6:45:57 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion
(was To put an end ...)
Robert, Helmut, List:
RM: In this response, after acknowledging our differences, you use CSP's
statements as an argument of authority.
HR: Peirce is not necessarily always right, is he?
This comment and question both indicate a misunderstanding of my intent. I am
not suggesting that there must be final causes in nature because Peirce says
so, which would indeed be a fallacious appeal to authority--as would suggesting
that there cannot be final causes in nature merely because Democritus and Monod
say so. I am simply pointing out that Peirce explicitly (and repeatedly)
affirms that there are final causes in nature, such that denying the reality of
final causes is straightforwardly disagreeing with Peirce. I trust that no one
disputes this.
HR: "For evolution is nothing more nor less than the working out of a definite
end", is theism and speculation, isn´t it?
No, why suggest that? Again, a final cause is not necessarily the purpose of
an agent, that is just its most familiar manifestation. The reality of final
causes would not, by itself, entail the reality of God; and atheism does not,
by itself, entail the rejection of final causation.
RM: Indeed, the quotation CP 1.204 states a proposal according to without a
final cause there would be no evolution, arguing that evolution itself is the
realization of an end, which will no longer be challenged by the science of its
time (in 1902, I presume) which would have provided evidence of it. The old
notion (Democrite I suppose) would be an old-fashioned one who can be mocked.
There is nothing these and who think like me that Democrite is right and that
Jacques Monod is his continuator (he claims to do), with in addition a major
scientific support ...
HR: One may also assume, that evolution is continuous adaption without an end.
One may assume that, but for Peirce such "continuous adaptation" would not be a
synonym for biological evolution. After all, by itself random variation is
insufficient; natural selection also must come into play, and it is not the
brute necessity of the "necessitarianism" that Peirce routinely dismissed as
untenable. Instead, fitness for a particular environment is the telos of
biological evolution--its ideal end or final cause, a "would-be" that is never
perfectly realized, because if it were, then the process would cease. This
philosophical observation is perfectly consistent with not only the science of
Peirce's time, but also the science of today.
HR: And when he wrote "A final cause may be conceived to operate without
having been the purpose of any mind", had he forgotten then, that he had
claimed that the universe has a mind?
No, because he did not say that a final cause may be conceived to operate
without any mind at all, he said that it may be conceived to operate without
having been the purpose of any mind. Again, intentional agency is not required
for final causation, and Peirce's concept of mind (and thought) is much broader
than that. "It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the
purely physical world; and one can no more deny that it is really there, than
that the colors, the shapes, etc., of objects are really there" (CP 4.551,
1906).
HR: The big chill too, like the big bang, is not scientifically proven.
No theory is "scientifically proven" in the sense of being absolutely
definitive and infallible. Peirce's cosmological hypothesis is that the entire
universe is constantly evolving (3ns) at the present from being utterly
indeterminate (1ns) in the infinite past to being utterly determinate (2ns) in
the infinite future. These are not actual states, they are ideal states that
are approached but never reached, like the asymptotes of a hyperbola.
HR: Organisms who have brains apply a third kind of causation, volitional or
example causation: They remember or anticipate something they want to get.
This is still final causation, but it is the specific kind that manifests as an
agent having a purpose. In my view, influenced by what Menno Hulswit has
written on the subject, formal causation corresponds to 1ns, efficient
causation to 2ns, and final causation to 3ns. This is evident in the division
of signs according to the relation with the dynamical object--the latter is the
formal cause of an iconic sign, the efficient cause of an indexical sign, and
the final cause of a symbolic sign. We can also see it in the three
interpretants--the efficient cause of the dynamical (effective) interpretant is
the sign token itself, while its formal cause is the immediate (explicit)
interpretant and its final cause is the final (destinate) interpretant.
Consequently, every sign always (logically) has an immediate interpretant (as a
may-be) and a final interpretant (as a would-be), but a token is only involved
in the continuous (temporal) process of semeiosis when the dynamical object
determines it to determine a dynamical (actual) interpretant. This degenerate
triadic relation, which is reducible to its constituent dyadic relations, is
governed by the genuine and irreducible triadic relation between the dynamical
object, the sign itself, and the final interpretant. Semeiosis without such
final causation (3ns) is not genuine semeiosis at all, but rather degenerate
semeiosis as strictly efficient-causal action (2ns) due to "inveterate habits
becoming physical laws" (CP 6.25, EP 1.293, 1891). This is also insufficient
for evolution because it lacks the aspect of generalization, as Peirce explains.
CSP: Accordingly, the pragmaticist does not make the summum bonum to consist
in action, but makes it to consist in that process of evolution whereby the
existent comes more and more to embody those generals which were just now said
to be destined, which is what we strive to express in calling them reasonable.
(CP 5.433, EP 2:343, 1905)
Those generals that "the existent comes more and more to embody" by means of
the "process of evolution" are both destined and reasonable. But what did
Peirce "just now" describe as "destined" a few paragraphs earlier?
CSP: Now, just as conduct controlled by ethical reason tends toward fixing
certain habits of conduct, the nature of which ... does not depend upon any
accidental circumstances, and in that sense may be said to be destined; so,
thought, controlled by a rational experimental logic, tends to the fixation of
certain opinions, equally destined, the nature of which will be the same in the
end, however the perversity of thought of whole generations may cause the
postponement of the ultimate fixation. If this be so, as every man of us
virtually assumes that it is, in regard to each matter the truth of which he
seriously discusses, then, according to the adopted definition of "real," the
state of things which will be believed in that ultimate opinion is real. (CP
5.430, EP 2:342)
Something is "destined" in the relevant sense if its nature "does not depend
upon any accidental circumstances." The paradigmatic examples are
self-controlled "habits of conduct," which are beliefs as the final
interpretants of propositions, and the "ultimate opinion" after infinite
inquiry by an infinite community, whose dynamical object is reality as a whole
and whose final interpretant is the truth. This is the telos of all semeiosis,
its ideal end or final cause, the aim of every sincere inquirer even though
"the perversity of thought of whole generations may cause the postponement of
the ultimate fixation."
RM: I am very grateful to you for producing a comparative analysis and I look
forward to it with great interest.
There are some hints of it here and in my other post this evening, but more is
still to come. Thanks for your interest and patience.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 2:55 PM robert marty <robert.mart...@gmail.com> wrote:
Jon Alan , List
In this response, after acknowledging our differences, you use CSP's statements
as an argument of authority. Indeed, the quotation CP 1.204 states a proposal
according to without a final cause there would be no evolution, arguing that
evolution itself is the realization of an end, which will no longer be
challenged by the science of its time (in 1902, I presume) which would have
provided evidence of it. The old notion (Democrite I suppose) would be an
old-fashioned one who can be mocked.
There is nothing these and who think like me that Democrite is right and that
Jacques Monod is his continuator (he claims to do), with in addition a major
scientific support; and I guess it wouldn't be sacrilege if someone sent the
compliment back to CSP, 117 years later. Moreover, his proclaimed fallible
allowed us to yet would oblige us to do so ...
CP 1.211 is still an opinion that concerns only, it seems to me, the supporters
of the final cause.
I am very grateful to you for producing a comparative analysis and I look
forward to it with great interest.
Best regards
Robert
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