BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }I
don't think that Robert's contribution can be reduced to just the
podium; I appreciated some other issues.
1] I think he was reminding us that our knowledge base [Thirdness]
is developed, learned, adaptive [and thus not predestinate or
destinate]. It exists within the individual entity. He tried to show
this in two examples, the nicotine and the example of JAS's knowledge
base. Both were ignored.
2] He tried to warn us about the dangers of slipping into a Hegelian
mindset of either nominalism or conceptualism and ignoring the fact
that real objects exist, [Secondness] in themselves, outside of our
particular semiosis . Equally ignored.
3] His 'map' of semiosic processes - which showed both valid and
invalid conclusions - is excellent - and further clarifies what
happens when the direct validation of Secondness is ignored and one
moves into conceptualism.
4] He warned us that relying for evidentiary proof on multiple
quotations - without examples - is not in itself an argument.
I very much appreciate both his erudite knowledge of Peirce and his
quiet wit.
Edwina
On Sat 06/06/20 10:33 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
Jon, Robert, List,
I have followed this discussion as closely as I've been able to as
it is complex and difficult, as much of, especially, Peirce's late
semeiotic thinking seems to be. While I can't say that I comprehended
every nuance in your exchange, what I have been able to grasp has been
very helpful in fine tuning my understanding of at least some of the
matters discussed.
I must immediately add that I do not see Jon as distorting Peirce's
thinking in any way, and in particular in consideration of the
type-token distinction and the commens. In my opinion, Jon's use of
quotations has been apt and judicious in supporting his
interpretations.
As mentioned, these (and other) matters you've taken up have helped
me clarify certain difficult points in semeiotic grammar, especially
when I've had the time to study and reflect on the posts in your
exchange in some detail.
And, as I noted early on, I also find Robert's "podium diagram is an
innovative and useful visualization of the relations among Peirce's
categories, both genuine and degenerate." It is an intellectual gift
of considerable value for Peircean scholarship.
Finally, it does indeed seem like the discussion has taken its
course (I've already seen some repetition), while there remain
apparently irreconcilable differences in your individual thinking on
these matters.
Finally, I applaud your generally gentlemanly approach to the
discussion.
Best,
Gary
"TIME IS NOT A RENEWABLE RESOURCE." GNOX
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia
College of the City University of New York
[1]
Virus-free. www.avg.com
On Sat, Jun 6, 2020 at 8:45 PM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Robert, List:
I do not agree with your characterizations of my views and firmly
deny that I am "distorting Peirce's thinking." The Wikipedia
definition of "type-token distinction" is not how Peirce defines it
as it pertains specifically to signs. Your description of the
commens as "a real object, a collective construction, a social
object" is not how Peirce describes it in the only passage where he
ever uses the term. Providing quotations is not "trying to
compensate for the weakness of [my] arguments," it is presenting the
evidence that supports my interpretations of Peirce's writings.
All that said, I agree that we have carried our exchange far enough,
such that prolonging it would only lead to further repetition. On the
other hand, I also agree that the dialogue has been worthwhile, as it
has helped to sharpen my thinking about these matters. Moreover, I
continue to believe that your podium diagram is an innovative and
useful visualization of the relations among Peirce's categories, both
genuine and degenerate.
Best wishes,
Jon S.
On Fri, Jun 5, 2020 at 9:14 AM robert marty wrote:
Jon Alan, List
JAS > I used "multiple" exactly once in my five lengthy replies,
and all I mean by it (as Gary F. anticipated) is more than one, since
Peirce said that "signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a
Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-interpreter; and although these two are at
one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless
be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, welded" (CP 4.551,
1906, bold added). This is presumably just allowing for cases when
there are two or more interpreters of the same sign.
RM > Whether you use "multiple," "one, two, three, etc." or "more"
you don't get out of my criticism :
· regarding "multiple":
1 used or done by a number of people as a group
multiple ownership of a vacation condo
Synonyms for multiple :
collaborative, collective, combined, common, communal, concerted,
conjoint, conjunct , cooperative, joint, mutual , pooled, public,
shared , united
from https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/multiple
*regarding "etc". :
I'll remind you of my answer to Gary F: " The problem is not in
English but in Latin :
etc. = et cetera; used at the end of a list to mean “all other
similar things”
from the dictionary.cambridge.org ...
etc. = a number of unspecified additional persons or things
from https://www.merriam-webster.com
from etc. "
· regarding "more :
you can choose any positive natural number ( 1, 2, 3, ...) ...
for example 5 billions …
JAS > Again, Peirce explicitly defines "the commens" as "that mind
into which the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in
order that any communication should take place ... It consists of all
that is, and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter,
at the outset, in order that the sign in question should fulfill its
function" (EP 2:478, 1906, bold added). In other words, the commens
is clearly not "universal" and "independent of all these minds"; on
the contrary, it is the one mind into which two or more minds are
"welded" or "fused" by one sign.
RM >
· Again "more" … see above …
I can see what the "commens" design is that allows you to affirm
this last sentence. What you are talking about is a determination of
the commens: a token. You are talking about a token of the commens ,
a token of a type.
"The type–token distinction is the difference between naming a
class (type) of objects and naming the individual instances (tokens)
of that class. Since each type may be represented by multiple tokens,
there are generally more tokens than types of an object. [… ]The
distinction is important in disciplines such as logic , linguistics ,
metalogic , typography , and computer programming ."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type%E2%80%93token_distinction
but here's your design:
"A type is not "an existing concept," it is defined by Peirce as "a
definitely significant Form" that "does not exist; it only determines
things that do exist" (CP 4.537, 1906). A token embodies the form of
the type as "a Single object or thing which is in some single place at
any one instant of time," enabling it to act as a sign "just when and
where it does"
You play on the words confusing existence and reality. The commens
is a real object, a collective construction, a social object.
" The reality have "some external permanency" and "affect our senses
according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different
as our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws
of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really are"
(EP 1.120)
"we may define the real as that whose characters are independent of
what anybody may think them to be" (How to Make Our Ideas Clear) "(EP
1.137)
JAS > I am still wondering what you mean by "conceptualism" in
this context and why you attribute it to me. Could you please
enlighten me on this before you continue your reading, as well?
RM > Regarding the conceptualism :
"In metaphysics, conceptualism is a theory that explains
universality of particulars as conceptualized frameworks situated
within the thinking mind. Intermediate between nominalism and
realism , the conceptualist view approaches the metaphysical concept
of universals from a perspective that denies their presence in
particulars outside the mind's perception of them. Conceptualism is
anti-realist about abstract objects, just like immanent realism is
(their difference being that immanent realism accepts there are
mind-independent facts about whether universals are instantiated)".
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conceptualism
This to explain to you how this term came to mind. But I regret
putting it into the debate because it is really not the subject and
it is not for me to assign you a metaphysical posture. Everyone can
-or not- declare how they wish to be categorized into these matters.
I declare myself resolutely immanent realist.
Now the real subject is, since we have expressed each other
different positions, what are their respective legitimacy regarding
Peirce?
I gave theoretical arguments, quotations (in just enough numbers not
to drown the debate), analyses (the parable, nicotine). I have tried
to provide you with mathematical elements that are easier to access.
I criticized your arguments: I think that you use the inevitable
instanciations of external realities (see again CP 5,483) to
relentlessly and on every occasion bring the outside world back into
the mind and thus deny the reality of the outside social world.
I think you are distorting Peirce's thinking in this way, and I am
clearly opposed to it. I also think you are trying to compensate for
the weakness of your arguments with incessant "literalist" activism.
Colleagues on the list who have not been discouraged from following
our debate so far will judge. Some have intervened with their own
interests supporting certain postures or criticizing others, bringing
new references of great interest.
Personally this has been very helpful to me; I have been able to
better situate myself thanks to you and them, more often "a
contrario", in the Peircean continent. I hope that for you it will
have been the same. But the time has come to stop us otherwise will
repeat endlessly the same arguments, the same quotations, etc...
You have been a very good competitor, a great connoisseur of Peirce
who knows how to find the "right quotes" and avoid bad, tenacious and
flexible at the same time. This useful confrontation was also a
pleasure ...
Best regards,
Robert
Le jeu. 4 juin 2020 à 03:05, Jon Alan Schmidt <
jonalanschm...@gmail.com [4]> a écrit :
Robert, List:
I used "multiple" exactly once in my five lengthy replies, and all I
mean by it (as Gary F. anticipated) is more than one, since Peirce
said that "signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer
and a Quasi-interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e., are
one mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In
the Sign they are, so to say, welded" (CP 4.551, 1906, bold added).
This is presumably just allowing for cases when there are two or more
interpreters of the same sign.
Again, Peirce explicitly defines "the commens" as "that mind into
which the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order
that any communication should take place ... It consists of all that
is, and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at
the outset, in order that the sign in question should fulfill its
function" (EP 2:478, 1906, bold added). In other words, the commens
is clearly not "universal" and "independent of all these minds"; on
the contrary, it is the one mind into which two or more minds are
"welded" or "fused" by one sign.
I am still wondering what you mean by "conceptualism" in this
context and why you attribute it to me. Could you please enlighten
me on this before you continue your reading, as well?
Thanks,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [5] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [6]
On Wed, Jun 3, 2020 at 11:49 AM robert marty wrote:
Jon Alan, List
Answers #1
#1.1 On the unicity of the commens. I know the texts you quote ... I
wanted to say and the rest proves it: one commens for each pair of
minds. That is what you wrote. But now in your answer you write
this:
# 1.2 "Whenever communication happens, a sign fuses or welds
multiple distinct minds into one mind, which is the commens on that
particular occasion."
Jon Alan this addition of the term "multiple" that is not in your
initial text change everything, at least for me! Because with
"multiple" you have possibly welded very large human communities into
the commens in each particular occasion.
So preliminary question: this commens where is it? Is it a creation
that weld all the minds concerned with every mass communication? Or
are there any social construction outside of those minds that have
internalized it through social learning from birth? In other words,
is it the particularity of a universal commens independent of all
these minds? It is an old debate and you will understand that the
answer to this question conditiones the continuation of the debate,
especially the question of conceptualism. It is important that you
enlighten me on this before I continue my reading.
Best,
Robert
[8]
Virus-free. www.avg.com
Links:
------
[1]
http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail
[2]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'jonalanschm...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'robert.mart...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[4]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'jonalanschm...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[5] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[6] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[7]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'robert.mart...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[8]
http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu
with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of
the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by The PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
