List, Jon: Thank you for the clarification of the issue of ampliative logic from your perspective and for the textual references. Very helpful. Thanks.
"The term "ampliative" appears 25 times in CP,…” This is rather surprising. One rarely if ever sees this term in logical texts today. Would you care to speculate why it is uncommon today? One possibility its that the term “ampliative” with the implication of quantity has been replaced with the notion of “logical quantifier”. With regard to the assertions: > CSP: Non-deductive or ampliative inference is of three kinds: induction, > hypothesis, and analogy. If there be any other modes, they must be extremely > unusual and highly complicated, and may be assumed with little doubt to be of > the same nature as those enumerated. For induction, hypothesis, and analogy, > as far as their ampliative character goes, that is, so far as they conclude > something not implied in the premisses, depend upon one principle and involve > the same procedure. All are essentially inferences from sampling. (CP 6.40, > 1892) > > Again, for Peirce "non-deductive" and "ampliative" are synonymous, and here > he adds analogy to induction and abduction/retroduction--which he begins to > distinguish more sharply a couple of years later--as the kinds of reasoning > that qualify. This text is also the basis for my own summary > definition--"ampliative reasoning produces conclusions that are not already > contained in or implied by the premisses" > (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-12/msg00016.html > <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-12/msg00016.html>). The historical nature of logical processes in the natural sciences necessitate that novelty and emergence create new predicates of matter that are constructive in nature. By constructive in nature I mean that the meanings of terms in the premises are transformed into other terms in the conclusion forming novel predicates as well as retaining some simple predicates such as mass. The classic example is the difference between homopathic logics and heteropathic logics (following J S Mills.). This necessity has nothing to do with “inferences from sampling” or other statistical jargon. Perhaps you may have some fresh thoughts on the how CSP’s bizarre usage of logical terminology explains the fundamentally creative nature of natural history? Cheers Jerry > On Dec 19, 2020, at 6:51 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > Jerry, List: > > The term "ampliative" appears 25 times in CP, several of which are in > headings added by the editors, who evidently did not see a need to provide > further explanation beyond Peirce's own texts. Nevertheless, here are a few > relevant excerpts in addition to CP 5.176 (1903) as already quoted by Gary F. > (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-12/msg00030.html > <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-12/msg00030.html>). > > CSP: We are thus led to divide all probable reasoning into deductive and > ampliative, and further to divide ampliative reasoning into induction and > hypothesis. (CP 2.709, 1878) > > According to Peirce, all deductive reasoning is non-ampliative; only > inductive and abductive/retroductive reasoning is ampliative. > > CSP: Propositions were further distinguished into propositions per se and > propositions per accidens. But this was a complicated doctrine, which Kant > very conveniently replaced by the distinction between analytic, or > explicatory, and synthetic, or ampliative, propositions. (CP 4.43, 1893) > > As that other quote also discusses, Peirce's distinction between explicative > (here "explicatory") and ampliative reasoning roughly aligns with Kant's > distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. > > CSP: Non-deductive or ampliative inference is of three kinds: induction, > hypothesis, and analogy. If there be any other modes, they must be extremely > unusual and highly complicated, and may be assumed with little doubt to be of > the same nature as those enumerated. For induction, hypothesis, and analogy, > as far as their ampliative character goes, that is, so far as they conclude > something not implied in the premisses, depend upon one principle and involve > the same procedure. All are essentially inferences from sampling. (CP 6.40, > 1892) > > Again, for Peirce "non-deductive" and "ampliative" are synonymous, and here > he adds analogy to induction and abduction/retroduction--which he begins to > distinguish more sharply a couple of years later--as the kinds of reasoning > that qualify. This text is also the basis for my own summary > definition--"ampliative reasoning produces conclusions that are not already > contained in or implied by the premisses" > (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-12/msg00016.html > <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-12/msg00016.html>). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > On Mon, Dec 14, 2020 at 10:07 PM Jerry LR Chandler > <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com <mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>> wrote: > List: > > Following Jon's assertion, an internet search reveal fresh information on the > usage of “ampliative”, starting with the citation in the Comment Dictionary. > > The Commens dictionary states: > News | Posted 12/03/2017 > Workshop: Ampliative Reasoning in the Sciences > <http://www.commens.org/news/item/workshop-ampliative-reasoning-sciences> > Charles Peirce introduced the term “ampliative” for reasoning in which the > conclusion of an argument goes beyond that what is already contained in its > premises (Collected Papers 2.623). > > > The citation at 2.623 concerns the bean counting examples wrt Induction and > Hypothesis. > Ampliative does not occur in 2.623 > > Apparently, the citation was picked by the sponsors of the subsequent > conference where Commens provides the following statement: > > Charles Peirce introduced the term “ampliative” for reasoning in which the > conclusion of an argument goes beyond that what is already contained in its > premises (Collected Papers 2.623). This is how the term is still standardly > used in contemporary logic and philosophy of science, and how it is to be > understood in the title of this workshop. > > (The purpose of the workshop was to explore possible meanings of the term.) > > Analytically, the citation lacks logical coherence. After all, even a simple > deduction goes beyond what is already contained in the premises! > > BTW, 2.630 uses the term, “amplifiative”, perhaps in a different sense. > > The Oxford dictionary cites “amplicative reasoning”. (But reasoning is a > general term with many meanings > Term used by Peirce to denote arguments whose conclusions go beyond their > premises (and hence amplify the scope of our beliefs). Inductive arguments > and arguments to the best explanation are not deductively valid, but may > yield credible conclusions. Most reasoning takes us to conclusions that go > beyond our data, in ways that interest us. > > Historically, apparently the term did not originate with CSP: > > "1653, Hugh Binning (1627–1653), “Sermon VI.”, in The Works of the Rev. Hugh > Binning[1] <http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/24238>, page 579: > Therefore I take it to be rather declarative, or ampliative, or both." > In summary, this evidence appears to support the ablative usage of the term > “ampliative” as an adjective that modifies the perception of the scale of the > scope of a logic in order to be consistent with the meaning of the Latin root. > > Jon wrote: >>> That being the case, necessary reasoning is by definition not ampliative >>> but merely explicative. > > I continue to maintain that this is problematic. Necessary reasoning in > often ampliative. > > Cheers > > Jerry
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