Gary R., List:

GR: Qualisense refers, of course, to 'quality' while 'primisense' implies
first or 1ns.


Again, I am very much open to the terminological substitution of
"qualisense" (1909) for "primisense" (c. 1896), especially since in its
original context the latter is synonymous with "Feeling" as "the
momentarily present contents of consciousness taken in its pristine
simplicity, apart from anything else" (CP 7.551).

GR: "Molition" ("volition minus all desire and purpose") brings to mind
action (and, so, reaction as well) and so may not be considered all that
different from "altersense" (while they are certainly not synonymous).


The main difference is that "altersense" encompasses *more *than
"molition"--not just volition/will as the *active *aspect of reaction in
consciousness (2ns of 2ns), but also sensation as its *passive *aspect (1ns
of 2ns).

GR: Finally, the sense of "habit" seems quite different from its parallel
term in the trichotomy Jon pointed to, namely, "medisense," that is, the
sense of mediating between "something" and "something other."


Likewise, the main difference is that "medisense" encompasses *more *than
"habit-consciousness"--not just association (3ns of 3ns), but also
suggestion (2ns of 3ns) and abstraction (1ns of 3ns). Here "suggestion" is
not "in reference to the phenomena of hypnotism," but instead, "What takes
place in suggestion is that an idea when it rises gives an upward motion to
all other ideas belonging to the same set" (CP 7.548-549). Moreover,
"abstraction" is "a separative process, the centrifugal tendency of
thought, by which any idea by following out its own development becomes
separated from those with which it is connected" (CP 7.544). Hence, it
encompasses prescission, which the next few slides will highlight as an
especially powerful tool of phaneroscopy.

GR: Of course all the above have associations with either 1ns, 2ns, or 3ns
(as there are many such associations with each of the three universal
categories) ...


Indeed, but if we are going to take seriously Peirce's designation of
quality/reaction/mediation as "the purest conceptions" of 1ns/2ns/3ns, such
that "what you are striving to apprehend is pure Firstness, the Firstness
of Secondness--that is what Secondness is, of itself--and the Firstness of
Thirdness" (CP 1.530, 1903), then I propose that
qualisense/altersense/medisense is the best option currently on the table
for their counterparts in consciousness.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Jun 20, 2021 at 3:55 PM Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Gary F, Jon, List,
>
> For the moment I'd like to direct our attention to a subtlety which at
> first mainly eluded me regarding the 'sense' aspect of phaneroscopic
> practice and the terminology used to express it.
>
> So far we have:
>
> "primisense," "altersense," and "medisense" (Peirce)
> "qualisense," "molition," and a sense of recognizing "habit" (Peirce)
> "qualisense," "sinsense," and "legisense"
>
>
> The last trichotomy above is the result of my entertaining the notion of
> retaining "qualisense" but renaming "molition," *sinsense, *and
> recognizing "habit," *legisense. *Jon and I seem to disagree whether this
> possible renaming employing '-sense' rather than '-sign' constitutes a
> feature (my position) or the *possibility* of a conflating bug (Jon's).
>
> Be that as it may I'd like to point to something which I first overlooked,
> namely, that "primisense," "altersense," and "medisense" bring to mind
> categoriality, obvious in 'primisense', but clear enough for the other two,
> the three of them paralleling his much earlier 'something'. 'other' (in
> relation to that 'something'), and 'medium'.
>
> Now contrast those associations (however you may wish to characterize them
> other than I have) with the those of the three I first pointed to, namely,
> "qualisense," "molition," and a sense of recognizing "habit".
>
> Here the associations are somewhat different. Qualisense refers, of
> course, to 'quality' while 'primisense' implies first or 1ns. "Molition"
> ("volition minus all desire and purpose") brings to mind action (and, so,
> reaction as well) and so may not be considered all that different from
> "altersense" (while they are certainly not synonymous). Finally, the
> sense of "habit" seems quite different from its parallel term in the
> trichotomy Jon pointed to, namely, "medisense," that is, the sense of
> mediating between "something" and "something other."
>
> Of course all the above have associations with either 1ns, 2ns, or 3ns (as
> there are many such associations with each of the three universal
> categories), so I suppose that this is merely to suggest that this also, as
> you wrote, Gary, "makes it hard to even talk about it." Still, if we are
> to go beyond the challenging phaneroscopic practice towards developing a
> full-scale science of Peircean Phenomenology it may be important to settle
> on some shared terminology. Peirce has, as he often has, does not make this
> easier by introducing alternative terminologies.
>
> [I see that Jon has sent a post which, while the above may address some of
> his reservations, I'll have to take up separately.]
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> “Let everything happen to you
> Beauty and terror
> Just keep going
> No feeling is final”
> ― Rainer Maria Rilke
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
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