JACK, List For clarification, here is section 5 of my preprint in which I point out that Peirce proposes a name to designate each category and a derived name to designate the elements (phanerons) belonging to each of these categories. By adopting these distinctions one avoids many confusions.
"5. Some preliminary and necessary clarifications about terminology. Universal Categories are "categories of elements of phenomena." Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish clearly, in any statement, whether one is referring to a particular category or an element (phaneron) belonging to this category. Very frequently, Peirce, when he designates elements, calls "Priman" any element belonging to the Firstness (CP 1.295, 1.320), "Secundan" any element belonging to the Secondness (CP 1.296, 1.319, 1.320), "Tertian" any element belonging to the Thirdness (1.297, 1.351). In "The basis of the pragmaticism in phaneroscopy" (EP2 360- 370) of 1903, Peirce makes systematic use of it (EP2: 364). A distinction rarely found in the literature. Peirce also uses other equivalent terms, notably "a Firstness" or "a Possible" instead of "a Priman, "a Secondness, "an Existent" or "a Fact" instead of "a Secundan" and "a Thirdness, "a Necessitant" instead of "a Tertian." (EP2, 479). This is the reason why it must be well established, from this moment on, that we will have a name to designate each of the three categories and a well differentiated name to designate the corresponding elements that belong to each category. This is necessary because Peirce often leaves the distinction to the reader. For example, he often refers to the correlates of relations as "First," "Second," "Third" (CP 2.274), and it frequently happens that these terms are interpreted as "a Firstness," "a Secondness," or "a Thirdness," respectively. Consequently, we will proceed to systematic rewriting, which will be very useful in the definitions in particular. " https://www.researchgate.net/publication/352641475_The_Podium_of_Universal_Categories_and_their_degenerate_cases Best, Robert Marty Le sam. 10 juil. 2021 à 15:05, <g...@gnusystems.ca> a écrit : > Jack, list, > > First, I should clarify that it is only the *universal* categories that > are “ubiquitous,” to use Peirce’s term. He mentions several times that > there are other sets of categories, or elements, that the practice of > phenomenology/phaneroscopy could bring to light; but he preferred to focus > on the *formal* elements of the phaneron (as opposed to the *material* > elements) precisely because they are universal, and because the set is very > small. > > Second, Peirce does give examples of a phenomenon with only one (of the > three) elements. His favorite is a disembodied “red patch” — but you have > to imagine it as eternal, unchanging, and being the *entire content of > consciousness*, i.e. the whole universe. It does not stand out from a > background, and it’s not the predicate of a subject, because the > subject/predicate distinction brings in the element of Secondness, just as > the subject/object distinction does in commonsense psychology. You can’t > even experience it as “a phenomenon” because that would assume that > multiple phenomena are at least possible, and so you have Secondness again, > plus Thirdness as soon as you *classify* it as a phenomenon. That, I > think, is why Peirce wrote to James that he spoke of “only one > ‘phenomenon’” (CP 8.301) and needed to invent a new word for it, which > turned out to be “phaneron”. > > But once he had defined *phaneroscopy* as a procedure that could be > practiced by any number of investigators, then he could (and did, although > rarely) speak of *phanerons* in the plural: > > CSP: There is nothing quite so directly open to observation as phanerons; > and since I shall have no need of referring to any but those which (or the > like of which) are perfectly familiar to everybody, every reader can > control the accuracy of what I am going to say about them. Indeed, he > must actually repeat my observations and experiments for himself, or else I > shall more utterly fail to convey my meaning than if I were to discourse of > effects of chromatic decoration to a man congenitally blind. (CP 1.286) > > So yes, if someone wants to define “elements of the phenomenon” in some > other way than Peirce’s, he’s free to do so, but according to Peirce’s > ethics of scientific terminology he cannot call what he is doing > “phaneroscopy,” because he is not following *the procedure defined by > Peirce* as phaneroscopy, and thus not repeating *Peirce’s* observations > and experiments. > > JC: To what extent, if at all, is Peirce's system constrained by the > weight of its own emphasis upon the interpretative? > > GF: There is no “emphasis upon the interpretative” in phaneroscopy as > Peirce defined it; on the contrary, the emphasis is on direct experience > and unfiltered observation (which is not easy, as Peirce said repeatedly). > The emphasis in *semeiotic* is a different story, but as I’ve said > before, you have no chance of actually practicing phaneroscopy if you treat > it as a mere branch of semiotics (or of any other science). That’s why > Peirce called it “the most primal of all the positive sciences” (CP 5.39). > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> *On > Behalf Of *JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY > *Sent:* 9-Jul-21 11:52 > > The phaneron, or any phenomenon, always has three elements, Firstness, > Secondness and Thirdness. > > > > Gary, List, > > > > When you say that the phaneron (or any phenomenon) always has three > elements, I was wondering (rhetorically), "Yes, but as defined by who?" I > know this is Peirce's definition but, to play devil's advocate, if one is > convinced that whatever phenomenon has only one element, then does it not > really seem as if this is so (and does not that seeming - the appearance - > thus make it so?). The distinction I'm making here is between "emic" and > "etic" - for the person who believes the phaneron has, say, one element > only, that belief must surely translate into reality? Whereas the observer > who may be well-versed in Peirce sees that person's belief as an error of > judgement. > > > > Or: To what extent, if at all, is Peirce's system constrained by the > weight of its own emphasis upon the interpretative? > > > > best > > > > Jack > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
