JFS: Phenomenology/phaneroscopy analyzes experiences in the phaneron in order to classify and determine the elements of experience. But as Peirce said, the same kinds of experiences may comefrom external sensation, from imagination, or from memories.
GF: The phrase "kinds of experiences" is ambiguous. My specific answer to the question I posed would be that the distinction between the actual world and a world of imagination arises from awareness of the difference between Secondness and Firstness, together with the recognition that these distinct elements of experience are equally elementary. JFS: The distinctions necessary for science or for any action in and on the world would come from normative logic: speculative grammar or stechiology; critic; and methodeutic. GF: The question is not about distinctions in general, but about a specific distinction which normative science cannot rely on mathematics to supply. Your general statement glosses over the fact that according to Peirce's classification of sciences, normative logic depends for its principles on phenomenology/phaneroscopy (as well as on mathematics, from which it cannot inherit this distinction in principle). Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> On Behalf Of John F. Sowa Sent: 7-Aug-21 00:13 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Jon AS, Edwina, Jack, Gary F, List, JFS: The simplest and clearest definition [of the adjective 'mathematica'l': "Anything that can be completely specified by a definition stated in any branch of mathematics." JAS: That is not a definition, it is a tautology. No. Jack asked "what is meant by 'mathematical' here?" For phaneroscopy, the adjective must allow any branch of mathematics that may be useful for analyzing any kind of experience. It's important to state that. JAS: For Peirce [mathematics] is the science which draws necessary conclusions... That is Benjamin P's definition. It's an excellent characterization of the subject, but it doesn't provide guidance for a phenomenologist. Immediately before Peirce discussed phenomenology in 1903, he defined mathematics by its three main branches: formal logic; discrete math; continuous math. Edwina: My comparison to "grammar" follows from a similar understanding of this as a "process of setting up relations and interactions between units". I.e., what is an abstract logical process? The closest I can get to something which fits that description is "grammar" Grammar would be a good way to characterize the combinations of elements in a linear language. But Peirce said that diagrams are closer to the original patterns in the experience. Jack: Therefore- my interpretation of the above is that mathematics is essentially an abstract logical process; not an actual measurement process. But a process of setting up relations and interactions between units. Yes. And Peirce went beyond linear grammars to diagrams in two or more dimensions. Existential graphs are the most common diagrams he used, but he also mentioned his wish for the technology for stereoscopic patterns in three dimensions plus motion. He would have loved today's systems for virtual reality. Gary: According to Peirce, "The actual world cannot be distinguished from a world of imagination by any description" (EP1:227, W5:164, CP 3.363, 1885). As we have all repeated many times, mathematics itself does not and cannot distinguish between the actual world and a world of imagination. If this distinction is necessary for science, including logic, and it cannot come from mathematical principles, where does it come from? Phenomenology / phaneroscopy analyzes experiences in the phaneron in order to classify and determine the elements of experience. But as Peirce said, the same kinds of experiences may comefrom external sensation, from imagination, or from memories. The distinctions necessary for science or for any action in and on the world would come from normative logic: speculative grammar or stechiology; critic; and methodeutic. John
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