List, Gary: Excellent post. Thank you! Below, I will postulate how Gary’s interpretation of this semantic distinction illates to syntactical distinctions of the natural philosophy of the natural sciences and natural diagrammatic mathematics resting on CSP’s notion of the symbolic relationships between icons and rhema.
This is of particular importance in view of the foundations of CSP’s notions of foundations of arguments (the linguistics of the trichotomistic descriptions of phenomena resting on semiotics). In the view of alternative views of Husserl / Cantor and Frege that dominate the axiomatic structures of nominalism, the contrasts and comparisons of meanings of the two quasi-parallel notions, phenomenology and phaneroscopy. In particular, it not merely separates two philosophical perceptions of numbers and continuity, it widens the gap between truth functions based on the languaging of the definitions of the trichotomistic terms and the truth functions resting on the Whitehead and Russell’s notion of mathematical logic. Further, this distinction in meaning is highly relevant to the contradictions of “liar’s paradox” of Russell (along with his notion of atomic and molecular sentences) and the realism of CSP composing categorical "molecular sentences” by compounding Rhema and Decisions. CSP’s logical compositions of arguments from rhematic terms and dicisignated terms can be used to define symbols and lattices of symbols representing legisigns because the truth of arguments rests on icons, not axioms. This view is constructed from the composition of atoms into categories of molecules. The notions of scientific imagination necessary to relate the mathematical operations relating semiosis to the enumerable forms representing legi-signs cohere smoothly with diagrammatic forms would be specific examples of phaneroscopy. Perhaps someone who understand the meaning of the “contradictory term” of “phenomenology”, could imagine a counter-example relevant to the logics of the natural sciences? Cheers Jerry > On Aug 30, 2021, at 7:26 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > John, I am aware that some scientists use the word “phenomenology” in > reference to “The division of any science which is concerned with the > description and classification of its phenomena, rather than causal or > theoretical explanation.” The Oxford English Dictionarycites both Whewell and > Hamilton as using the word in that sense in the 19th century, so it would not > surprise me if Peirce also used the word that way in 1878, especially in a > non-philosophical context. > > I see I have failed to persuade you that Peirce’s use of the word from 1902 > on referred to a radically different practice, but what persuaded me was a > close reading of Peirce’s work that uses the word specifically in reference > to a science which is neither a normative nor a special science, but provides > a formal grounding for those sciences in terms of the “formal elements” of > the phenomenon/phaneron. That he felt forced to change the name of this > science to “phaneroscopy” in 1904 is, to me, even more compelling evidence of > that he was referring not to “a division of any science” but to “the most > primal of all the positive sciences” (CP 5.39, 1903). But I won’t try to > change your mind, certainly not by quoting more of Peirce. I will simply have > to accept that what you call “phenomenology” or “phaneroscopy” is not what I > refer to by those terms when I am trying to mirror Peirce’s usage of them, or > when I am using them in any philosophical context. > > I’ll just go back to the discussion of ADT’s slides now, with that in mind. > We are getting close to the end of the slow read, but there are still some > issues to be resolved concerning the practice of phaneroscopy. > > Gary f. > > From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu > <mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu > <mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu>> On Behalf Of John F. Sowa > Sent: 30-Aug-21 00:16 > To: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com > <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> > Cc: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>> > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide > > Jon AS, Gary F, List, > > We must always distinguish the subject matter of any science from the > people who (a) develop the science or (b) apply the science. > > The dependencies among the sciences, which Comte noted and Peirce > adopted after reading Comte's classification, show how each science > depends on principles from the sciences that precede it. > > But most people who develop or use any science are not aware of the > Comte-Peirce classification. I recall that Gary F said that the > dependencies in the development seemed to be circular. And I > agree. In their daily work, everybody, including professional > mathematicians, are free to use any knowledge they acquired in any > way from any source. Remember Archimedes' Eureka moment, when > he discovered a new mathematical principle while taking a bath. > > But a pure mathematical theory, as abstracted from its original > discovery, is independent of any features from its origin. Its > principles then become available for any science of any kind. > > JAS: I will only add that unlike the mathematician, the > phenomenologist does inquire and care whether a given hypothesis > agrees with the actual facts or not. > > But we must distinguish the subject matter of mathematics and > phenomenology from the people who develop and use them. All people > have all their knowledge available at all times. Peirce was a > polymath. At one moment, he could apply pure mathematics while > analyzing experience. But in the next moment, he could use normative > principles to evaluate the results. Then he could apply those results to > a problem in physics. For a case study, see his Photometric > Researches, or the excerpts I posted at > http://jfsowa.com/peirce/PRexcerpts.pdf > <http://jfsowa.com/peirce/PRexcerpts.pdf> > > JAS: I will only add that phenomenology is not limited to experience > in the strict sense of that in cognition which is forced upon us by > the outer world of existence, it also encompasses the inner world of > imagination and the logical world of mathematics. > > Yes. Experience includes sensations from external sources as well as > anything from memories, imagination, or internal proprioception. > Mathematical experience is a kind of imagination. A chess expert can > play a good game blindfold. And mathematicians can do the algebra or > the geometry in their heads. > > GF: John says, “The special sciences depend on phenomenology for the > raw data and on mathematics for forming hypotheses.” But we have > previously agreed that in Peirce’s hierarchy of sciences, each science > depends on those above it for principles, while the higher levels can > and often do get their raw data from those below. > > Please see pages 1 to 3 of PRexcerpts.pdf. Peirce published that book > in 1878, more than 20 years before his classification of the sciences. > On page 1, he begins with a discussion of principles that could be > called informal phenomenology. on page 2, he introduces the distinction > between phenomenal light (as it is experienced) from noumenal light > (as it really is). On page 3, he cites results by physicists Newton > and Maxwell. > > In citing results by other physicists, he is practicing methodeutic in > evaluating the results of his phaneroscopy with the results that other > scientists had derived by their observations. > > Summary: All our knowledge about anything is ultimately derived from > our experience (by formal or informal methods). Much of that > experience includes communications from other people who derived their > knowledge from their own experience or from their experience in > communications with other people who ,,, > > When you trace all the sources of your knowledge of any kind from any > source, it all comes directly or indirectly from somebody analyzing > experience. > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. 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