List, According to the physical doctrine, nothing ever happens but the continued rectilinear velocities with the accelerations that accompany different relative positions of the particles. All other relations, of which we know so many, are inefficient. Knowledge in some way renders them efficient; and a sign is something by knowing which we know something more. With the exception of knowledge, in the present instant, of the contents of consciousness in that instant (the existence of which knowledge isopen to doubt) all our thought and knowledge is by signs. According to the physical doctrine, nothing ever happens but the continued rectilinear velocities with the accelerations that accompany different relative positions of the particles. All other relations, of which we know so many, are inefficient. Knowledge in some way renders them efficient; and a sign is something by knowing which we know something more.
I've been contemplating this passage taken from CP 8.332. What does Peirce mean by "a sign is something by knowing which we know something more"? Vincent Colapietro picks up on this in his article Is Peirce's Theory of Signs Truly General?, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 23(2): 1987: 205-234. Colapietro notes, in dialog with Savan, that this pertains to a distinction between species of sign (cognitive versus other varieties). I'm curious, though, as to whether we can legitimately interpret the above (bolded) passage as supporting the thesis that knowledge/experience of the phaneron (in part) provides us with an excess of knowledge/experience of the phaneron beyond that which is immediately given to us in any particular cognitive determinant? I.e., does this indirectly support the idea of somatic acquisition of habit? Or, perhaps more controversially, does this not sound/look/feel like Chomsky's poverty of stimulus argument? I'm currently trying to tease out all these relations as part of something larger (but a lot of what interests me here will not make the final cut of my own thesis and so I thought it might be useful to throw it to the "floor" as it were). Best Jack ________________________________ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> on behalf of Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> Sent: Monday, October 4, 2021 8:20 AM To: s...@bestweb.net <s...@bestweb.net>; Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [PEIRCE-L] All Semiotic, No Puzzle *Warning* This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System. Do not reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know the content is safe. Dear John, I used to comment on this every time it came up, these days more like only every 10th or 11th time ... Logic = Formal Semiotic ======================= C.S. Peirce • On the Definition of Logic https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/06/01/c-s-peirce-on-the-definition-of-logic/ Formal = Quasi-Necessary = Normative ==================================== C.S. Peirce • Logic as Semiotic https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/06/04/c-s-peirce-logic-as-semiotic/ (Yes, it's a peculiar use, but it's Peirce's peculiar use in this context.) ∴ Ergo Logic = Normative Semiotic ========================== Corollary This leaves room for Descriptive Semiotic. See Also Definition and Determination • 5 https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/06/02/definition-and-determination-5/ Regards, Jon On 10/4/2021 12:29 AM, sowa @bestweb.net wrote: > Gary F, Jon AS, List, > > Questions for everybody to consider: In the 1903 classification of > the sciences, Peirce did not mention semeiotic, the most important > science that he introduced. Why not? Where does it belong in the > classification? > > Since signs are involved in phaneroscopy, it seems that phaernoscopy > would depend on a theory of signs -- or perhaps it is itself a theory > of signs or at least a part of such a theory. Since Peirce had > suggested the name 'formal semeiotic' for the third branch of the > normative sciences, it would seem that formal semeiotic depends on > both phaneroscopy and normative science. > > These issues seem to create a circular dependency. One way to solve > these puzzles is to define semeiotic as a science that has two parts; > phaneroscopy and normative science. Then philosophy would also have > two parts: semeiotic and metaphysics. This would be a major revision > of Peirce's 1903 classification. But Peirce did not suggest such a > revision. Why not? Can anyone suggest any other way to resolve these > issues? >
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