Gary R., John, List, It is necessary, in the first place, to consider that the text of which we speak is, in the field of knowledge, a true "continent," a metaphor of Jean-Marie Chevallier[1] <#_ftn1>, a particularly accurate metaphor that illustrates its extent, its complexity, the variety of its territories. Inside we find in particular semiotics and logic of which Peirce said himself:
*I am, as far as I know, a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman**, in the work of clearing and opening up what I call semiotic, that is, the doctrine of the essential nature and fundamental varieties of possible semiosis; and I find the field too vast, the labor too great, for a first-comer. I am, accordingly, obliged to confine myself to the most important questions.* (CP 5.488) [emphasize mine] And of the only writings related to logic, he said: *All that you can find in print of my work on logic are simply scattered outcroppings here and there of a rich vein which remains unpublished. Most of it I suppose has been written down; but no human being could ever put together the fragments. I could not myself do so. *(CP 2.1)[emphasize mine] The Peircean text, which contains so much richness, depth, and freedom of thought, diversity, creative anticipations when delivered to interpretation, concerns all the fields of knowledge that are potential places of conflict. Let us be clear: these conflicts should be organized as competitions giving rise to debates marked by loyalty and mutual respect. This is what generally happens in the Exact (or hard) Sciences. Indeed, constitutionally, one can agree, within them, on objective criteria of truth. This is obvious for mathematics and the formal models they structure, much less for the observational sciences, which depend on data processing. On the other hand, for the Humanities and Social Sciences, pejoratively qualified as "soft," the oppositions can be lively and appeal to arguments of authority based on established disciplinary hierarchies or simply on positions of power occupied in academic or associative organizations. The "Peircean continent, "which extends over the whole of knowledge, accumulates not only the occasions of interpersonal, inter-group, and even inter-organizational oppositions internal to each camp, but also and above all the more radical oppositions between the camp of the " hard " and the camp of the " soft "if we follow the metaphor. This "continent" is crossed by a large gap between the "hard" and the "soft" terms that finally plunge us into anthropology. I recall in this respect that, following the anthropologist Claude Lévy-Strauss, we find on the hard side the "engineers" and on the "soft" side the " bricoleurs." Lévy-Strauss experienced a happy collaboration between the two camps by calling upon the mathematician André Weil; this is, in my opinion, an example to follow. This is a question that has not ceased to be asked precisely because of the undeniable success of the Exact Sciences. This success has led many researchers in the Humanities and Social Sciences to look for statutes adapted to the specificities of their field to reach, if not approach, that of the Hard Sciences. For example, the Tartu Moscow Semiotics School mixes two postures: *"For the representatives of this School semiotics was, rather than a particular field of knowledge with its axiomatics and methodology, a key that determined their approach to the most diverse phenomena of human culture and to see important similarities between them" *(Ouspenski, 2015: 30). while the emblematic founder Yuri Lotman himself makes this confession: *"[...] when I take a theoretical step forward, it goes without saying that I do not think about whether it is Saussure or Peirce. Otherwise it would be impossible to work. [...]. To tell the truth, ... in general I am not interested in the models of the sign. What interests me is above all the applied aspects of semiotics ...**"* (Velmezova, 2015: 19) Some even tried to tinker with forms or cosmetic modifications of their discourse (see the Sokal affair[2] <#_ftn2>) only to imitate the hard sciences. One will easily find examples of this in the Peircean field. I have commented on this list about the representation of the triad by a triangle or the improbable invention of broken vectors. The gap is not new; here is an excerpt from one of my forthcoming articles: "Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), mathematician, physicist, inventor, philosopher, moralist, and theologian, an intellectual profile of researcher comparable to that of Peirce. Indeed, Pascal noted a strong discrepancy between what he called "the spirit of geometry" and "the spirit of finesse": *"Difference between the spirit of geometry and the spirit of finesse[...] All geometers would therefore be subtle if they had good eyesight because they do not reason wrongly on the principles they know. And subtle minds would be geometricians if they could bend **their sight toward the unaccustomed principles of geometry*." (Pascal: 1669) This difference has become increasingly institutionalized. It is particularly evident in the academic organization's disciplinary sectors and their assignment to dedicated, separate, specifically managed research teaching locations. Pluridisciplinarity, multidisciplinarity, and a fortiori transdisciplinarity have almost no material inscription. Their practice is often associated with institutional deviance or even desertion from the original academic community, often accompanied by dissuasive judgments on values. On both sides, tenacious prejudices have been established that must be confronted as calmly as possible."(From "Iconographic and Mathematical Models in Semiotics; *From the 'unformed' to Peirce's 'skeletons sets'")* I come back to the beginning of my argument: we must make, collectively and in the long run, a rational representative construction of Peirce's work that is communicable with a minimum of effort. To reach this goal, we must not fall into a dialogue of the deaf. We are also backwoodsmen in the traces left by Peirce; faithful to his spirit there are several of us on this list who follow and develop some of these traces. We find them particularly relevant because we have new tools. Some literalists think we should leave the forest as it is. Every time they get in the way, which keeps happening, there's a big problem. Regards, Robert Marty ------------------------------ [1] <#_ftnref1> (11) (PDF) La découverte du continent peircien | Jean-Marie C Chevalier - Academia.edu <https://www.academia.edu/3383353/La_d%C3%A9couverte_du_continent_peircien> [2] <#_ftnref2> Sokal affair - Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sokal_affair> Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* Le dim. 10 oct. 2021 à 23:48, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> a écrit : > John, List, > > John, do you really believe that most everyone -- or even many a one -- > now working in linguistics, cognitive science, and AI sufficiently, let > alone, thoroughly understands Peirce's contributions to philosophy, > semeiotic and a number of relevant sciences and so they are now fully ready > to employ it to springboard into a new "foundation for science"? Would > that were the case. > > Your paper, "Peirce's contributions to the 21st century" (which I read > during that decade when I was attending your *International Conference on > Conceptual Structure* and was reading all your papers then available as > well as the 1st edition of your book on KR), your "Peirce's contributions" > paper, even in its abstract, suggests that you are, of course, well aware > that Peirce has been severely neglected; and, I would add, not only > neglected but misused by certain thinkers, and not only those whom you > mentioned in the analytic tradition. > > Abstract. Peirce was [. . .] a largely neglected philosopher in the 20th > century. Peirce's research in logic, physics, mathematics, and lexicography > made him uniquely qualified to appreciate the rigors of science, the > nuances of language, and the semiotic processes that support both. Instead > of using logic to understand language, the philosophers who began the > analytic tradition — Frege, Russell, and Carnap — tried to replace language > with a purified version of logic. As a result, they created an unbridgeable > gap between themselves and the so-called Continental philosophers, they > exacerbated the behaviorist tendency to reject any study of meaning, and > they left semantics as an unexplored wilderness with only a few elegantly > drawn, but incomplete maps. . . This article reviews the ongoing efforts to > construct a new foundation for 21st-century philosophy on the basis of > Peirce's research and its potential for revolutionizing the study of > meaning in cognitive science, especially in the fields of linguistics and > artificial intelligence. > > > It seems to me that the continuing, and in many cases, excellent work of > those who want Peirce to be understood on his own terms, that *that* work > ought to be respected as a kind of propaedeutic to the 'revolutionary' "new > foundation" for science which you propose. By this I mean that in my view > one needs a clear, contextualized and, optimally, both broad understanding > as well as a specific (to the disciplines one is working in) understanding > of what Peirce thought, as difficult as it may be to attain those > understandings. > > Peirce was not only thoroughly neglected, but some of those early 20th > century scholars knew well enough *the potential value *of his work and > opted to ignore it for various reasons including out of a sense of its very > power and potential, in many cases far exceeding their own. Their studies > led to a kind of logical dead-end which we have yet to recover from. In > addition, many of these scholars were clearly much more concerned with > creating 'schools' of 20th century analytic thought and forming the > faculties of university departments and the like than they were with the > advance of science. That is, and in particular, they were considerably more > interested in career building and fame than in logic. And so there was a > lot of me-tooism (as opposed to *hetero-criticism*, to use Peirce's term) > in those schools and university departments. Of course you know all this as > you've written about it. > > Then there were several 'thieves of Peirce', like Charles Morris and > Walker Percy, who both misunderstood and misused Peirce, taking what they > could use for their own purposes, leaving behind what they could use (or, > perhaps, grasp) and typically misrepresenting Peirce, including by using > some of his terminology and modifying it to mean concepts far different > than he had intended, this to the confusion of generations of students of > philosophy of science, linguistics, logic, semiotic, etc. > > Take for example Morris' dyadic and psychologically based, indeed, > social behaviorally based (stimulus-response) theory which employs Peirce- > *like* terminology, notably, 'syntactics', 'semantics', and 'pragmatics'. > This is the kind of distortion which happens when Peirce's work in a given > area of science or philosophy is not fully comprehended or, in the case of > Morris, perhaps purposely misinterpreted. It has been my experience that > too many (all whom I know, some of whom are friends) KR workers employ > Morris' distorted terms (and the meanings he affords them) and are > generally ignorant of how Peirce employs the original terminology in his > semeiotic. > > And I am of the mind that Morris' is just one -- albeit a major example-- > of misrepresentation and misuse of facets of Peirce's work, Richard Rorty's > postmodern neo-pragmatism being another (in)famous example. See Susan' > Haack's damning criticism of his distortions in "Vulgar Rortyism." > https://newcriterion.com/issues/1997/11/vulgar-rortyism > > You write, John, that you now have "no intention of telling anyone what > they should not do." But the implication of what you've written on the > List is and remains that those who are trying to thoroughly understand what > Peirce thought -- and as they see it *precisely* for the edification of > scholars and scientists of the present and future -- are, well, rather > wasting time since, apparently, we already know enough of what we need to > know of his thought. Is this why you think that only a few scholars, > philosophers, and scientists at conferences like APA are interested in > researching and learning about Peirce's work in depth? > > Yet you also seem to "acknowledge that those with a textual focus are > vital to the whole research field," "but a far more important issue is > what his ideas mean for us today." Well, which is it? If a "textual > focus' is *vital*, then it would seem to be an* equally* important issue. > > Of course I personally think these two ought to be put on an equal footing > and, in fact, mutually fructify each other. The scholars whom I know in > person or by reputation (and I know quite a few) who are working "with a > textual focus" would all like to see Peirce's work play a greater role in > the semeiotic, linguistic, and cognitive science of our day and into the > future. They merely tend to strongly agree with you when you write that > their focus is "vital to the whole research field." > > Best, > > Gary R > > “Let everything happen to you > Beauty and terror > Just keep going > No feeling is final” > ― Rainer Maria Rilke > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > > > > > > > On Sun, Oct 10, 2021 at 1:30 PM sowa @bestweb.net <s...@bestweb.net> > wrote: > >> I accidentally hit SEND on my previous reply. >> >> I won't criticize anybody's attempts to determine exactly what Peirce >> intended a century ago/ But a far more important issue is what his ideas >> mean for us today. A few years ago, I wrote a widely cited n article with >> the title "Peirce's contributions to the 21st century: >> http://jfsowa.com/pubs/csp21st. If I were writing that today, I'd add >> quite a bit more. >> >> On the topic of continuity and dimensionality, an enormous amount of new >> work has been published in the century after Peirce. For a survey, see the >> article on infinite dimensional category theory in the October 2021 issue >> of Scientific American. This is related to the work that Robert Marty and >> others have been discussing. >> >> Different people have different preferences. Textual criticism of what >> Peirce wrote (as the PEP project was doing) is important. Surveys of what >> Peirce wrote are also important. But at APA,conferences that kind of work >> is buried in sessions that are only attended by Peirce scholars. >> Meanwhile, lectures on other 19th century philosophers and logicians >> (Frege, for example) get far more attention in general sessions. >> >> I have no intention of telling anyone what they should not do. But >> Peirce himself wwas writing for the future, especially in the last several >> years of his life. I believe that Peirce's legacy depends critically on >> his relevance for ongoing research today. The Peirce Centennial Congress >> in 2014 was far more exciting. It drew international participants from a >> wide range of fields who showed how Peirce's ideas had influenced their >> research today. >> >> I have no intention of stopping anybody from talking about the past, but >> Peirce's emphasis was always on the future. I believe that Peirce would >> strongly encourage us to relate his ideas to the latest research today. >> >> John >> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . >> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to >> l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the >> message and nothing in the body. More at >> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; >> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
