Helmut, Gary R., List:

HR: I think, that abiotic semiosis follows efficient causation, which is
deductive necessity, the O-R-I follows rule-case-result ...


I am inclined to agree, in accordance with what I posted earlier about
physicosemiosis being *degenerate *semiosis, the result of "inveterate
habits becoming physical laws."

HR: Biotic semiosis also follows final causation, which is inductive
probability, the O-R-I is case-result-rule.


Peirce does not confine final causation to *biological* processes, he also
associates it with *statistical *phenomena.

CSP: Those non-conservative actions which seem to violate the law of
energy, and which physics explains away as due to chance-action among
trillions of molecules, are one and all marked by two characters. The first
is that they act in one determinate direction and tend asymptotically
toward bringing about an ultimate state of things. If teleological is too
strong a word to apply to them, we might invent the word *finious*, to
express their tendency toward a final state. The other character of
non-conservative actions is that they are *irreversible*. (CP 7.471, 1898)


The trillions of molecules are *individually *interacting with each other
in a strictly efficient-causal way, and yet the *overall *physical process
has a definite and irreversible "tendency toward a final state."

HR: If we say, that semiotics is about (a mind´s) representation of
objects, then in abiotic nature there are no discrete material objects,
because they are not represented, but just mindlessly interact.


Peirce generalizes 3ns from representation to mediation, and a discrete
material object S *can *mediate between two other discrete material objects
O and I. This is what happens in the situation where O efficiently causes
S, and then S efficiently causes I, such that O causes I by causing S; for
example, when three billiard balls impact each other sequentially. However,
the interaction of the three correlates is reducible to those two
*dyadic *relations
rather than being a genuine *triadic *relation.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Nov 21, 2021 at 9:32 AM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:

> Supplement: Maybe "If A then B", the law, is the dynamic object, and the
> law`s instantiation "A, therefore B" is the immediate object.
>
> Gary, Jon, List,
> "that it is not necessarily* only* biological organisms which are
> living", I think, is Peirce-related, as he claims a quasi-mind of the
> universe, given, that a quasi-mind makes a living being. If we say, that
> semiotics is about (a mind´s) representation of objects, then in abiotic
> nature there are no discrete material objects, because they are not
> represented, but just mindlessly interact. Maybe this is the real
> "not-real"-issue. But if we say, that the natural laws are the objects,
> then we can speak of representation: Each situation is a representamen
> denoting the object natural law, and determined by it. The result from this
> is the interpretant interaction.
>
> If we put a natural law in the form "If A then B", then "If A then B" is
> the object law, whose instantiation is "A, therefore B". "A" is the
> representamen situation, and "B" is the interpretant result, the
> interaction.
>
> Best,
> Helmut
>  21. November 2021 um 15:49 Uhr
> "Gary Richmond" <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> Helmut, Jon, List,
>
> You asked: "Is this far-fetching to press it into a table?"
>
> Whatever may be the case for biotic semiosis/biosemiosis (I'd suggest that
> 'nervous semiosis' is a form of the former), since semiosis has come to be
> seen by many researchers as always-already rather clearly in effect in the
> life forms on earth, it seems to me that you are begging the question to
> apply the O-R-I semiotic triad to abioticsemiosis when, it would appear,
> that the thrust of Champagne's article is that we ought to deeply reflect
> on the very conditions necessary to prove the reality of abioticsemiosis.
>
> While Deely finds support for the idea of the reality of abioticsemiosis
> in the work of Poinsot and Peirce (for example, consider this well known
> CSP quote that Jon offered: "Thought [. . .] appears in the work of bees,
> of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"); and while the 
> "inference
> to the best explanation" (that the 'absence of semiosis outside the living
> world would turn out to be more. . . unlikely than its presence' " is, at
> least for me, rather compelling, yet merely asserting that
> abioticsemiosis is a scientific fact is obviously in itself insufficient as
> a proof of its reality (apparently the motivation behind Champagne's
> article, which centers on what he believes is necessary for such a proof of
> abioticsemiosis).
>
> Yet I am also questioning Champagne's claim that "in order to truly
> establish the presence of sign-action in the non-living world, all the
> components of a triadic sign – including the interpretant – would have to
> be abiotic (that is,not  dependent on a living organism)." My thought is
> that it is not necessarily* only* biological organisms which are living.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>   “Let everything happen to you
> Beauty and terror
> Just keep going
> No feeling is final”
> ― Rainer Maria Rilke
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
> On Sun, Nov 21, 2021 at 5:16 AM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
>
>> Gary, List,
>>
>> I think, that abiotic semiosis follows  efficient causation, which is
>> deductive necessity, the O-R-I follows rule-case-result (See Peirce´s
>> example with the beans from the bag). E.g.: The rule is that masses attract
>> each other (law as object), the case (representamen) is two masses with a
>> certain distance and no relative velocity, the result (interpretant) is
>> they are drawn towards each other and collide.
>>
>> Biotic semiosis also follows final causation, which is inductive
>> probability, the O-R-I is case-result-rule. E.G.: An organism (objectively)
>> needs food (case), it is hungry (result, representamen), when it then eats,
>> the hunger and the need go away (rule, law, interpretant). The constraint
>> on matter is the organism´s skin.
>>
>> Nervous semiosis also follows example causation (secularized causa
>> exemplaris), which is abductive plausibility, the O-R-I is
>> result-rule-case. E,g.: A neural image is a result (e.g of vision or
>> smelling) and the object of an animal´s nervous system. About this object
>> exists an abductive rule of plausibility, e.g. it is plausibly good or bad
>> for the organism. This feeling of good or bad is the representamen. The
>> case is that then the organism either pusues or flees it (interpretant).
>>
>> Is this far-fetching to press it into a table? Just an attempt.
>>
>> Best, Helmut
>>
>
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