Gary R., List: I apologize for this lengthy post with numerous Peirce quotations, but you raised several issues that are deep and complex, such that I saw no other way to address them adequately. I have changed the subject line since we are not really discussing Champagne's article anymore.
GR: Doesn't your Whiteboard expansion of the Blackboard example have God scribing a particular universe with some particular characteristics out of all the Platonic possibilities; so, for prime example, our universe? Yes, "whiteboard" is my suggested shorthand for a melded group of chalk marks on the blackboard, representing a Platonic world; and our existing universe is "a discontinuous mark," a continuum of lower dimensionality, on one such whiteboard (NEM 4:345, 1898; CP 6.206-208, 1898). I discuss this in detail in section 5 of "A Neglected Additament: Peirce on Logic, Cosmology, and the Reality of God" ( https://tidsskrift.dk/signs/article/view/103187). GR: If our universe has no beginning, then what is the purpose and meaning of God scribing some particular potential Platonic ideas which will constitute characters of *this* universe? What Peirce states is that "past time had no definite beginning, yet came about by a process which in a generalized sense, of which we cannot easily get much idea, was a development" (CP 6.506, c. 1906). He elaborates on this in an earlier manuscript, right after giving a brief commentary on the first few verses of Genesis. CSP: This first day of creation was all in the very first moment of time. ... That first moment of time was of course infinitely long ago. But more than that, although it was but one moment, it was infinitely longer than any number of ages. It contained as great a multitude of ages as there are points upon a continuous line. In one sense this continuum was not time, it is true, because it all occupied but a moment of time. But it was not only strictly analogous to time, but it gradually and continuously developed into time; so that it was of one continuous nature with time. All that follows from the principles of continuity. (NEM 4:139, 1898) Nevertheless, God as a "disembodied spirit, or pure mind, has its being out of time" (CP 6.490, 1908). Hence, time as a continuous whole is a *created *aspect of our existing universe, even if it extends into the infinite past and infinite future as Peirce maintains. A *definite *beginning of time, such as the singularity posited by the Big Bang theory, would be a *discontinuity*. He rejects this accordingly, claiming instead that "there is no absolutely first and last of time" and "there must be a connection of time ring-wise" (CP 1.498, c. 1896) such that it must somehow "return into itself" (CP 1.274, 1902). I discuss this in detail in section 7 of "Temporal Synechism: A Peircean Philosophy of Time" (https://rdcu.be/b9xVm). GR: As for scientists' views of whether physical laws are immutable -- likely the opinion of most every 19th and 20th century physicist -- today that may be changing. This is a welcome development, but the Big Bang theory is now quite entrenched within our entire culture, not just the community of physicists. I suspect that most people do not recognize the underlying *assumption *that the physical laws of our universe have not changed since immediately after the alleged singularity. GR: Now I thought your Whiteboard expansion of Peirce's Blackboard example was, at least in part, meant to suggest that other universes were possible out of the infinite number of Platonic characters which could be 'chosen', as it were, by the Inscriber. Peirce himself suggests that there are (or at least could be) multiple Platonic worlds corresponding to different groups of melded chalk marks that I call whiteboards, which would presumably be different from not only our universe of actuality but also the entire universe of possibilities from which it is actualized. As such, our finite imaginations likely cannot even conceive those alternative possibilities, but the infinite mind of God certainly could. As Peirce says, "We start, then, with nothing, pure zero. ... It is the germinal nothing, in which the whole universe is involved or foreshadowed. As such, it is absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility--boundless possibility. There is no compulsion and no law. It is boundless freedom" (CP 6.217, 1898). But *whose *freedom? I take it to be *divine *freedom, which God exercises in *choosing *which possibilities to actualize, including our entire existing universe. GR: Finally, what of Peirce's view that this universe at least will at last deaden into cold material wholly lacking life and spirit? As I understand it, Peirce's view is *not *that this universe *will *at some point in the *finite *future "deaden into cold material wholly lacking life and spirit," but that it *would *do so in the *infinite *future. CSP: At present, the course of events is approximately determined by law. In the past that approximation was less perfect; in the future it will be more perfect. The tendency to obey laws has always been and always will be growing. We look back toward a point in the infinitely distant past when there was no law but mere indeterminacy; we look forward to a point in the infinitely distant future when there will be no indeterminacy or chance but a complete reign of law. But at any assignable date in the past, however early, there was already some tendency toward uniformity; and at any assignable date in the future there will be some slight aberrancy from law. (CP 1.409, EP 1:277, 1887-8) The persistence of "some slight aberrancy from law" is Peirce's doctrine of *tychism*. What prevents "the complete induration of habit reducing the free play of feeling and the brute irrationality of effort to complete death" is the reality that "absolute chance is a factor in the universe"; but as he goes on to say, "when I speak of chance, I only employ a mathematical term to express with accuracy the characteristics of freedom or spontaneity" (CP 6.201, 1898). Again, *whose *freedom or spontaneity? Again, I take it to be *divine *freedom and spontaneity. This is consistent with understanding our entire universe to be what Peirce calls "a *perfect *sign, in the sense that it involves the present existence of no other sign except such as are ingredients of itself. ... It is perpetually being acted upon by its object, from which it is perpetually receiving the accretions of new signs, which bring it fresh energy, and also kindle energy that it already had, but which had lain dormant" (EP 2:545n, 1906). What else but God could be the *object *of our entire universe as a perfect sign--something external to, independent of, and unaffected by it? What else but God could be continually infusing it with new signs and fresh energy? "In addition, the perfect sign never ceases to undergo changes of the kind we rather drolly call *spontaneous*, that is, they happen *sua sponte* but not by *its* will" (ibid). By *whose *will could these spontaneous changes happen, if not by God's will? GR: For as everything which expresses "mind in general" must itself be embodied, have a structure, whether it's a human mind (better: what some would call a 'body-mind') or a bee body-mind colony (within its *umwelt*), or a crystal-quasi-mind (also necessarily involving structure, although admittedly it would be a stretch to call such structures 'embodied'). *Within *our universe as it exists today, it might indeed be the case that all *created *mind is embodied, but my understanding of Peirce's objective idealism is that it was *not *so at the (indefinite) beginning. If mind is primordial and matter is a peculiar sort of mind, such that inveterate habits *became *physical laws, then the embodiment of mind is in some sense a subsequent development--in fact, a creative process that is still ongoing and will never *actually *be finished. "This development of Reason consists, you will observe, in embodiment, that is, in manifestation. The creation of the universe, which did not take place during a certain busy week, in the year 4004 B.C., but is going on today and never will be done, is this very development of Reason" (CP 1.615, EP 2:255, 1903). GR: In my view (perhaps not Deacon's, but springboarding off of it), mind is certainly primordial as it *must* be active for there to be any kind of cosmic evolution (let alone, and long before the biological one) in the structuring of those 'materials' ... that is, everything prerequisite for their eventual forming viable structures via Deacon's 'constraints' into such structural arrangements as crystals, and organisms such as bees ... As I understand Peirce's view, it is that mind is not merely what *structures *matter, it is what *precedes *and *becomes *matter. Those "materials" do not exist from the (indefinite) beginning, but instead come into existence as primordial created mind gradually evolves into matter--"specialized and partially deadened mind" (CP 6.102, EP 1:312, 1892), which is "so completely under the domination of habit as to act with almost perfect regularity & to have lost its powers of forgetting & of learning" (R 936:3, no date). GR: For the principle of what is the equivalent of created ur-continuity reveals that nothing is truly independent of, if not literally all things, but virtually all things. Indeed, this is a fundamental tenet of *synechism*, and thus of Peirce's entire philosophical system. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Nov 23, 2021 at 11:59 PM Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Jon, List, > > You quoted a snippet from my previous email and responded: > > > GR: Your view would seem to imply that there is only one possible universe > for all time and in all space. > > > JAS: How so? I simply noted that the Big Bang theory is based on the > assumption that the physical laws of *our *actual universe have been > unchanging for billions of years, while Peirce insists that they must be > results of ongoing evolution. He explicitly denies that the creation of > *our *actual universe occurred in 4,004 BC or at any other assignable > date--i.e., in the *finite *past--maintaining instead that it has been > going on for an infinite time and is still in progress today. > > > This is a bit confusing to me. Not so much Peirce's view, but the one that > comes from my reflection on the Blackboard example as interpreted and > developed by you. As I recall (unfortunately I haven't time to reread your > paper since Thanksgiving preparations have begun in earnest) in your view > God scribes on something 'deeper, more 'ur-' even than Peirce's Blackboard. > Doesn't your Whiteboard expansion of the Blackboard example have God > scribing a *particular* universe with some particular characteristics out > of all the Platonic possibilities; so, for prime example, our universe? If > our universe has no beginning, then what is the purpose and meaning of God > scribing some particular potential Platonic ideas which will constitute > characters of *this* universe? > > As for scientists' views of whether physical laws are immutable -- likely > the opinion of most every 19th and 20th century physicist -- today that may > be changing. Take, for example this article (one of several I quickly > found): > > New findings suggest laws of nature not as constant as previously thought > (ScienceDaily) > Date: > April 27, 2020 > Source: > University of New South Wales > Summary: > Not only does a universal constant seem annoyingly inconstant at the outer > fringes of the cosmos, it occurs in only one direction, which is downright > weird. > https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2020/04/200427102544.htm > > GR: "Semiosis. . . had no beginning and will have no end." Are you saying > that this is Peirce's view? I don't see strong support for this notion when > one considers the possibility of multi-universes. > > > JAS: I am saying that Peirce's view is that mind is primordial within > *our* actual universe, which has no definite beginning or end. > Accordingly, how could semiosis have a definite beginning or end? Again, I > do not see the relevance here of "the possibility of multi-universes," > because *our *time and space belong only to *our *universe, which in Peirce's > cosmology is a discontinuous mark on the continuum of higher dimensionality > that encompasses all true and real possibilities. > > > I know that Peirce's view is that mind -- and not matter -- is primordial, > and definitely share that view, as do you, of course. But for me if this > universe is represented as (". . . a discontinuous mark on the continuum > of higher dimensionality," that 'discontinuous mark' would seem to me at > least a preparatory 'phase' (so to speak since before time is) towards the > creation of our universe. And any other possible universe could also be > represented as a 'discontinuous mark'. > > Now I thought your Whiteboard expansion of Peirce's Blackboard example > was, at least in part, meant to suggest that other universes were possible > out of the infinite number of Platonic characters which could be 'chosen', > as it were, by the Inscriber. Are all these possible universes -- were they > to be created -- also quasi-necessarily without beginning and end in your > view? Or is this a requirement of only ours? Or do multi-universe theories > seem to you far-fetched, something better suited to expositions in science > fiction literature and media? In addition, whether it concerns only ours or > other possible universes, how is that which has no beginning *created*? > After all, even if matter is a degenerated form of material, there is > certainly a heck of a lot of matter in the cosmos. Finally, what of > Peirce's view that this universe at least will at last deaden into cold > material > wholly lacking life and spirit? > > GR: 'Mind' here must connote something quite different from God's Mind. > > > JAS: I have not said anything so far about *God's *mind. I have been > discussing only our *created *universe in which, according to Peirce, > mind and psychical laws are primordial, while matter and physical laws are > derived and special. I seem to recall that you view the blackboard in his > cosmological diagram ("ur-continuity") as representing the very mind of > God, but I understand it as instead representing *created *3ns, with God > as the one who makes it and draws the chalk marks on it. > > > I cannot myself think deeply about Peirce's cosmology without thinking of > God. Insofar as I think our -- or any other possible -- universe is > *created*, and that any given created universe *will* manifest a form of > cosmological time, it would seem that I am not in agreement with Peirce nor > you that their is no beginning of cosmological time. On the other hand, I > have come to agree with you that what I termed the ur-continuity is *not* > the mind of God but, rather, represents created 3ns (I might, however, say > "created continuity" rather than 3ns as I consider the categories, > including 3ns, to be characters of our universe, and so might stick to my > term 'ur-continuity' here). > > GR: Again, I have suggested that a better subtitle might be "How Mind > Emerged from *constraints *on Matter," by which I mean that the mind in > the cosmos -- *not *God's mind-- but the kind of mind we call 'conscious' > mind, for example, is *not *given primordially, but evolves in the sense > that the whole cosmos is evolving. > > > JAS: I am having a hard time reconciling this suggestion with Peirce's > objective idealism, in which "the mind in the cosmos" *is *primordial and > matter comes about only as a peculiar sort of mind. Are you perhaps > referring to the origin of *individual *embodied minds as distinguished > from mind *in general*, which "is not necessarily connected with a brain" > but "appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely > physical world"? > > > As I see it,* constraints*, as discussed in Deacon's* Incomplete Nature* > are necessary, "to the origin of *individual *embodied minds" *as well as* > the origin of mind as "not necessarily connected with a brain" but > "appear[ing} in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely > physical world"?" However, I would exclude the idea 'general' here (JAS: . > . ". . . the origin of *individual *embodied minds as distinguished from > mind *in general*, which appears, etc.). For as everything which > expresses "mind in general" must itself be embodied, have a structure, > whether it's a human mind (better: what some would call a 'body-mind') or a > bee body-mind colony (within its* umwelt*), or a crystal-quasi-mind (also > necessarily involving structure, although admittedly it would be a stretch > to call such structures 'embodied'). And the whole of humanity is itself > mind embodied in a species, more real than any individual human person. > > GR: Deacon's theory, at least at face value, may seem to be a kind of > "materialist doctrine;" but I see no reason to suppose that his scientific > insights "suppose that a certain kind of *mechanism *will feel." Rather a > certain kind of *organism *will feel. > > > JAS: I take Peirce's point to be that if the physical law is primordial > and the psychical law is derived and special, then dead matter must somehow > feel as a brute fact--"an ultimate, inexplicable regularity"--in order for > a living organism ever to develop from it. That is why he considers > materialism to be "quite as repugnant to scientific logic as to common > sense" and rejects it accordingly, despite acknowledging that there is much > to be said for it. > > > Whatever his own views of what he considers primordial, mind or matter > (and more than likely to be 'matter'), my own *interpretation * of > Deacon's argument, leads me to a conclusion quite different, really almost > the opposite of your take on or use of the ideas expressed in *Incomplete > Nature*. For now I will attempt to succinctly summarize them. > > In my view (perhaps not Deacon's, but springboarding off of it), mind is > certainly primordial as it *must* be active for there to be any kind of > cosmic evolution (let alone, and long before the biological one) in the > structuring of those 'materials' (everything from neutrons, protons, > electrons, anti-electrons, photons and neutrinos through the light gasses > and elements to soft, fragile tissue and all which brings together these > parts into a whole); that is, everything prerequisite for their eventual > forming viable structures via Deacon's 'constraints' into such structural > arrangements as crystals, and organisms such as bees (further manifesting > behaviors which structure, for example, honeycombs). And further, humans > and their 'societies', and other floral and faunal societies, each in their > own umwelt which is as structurally essential as their own intelligent > being. For the principle of what is the equivalent of created ur-continuity > reveals that nothing is truly independent of, if not literally all things, > but virtually all things. > > Best, > > Gary R > > “Let everything happen to you > Beauty and terror > Just keep going > No feeling is final” > ― Rainer Maria Rilke > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >
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