Jeff, List: Again, my sketch is not a deductive argumentation "proceeding upon definitely formulated premisses." Nevertheless, what do you consider to be "the key premisses in the 1903 attempt to offer a defense of pragmatism"?
According to Nathan Houser, "In his Harvard Lectures, Peirce built his case for pragmatism on a new theory of perception, grounded in his theory of categories and on results from phenomenology, esthetics, and ethics" (EP 2:xxv). None of these subjects appears in my sketch, which instead has more in common with the "proof from Peirce's theory of signs" that Houser reconstructs from the 1907 drafts for an introductory article (EP 2:xxxv-xxxvi). That said, none of Peirce's restatements and elaborations of his maxim of pragmatism that I compiled from those lectures says anything about them, either--except his famous concluding remark, "The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason" (CP 5.212, EP 2:241, 1903). Even here, it seems clear that perception has to do with the *object *of a concept, while pragmatism has to do with its (ultimate logical) *interpretant*. Regards, Jon On Thu, Sep 8, 2022 at 2:38 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Hi Jon, List, > > Thank you for sharing your questions about Peirce's proof of pragmatism. > > The focus of your inquiries is on the interpretation of Peirce's attempt > to offer a proof of pragmatism around 1908. I tend to think the later > writings often build on the earlier. As such, I wonder what the later proof > borrows by way of premisses from the arguments developed in the 1903 > Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism. Once that is clearer, we can then ask what > might have been added to the later argument by way of additional premisses. > > Are any of the key premisses in the 1903 attempt to offer a defense of > pragmatism missing in your reconstruction of the later argument? If so, > might the addition of those premisses make the argument stronger? > > Yours, > > Jeff > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > ------------------------------ > *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *Sent:* Tuesday, September 6, 2022 7:14:39 PM > *To:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's "Proof" of Pragmatism > > List: > > About 18 months ago, I posted my sketch of what Peirce might have had in > mind for his "proof" of pragmatism using Existential Graphs ( > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-03/msg00086.html). Some > lively exchanges on Twitter over the holiday weekend prompted me to revisit > it, and I thought that the following slightly updated summary might be of > interest. In Peirce's terminology, it is in the form of an *argument*, > "any process of thought reasonably tending to produce a definite belief," > rather than an *argumentation*, "an Argument proceeding upon definitely > formulated premisses" (CP 6.456, EP 2:435, 1908). Any feedback or > discussion would be welcome, as always. > > 1. Intellectual concepts are symbols and thus indeterminate, so their only > mode of composition is mutual determination by means of propositions--"Some > stones possess the character of hardness." > > 2. The logical meaning of an intellectual concept (second grade of > clearness) is the continuum of all possible propositions that would > truthfully affirm or deny it of something--"Any diamond possesses the > character of hardness." > > 3. Belief in an intellectual concept corresponds to *individual *habits > of expectation described by indicative judgments--"If *this *stone > possesses the character of hardness, then when I rub it with a knife, it *will > *resist scratching." > > 4. The pragmatistic meaning of an intellectual concept (third grade of > clearness) is a *general *mental habit described by a subjunctive > conditional--"If I *were *to rub any diamond with a knife, then it *would > *resist scratching." > > 5. Beliefs are subject to revision with further experiences, especially > surprising observations that call for explanatory hypotheses--"When I rub > *this > *stone with a knife, it resists scratching, and if it *were *a diamond, > then that would be a matter of course." > > 6. A general mental habit *manifests *in self-controlled conduct > described by a practical syllogism with #4 as the major premiss and a > relevant intention as the minor premiss--"I *desire *a stone that > possesses the character of hardness, so I *shall * obtain a diamond." > > Many scholars make the mistake of stopping at #4 (verification) or #5 > (abduction/retroduction), but #6 (prescription) is the *ultimate *meaning > of an intellectual concept in accordance with the maxim of pragmatism as > clarified by Peirce's various reformulations of it, which I present and > discuss in my *Transactions *paper on the subject ( > https://muse.jhu.edu/article/787776). For example, consider how he > contrasts his view with that of James in the first complete draft of his > introductory article: > > CSP: The most prominent of all our school and the most respected, William > James, defines pragmatism as the doctrine that the whole "meaning" of a > concept expresses itself either in the shape of conduct to be recommended > or of experience to be expected. Between this definition and mine there is > certainly a slight theoretical divergence ... > These examples bear out James’s definition of pragmatism, which I have > never denied is true of the logical meaning. My slight objection to it is > that it seems to be true also of the existential meaning. Intellectual > concepts are general or derivatives of generals, and therefore their > meanings must be general. The general forms of psychic action besides > concepts themselves are desires and habits. Desires are previous to the > existential realization, while habits result from repeated such > realizations. If, in place of James’s "experiences to be expected," we > substitute the habits which must result from those experiences,--must > result, I mean, if the defined concept be intellectual, but not if it be > existential or emotional,--we finally extract, I think, the very > quintessence of the logical meaning. ( > https://doi.org/10.23925/2316-5278.2022v23i1:e51310, pp. 4&9, 1907) > > > Incorporating Peirce's amendment into James's definition, pragmatism is > the doctrine that the ultimate meaning of an intellectual concept expresses > itself either in the shape of conduct to be recommended or in the habits > that must result from experiences to be expected--not those experiences > themselves, nor the expectation of them. > > Rather than a new diagrammatic system that I was tentatively calling > "Synechistic Graphs," I now suspect that what Peirce needed for #4-5 was "a > *Delta > *part [of Existential Graphs] in order to deal with modals" (RL 376, R > 500:2-3, 1911)--perhaps his 1909 Logic Notebook version using heavy lines > to denote possible states of things, which I outlined in May ( > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2022-05/msg00003.html). #6 > would then require a way to represent intentions and imperatives, which is > presumably why Peirce proposed tinctures in 1906, but he abandoned them > along with cuts in favor of simple shading for negation in 1911. Is there a > viable alternative? > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >
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