Helmut and List--- It seems correct to say that the categories are correspondently represented in phenomenal representamen that are signs and that such signs in turn are clearly reflective of the categories, so that both categories and signs are likely applicable to physics, whether physics is held to be theoretical as a formal science or held to be practical as a natural science. This aspect of the topic you suggest is intriguing for me as a Peirceanite, but your message has several pairs of terms that for me might need to be more fully defined in relation to Peirceanism. These pairs include: dimension/distinction, horizontal/vertical, process/state, static/dynamic, aspect/element, thing/object. There may also be a diagonal aspect to some of Peircean semiosis that you might want to include in your probe. For now, let me find out at my end where physics itself is mainly or usually located in Peircean philosophy and science. ---Frances
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> On Behalf Of Helmut Raulien Sent: Friday, 30 June, 2023 15:22 To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Categories for states and processes List, in physics, especially thermodynamics, we have state variables, e.g. temperature, and process variables, e.g. heat. I think, that this distinction is transferable to semiotics and the category theory. For example, if we look at the sign table, we have in the horizontal dimension the categorial distinction between sign, object, and interpretant (I know , that not everybody agrees here, but I think, that this is in accord with the Peircean categories 1ns, 2ns, 3ns.), and in the vertical dimension too the distinction 1,2,3, that distinguishes the sign in quali-, sin-, legisign, the object in icon, index, symbol, and the interpretant in rheme, dicent, argument. Now I think, that the horizontal disttinction is about categories applied to processes, and the vertical distinction is categories applied to states. Both is possible, and it is always goood to have in mind, when speaking of categories, whether they are applied to states or processes. The ten signs, that are possible, consist of dynamic elements, which have blended static and processural aspects, somehow. With this vagueity I am hoping for your interest and continuation about this topic. As most critical I see the object: I see it as a process, because a thing is only then an object, when it is being denoted, and an object can change. I know, that this view somehow confronts the concept of the dynamical object, but anyway, look at common speech: An object of interest has not been an object of interest before somebody had showed interest, has it? Best Regards! Helmut
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