Claudio, List: CG: It has been a long time since I last wrote to the List
I am delighted that you did so today, and I hope that it will not be as long before you do so again! CG: Coming from architecture and design disciplines in general, I am interested in being able to use the Peircean approach to better understand the design project (as a semiotic process) and to be able to take practical design decisions. Indeed, coming from structural engineering as a design discipline, I was initially drawn to Peirce's semeiotic (https://www.structuremag.org/?p=9015) and what I dubbed "the logic of ingenuity" ( https://www.structuremag.org/?p=10373) as our characteristic reasoning process. My interest in other aspects of his thought came later. CG: However, this *ethical concern* (Peirce?) entails a serious contradiction with respect to the Peircean triadic semiotics proposal where the main task should not be the positive essence but the inter-relational construction of a semiotic concept or process (Lizska wrote something about this). Are these the comments by Liszka that you have in mind? JL: Generally speaking, the project of the classification of signs seems to me to be wrongheaded because it is reductionistic, contrary to the insightful and fruitful triadic character of the sign that Peirce promotes otherwise. By reductionism is meant here the standard meaning in philosophical literature as the view that a whole can be explained by the property of its parts. ... By modeling sign classifications after chemical and mathematical ones in particular as he does, Peirce gets trapped in this reductionist approach to sign analysis that loses the holistic and integrative aspects of its triadic character. ... The reductionist approach supposes that signs have elementary features that, when mechanically compounded, can produce distinguishable kinds of signs. ( https://doi.org/10.1515/sem-2018-0089, 2019, p. 155) If so, then I generally agree. As Liszka says later, "the remedy is to re-emphasize the processual and functional view of semiosis, rather than to focus on particular classes of signs" (p. 157). That is why I often emphasize the *continuity *of semiosis in accordance with Peirce's late topical conception (https://philpapers.org/rec/SCHPTC-2)--the continuous whole (3ns) is ontologically prior to its parts, which are indefinite *material *parts (1ns) until they are deliberately marked off as discrete *actual *parts (2ns) for some purpose. The implication for speculative grammar is that each *individual *sign, *its *two objects, and *its *three interpretants are *entia rationis*--artifacts of phaneroscopic analysis that we prescind from the real and ongoing process. CG: Because, it seems to me (as far as I know) worth noting that Peirce NEVER performed any semiotic analysis using his own proposed classification of signs, except for his unhappy decision to repeatedly name only the weather vane as an index. On the contrary, Peirce offers specific examples for some of the other sign classes in his 1903 taxonomy with its three trichotomies, beginning with the ubiquitous weathercock as a dicent (indexical) sinsign. CSP: Thus, the ordinary Dicent Sinsign is exemplified by a weathercock and its veering and by a photograph. The fact that the latter is known to be the effect of the radiations from the object renders it an Index and highly informative. A second variety is a Replica of a Dicent Indexical Legisign. Thus any given street-cry, since its tone and theme identifies the individual, is not a Symbol, but an Indexical Legisign; and any individual instance of it is a Replica of it which is a Dicent Sinsign. A third variety is a Replica of a Proposition. A fourth variety is a Replica of an Argument. Besides the normal variety of the Dicent Indexical Legisign, of which a street-cry is an example, there is a second variety which is that sort of proposition which has the name of a well-known individual as its predicate; as if one is asked "Whose statue is this?" the answer may be, "It is Farragut." The meaning of this answer is a Dicent Indexical Legisign. A third variety may be a premiss of an argument. A Dicent Symbol, or ordinary proposition, in so far as it is a premiss of an argument, takes on a new force, and becomes a second variety of the Dicent Symbol. It would not be worth while to go through all the varieties; but it may be well to consider the varieties of one class more. We may take the Rhematic Indexical Legisign. *The *shout of "Hullo!" is an example of the ordinary variety,--meaning, not an individual shout, but this shout, "Hullo!" in general,--this type of shout. A second variety is a constituent of a Dicent Indexical Legisign; as the word "that" in the reply "That is Farragut." A third variety is a particular application of a Rhematic Symbol; as the exclamation "Hark!" A fourth and fifth variety are in the peculiar force a general word may have in a proposition or argument. (CP 2.265, EP 2:297, 1903) On the other hand, since Peirce never spells out the proper logical order of the ten trichotomies in his 1906-1908 taxonomies, he also provides no corresponding text with examples of the 66 classes. I am inclined to think that this would be too granular for practical purposes anyway, but it can nevertheless be useful to look at different subsets. I have done so in a recent post (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00015.html) for the three interpretant trichotomies because I find the ten classes that result from arranging them as final/dynamical/immediate to be more plausible than the ten classes that result from arranging them as immediate/dynamical/final. I also suggested the following a couple of months ago (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00082.html ). - A question is a suggestive phemic actuous symbol, a proposition presented for contemplation whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce action (elicit an answer). - A command is an imperative phemic actuous symbol, a proposition urged by an act of insistence whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce action. - A hypothesis is a suggestive phemic temperative, a proposition presented for contemplation whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce self-control. - An assertion is an imperative phemic temperative, a proposition urged by an act of insistence whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce self-control. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Apr 13, 2024 at 1:06 PM Claudio Guerri <claudiogue...@gmail.com> wrote: > Dear Etwina, Gary, List > It has been a long time since I last wrote to the List, however, I still > receive the corresponding information and from time to time I find precise > indications on the possibility of deepening in some Peircean concept in my > extensive library on Peirce. > > Coming from architecture and design disciplines in general, I am > interested in being able to use the Peircean approach to better understand > the design project (as a semiotic process) and to be able to take practical > design decisions... and the same with respect to qualitative market > research... another discipline with a necessary practical scope. > > However, in both cases it is a matter of developing to the maximum the > aspects of the *enabling Firstness*: the *design* and the understanding > of the problem... a difficult subject if there are any... or… our world > would be a little better than what we have. > > I consider Peirce's *ethics* (2ness) to be directly related to his > training in chemistry where every element in Mendeleev's table must > necessarily be precisely nominated: H=1 cannot be confused with Pb=207. > This is not the case with other matters such as color where there may be a > subtle variation, unnameable with precision, in a [blue] or a [red]. > > However, this *ethical concern* (Peirce?) entails a serious contradiction > with respect to the Peircean triadic semiotics proposal where the main task > should not be the positive essence but the inter-relational construction of > a semiotic concept or process (Lizska wrote something about this). > > I believe that the exegesis of Peirce's work is still necessary given the > vastness and the difficult access to his writings. However, semiotics, as a > discipline with pretensions of *scientific methodology* (Magariños de > Morentin) does not deal with any exegesis, but with cognitive-semiotic > processes that are important in order to understand something about any > subject and to be able to make decisions of different kinds, for example: > > 1. *to make possible* the formal description of the logic of a > theoretical concept in order to improve it, change it or discard it > (1ness); > > 2. to analyze a concrete product or behavior to *determine* its relative > economic validity (2ness); and > > 3. to allow the analysis of any socio-cultural-political value in order to > make a *decision* (Althusser) coherent with the *needs* (Peirce) of a > given time and context (3ness). > > On the other hand, while the proposal to take the classification to 128 or > hundreds of thousands of different sign-subsigns is absolutely logical, I > wonder if there is a single person in the world who has developed that > immense semiotic process applied to any object, problem or concrete case. > Probably AI programs will be able to do it... but will anyone really be > able to understand and review it for practical purposes? > > This is why I have developed the *Semiotic Nonagon* as a practical tool > for qualitative analysis in sufficient and recursive logical sub-aspects: > 3, 9, 27 or 81. Although, as Liszka says the SN “is not strictly Peircean”, > 40 years of its use in academia with doctoral theses and professional > practice as a qualitative market researcher have long demonstrated its > efficacy. Thanks to Gary Richmond I found out yesterday that there is a > long list of articles on this topic both in English and Spanish: > https://uba.academia.edu/CGuerri This allows me not to go into further > details about this ‘strictly’ semiotic tool. Because, it seems to me (as > far as I know) worth noting that Peirce NEVER performed any semiotic > analysis using his own proposed classification of signs, except for his > unhappy decision to repeatedly name only the weather vane as an index. And > since, as Saussure explains, verbal language develops in a sequential line > (which prevents us from saying more than one stupid thing at a time), every > object, behavior, or concept is always a complete triadic and always a > complex SIGN... of which we may name one aspect anyway, as basic rhetoric > teaches us. > > All the best > CL > > * Dr. Arch. Claudio F. Guerri* > Consultant Professor > Facultad de Arquitectura, Diseño y Urbanismo > Universidad de Buenos Aires > Home address: Gral. Lemos 270 (1427) Buenos Aires – Argentina > Telefax: (0054-11) 4553-7976 > Cell phone: (0054-9-11) 6289-8123 > E-mail: claudiogue...@gmail.com >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
