Gary F., List: I agree that Peirce's focus in the paragraphs that we are discussing is on the composition of concepts as helpfully diagrammed by Existential Graphs. Of course, only a *proposition *can be represented by an EG, no matter how large and complex; an *argument *can only be represented by a *series* of EGs being transformed in accordance with the permissions corresponding to the necessary *inference *from premiss to conclusion. However, for Peirce, the entire universe as an argument is not strictly deductive--"I have not succeeded in persuading my contemporaries to believe that Nature also makes inductions and retroductions" (NEM 4:344, 1898).
I disagree that classical theism and panentheism are properly characterized as "varieties of theism," except in the trivial sense that both affirm the reality of God; and I *strongly *disagree that the differences between them are merely "verbal ... without logical or metaphysical substance." If (classical) theism is true, then God *transcends *our existing universe; but if panentheism is true, then our existing universe is somehow contained *within *God. If (classical) theism is true, then God's attributes include simplicity and impassability, such that God has no parts and is unaffected by our existing universe; but if panentheism is true, then our existing universe is an organic part of God such that God is affected by everything that happens in it. I trust that the logical and metaphysical incompatibility of these basic tenets is obvious without scribing the corresponding EGs and deriving "not both (classical) theism and panentheism" from them. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Sep 12, 2024 at 7:13 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, list, > > It’s true that what Peirce characterizes as "Indefinite as to its Object" > is the consequent of a conditional *proposition*, not the conclusion of > an *argument*. But the context of that sentence is an exposition of what > Peirce’s study of Existential Graphs tells him about the “Composition of > Concepts.” In his words, “It thus appears that the difference between the > Term, the Proposition, and the Argument, is by no means a difference of > complexity, and does not so much consist in structure as in the services > they are severally intended to perform.” > > What I am suggesting is that the theological discrepancy between varieties > of theism is one example of a verbal difference (a “logomachy” as Peirce > might say) without logical or metaphysical substance. I see this as one of > many profound implications of what Peirce is saying in the concluding > part of the “Prolegomena” <https://gnusystems.ca/ProlegomPrag.htm#4572%22>. > Rather than try to give a formal “proof” of this, I will just suggest that > you try to express either or both brands of theism using existential > graphs, bearing in mind that “the essence of the Proposition is that it > intends, as it were, to be regarded as in an existential relation to its > Object, as an Index is, so that its assertion shall be regarded as evidence > of the fact”; and that an “existential relation” is represented in the > graphs by a line of identity. > > I don’t expect to convince you (Jon) of what I’ve said above, and I > probably shouldn’t have mentioned the theism dispute at all, as it’s > insignificant compared to what Peirce says about the *mutual > determination* of Antecedent and Consequent: “the Method of Existential > Graphs solves this riddle instantly by showing that, as far as propositions > go, and it must evidently be the same with Terms and Arguments, there is > but one general way in which their Composition can possibly take place; > namely, each component must be indeterminate in some respect or another; > and in their composition each determines the other.” > > All I wanted to accomplish with my post was to reconsider Peirce’s > assertion(?) that the Universe is an Argument in the light of this mutual > determination as Peirce explains it at the end of the “Prolegomena.” I’m > not finished reconsidering it myself, so I won’t even try to draw any > verbal “conclusions” from it. > > Love, gary f. > > Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg >
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