Jon, Suteerth, List, Suteerth had responded to my on List comments off List. I sent him the following response and suggested he posted both his off List comments and mine on List. He hasn't done so, but I think it might be helpful to at least send my off List response to him to the List; I think my remarks are generally in line with yours, Jon.
I wrote off List: In Peirce's essentially trichotomic ordering of the sciences in his most developed Classification of the Sciences, cenoscopic science (philosophy) comprises three principal sciences. The first is (for now) a single science, * phenomenology* (phaneroscopy); the second, *normative science*, has three branches, viz., esthetics, ethics, logic as semeiotic; and the third is *metaphysics* which has two major branches, viz., physical metaphysics and psychical metaphysics, each of which is divided into three sub-branches (descriptive, classificatory, and nomonological). Let's take a quick look at normative science. The first branch, esthetics (note the peculiar spelling without the initial 'a') doesn't concern itself with beauty (that aesthetics is not considered a normative science). Peirce's esthetic is the study of what is ultimately admirable in its own right i*n the pursuit of scientific truth*. As a normative science it is prescriptive—it aims to discover what ought to be regarded as worthy of admiration for the purposes of scientific inquiry. Peirce, as you know, arrives at "the reasonable in itself." This provides a principle for ethics, for right action, that is, ethical conduct in inquiry by scientists (and remember, for Peirce cenoscopy *is* a science). There's much too much to say about logic even addressing your particular questions and concerns. So for now I'll just say that logic as semeiotic has three sub-branches, semeiotic grammar, critical logic (i.e., logic as most people traditionally think of it), and methodeutic (also termed speculative rhetoric). It is in this sub-branch that the PM and pragmatism are placed; and it is the scientific method itself that underpins pragmatism as providing the optimal approach (of the four he outlined) toward the truth. Just a quick word about the larger Classification of the Sciences. Peirce identifies three Grand Sciences: *Science of Discovery* (Heuretic Science, what we'd call today pure, theoretical, research science, the one in which the cenocopic sciences are found), *Science of Review* (the systematic ordering of and reflection on the findings of science including the history and philosophy of science, handbooks of particular sciences, etc.), and *Practical Science* (what we call applied science today). It is important to note that Science of Discovery itself has three branches: *Science of Discovery* [At this point I offered a basic outline of the Sciences of Discovery familiar to most Peirce scholars. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classification_of_the_sciences_(Peirce)#Sciences ] The sciences higher in the classification offer principles to those lower; those lower in the classification offer examples and other material to reflect on within those sciences higher in the classification. Mathematics, for example, offers principles to almost all (some would simply say, 'all') the sciences below it. Best, Gary R On Sun, Oct 20, 2024 at 8:31 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Suteerth, Gary R., List: > > Nathan Houser provides a helpful summary of Peirce's various attempts at > formulating a "proof" of pragmatism in his introduction to volume 2 of *The > Essential Peirce* (EP 2:xxxiii-xxxviii). Pragmatism is the logic of > abduction in accordance with his theory of perception (1903), while > arguably his most successful approach is based instead on his theory of > signs (1907). In the latter treatment, Peirce makes it clear that > pragmatism is not about the meaning (interpretant) of *any* sign, but > only the *ultimate* meaning (final logical interpretant) of "intellectual > concepts"--"those upon the structure of which arguments concerning > objective fact may hinge" (EP 2:401), such as hard vs. soft but > not blue vs. red. > > As for *why* Peirce persistently sought to prove the truth of pragmatism, > it is presumably because he viewed it as a principle of logic, and > therefore essential to the proper practice of metaphysics and all the > special sciences in accordance with his architectonic classification. In > other words, he maintained that denying it inevitably leads to serious > mistakes in those other fields of inquiry. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Thu, Oct 10, 2024 at 11:02 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Suteerth, List, >> >> First, let me welcome you to the List. I hope you will find interlocutors >> to engage with in this e-forum. I would suggest that you read through the >> founder and first moderator of Peirce-L, Joseph Ransdell's comments on the >> structure and expected democratic conduct in the forum since, as the second >> moderator of the forum, I continue to consider them sound and, so, in >> effect. See "How the Forum Works": >> https://cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm#forum >> >> As to your question: Peirce's attempts at articulating a proof of >> pragmatism were offered at various points in his career, not just near its >> conclusion. Indeed, he never offered it as a single argument. >> >> There appear to some scholars to be two main strands of those proofs. >> Peirce scholars like Susan Haack (in *Evidence and Inquiry*) and >> Christopher Hookway (in *The Pragmatic Maxim*) emphasize those focused >> on the clarification of meaning, arguing that Peirce first identifies a >> fundamental problem in traditional metaphysics involving the ultimately >> confusing attempt to define the meaning of abstract concepts by looking for >> "essential properties." As opposed to this approach Peirce famously offers >> the PM. >> >> Some other scholars, like Cheryl Misak (*Truth and the End of Inquiry*) and >> Richard Bernstein (*The Pragmatic Turn*) highlight Peirce’s pragmatism >> as a methodological tool for structuring the process of inquiry, focusing >> especially on its role in science, reasoning, and the search for truth. You >> appear to be emphasizing this second approach. >> >> Perhaps the most famous example showing how his maxim clarifies *meaning >> *is Peirce's diamond example. Here the abstract idea of 'hardness' is >> illustrated/demonstrated by considering the effect of a diamond scratching >> the surface of another hard object, say, a rock (in his day the diamond was >> considered the hardest object; since then two harder substances have been >> identified). In a later modal development of this idea Peirce argues that >> the *act* of scratching need not even actually be required, that a >> diamond buried deep underground *would* scratch a rock even were it >> never mined. And even such abstract concepts as 'courage' can be understood >> through its *conceivable* practical effects. >> >> Turning now to that second strand which sees pragmatism as a method for >> guiding inquiry, Peirce famously begins his reflection on inquiry with the >> idea of *fallibilism* whereas all knowledge is provisional and >> subject to revision given new facts, experiments, etc. The beliefs -- >> including scientific beliefs -- that we have are all mental *habits* tending >> towards *action *(physical or mental}. A genuine doubt (not a "paper >> doubt" as Peirce put it *contra *Descartes) breaks a habit and leads to >> inquiry (or at least ought to) in the pursuit of a more stable belief >> (itself also fallible, of course). The only way to get to that stable >> belief is to test ideas by their *conceived* practical consequences in >> experience and, of course, this is especially so in scientific inquiry >> where hypotheses are experimentally tested to see to what extent they >> conform to the real world. Of course Peirce famously argues in "The >> Fixation of Belief" that the scientific method (which is itself supported >> by pragmaticism) is the only one of the four he outlines which can lead to >> reliable knowledge since it is based on the testing of hypotheses which >> experimentation involves the (possible) real effects of ideas. >> >> So, I agree with Robert Burch ("Peirce's Reduction Thesis")t hat >> .pragmatism is *both* a theory of meaning and a theory of inquiry. By >> proving that only pragmatic reasoning leads to stable, testable beliefs, >> Peirce grounded pragmatism in the very structure of logic and the >> scientific method. >> >> One might add that Peirce’s pragmatism is tied to his realism, synechism, >> and to his view of truth as that which would be agreed upon by an >> indefinite community of inquirers in the long run (as often discussed here, >> that being "agreement" being asymptotic and never actually reached). >> >> As earlier noted, Peirce's proofs of pragmatism are complex, incomplete, >> and spread across his writings. While I wasn't able to address all your >> points and questions, I hope I've at least hinted at why Peirce sought a >> proof of pragmatism. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> On Thu, Oct 10, 2024 at 9:47 AM suteerth vajpeyi < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> This is my third post so far. The second question (why did Peirce >>> attempt to prove the truth of the pragmatic maxim?) troubles me more. The >>> pragmatic maxim is a regulative (or in other words normative) principle for >>> attaining greater clearness of apprehension or in other words clarifying >>> the meaning of a sign. "Speak the truth !" one may say to one's kids. But >>> it would be absurd to try to prove the truth of a regulative principle from >>> factual premises. So why did peirce attempt to do it for his pragmatism? >>> Especially why do it late in his life when his understanding of logic was >>> getting clearer by the day. He had earlier remarked that pragmatism is a >>> principle of logic. Logic according to him is a normative science for >>> attaining truth. >>> >>> One thing that immediately strikes one is that since logic and >>> pragmatism are regulative principles for attaining knowledge, we can expect >>> that the pragmatic maxim must be a part of logic. But at which stage of the >>> inquiry process ? We try to resolve the problem by trial and error. All >>> thinking is semiosis according to peirce. Semiosis (sign-use to gain >>> increased knowledge) has three components: the object, the sign and finally >>> the interpretant. Similiarly there are three stages of inquiry- abduction, >>> deduction and induction. Can we connect the components of semiosis to the >>> process of inquiry ? >>> >>> The various possible relations are sign & object, sign & interpretant, >>> object & interpretant. What is the order in which they occur ? Firstly one >>> chooses a sign to stand for an object. Secondly one determines the >>> interpretant of the sign. Thirdly by interpreting the sign, a knowledge of >>> the object is attained. The order of logical processes on the other hand is >>> abduction, deduction and induction. Abduction then, corresponds to the sign >>> object relation. The allotment of a sign to stand for an object is just >>> another way of saying that we attribute meaning to a sign. The first >>> attachment of meaning to a sign and the first explanation of a surprizing >>> fact by a hypothesis requires that the meaning of a hypothesis be >>> apprehended first. As outlined in my previous post, pragmatism is just >>> another way of apprehending the meaning of any sign, whether it be a term >>> or a proposition. A hypothesis is just a proposition. So we can now come to >>> understand why peirce may have called pragmatism as the logic of abduction. >>> >>> But the first question (why he attempted to prove pragmatism to be true) >>> still eludes me... >>> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
