Jeff, Mike, List, This is the third and final installment of the Peirce quotations I culled from the CP and EP2 where he speaks of Plato's philosophy with, as I see it, suggestions how the latters work influenced his own. As I noted in the first email in this thread, I believe that many Peirceans -- myself included -- have tended to think of Peirce as *much more* attuned to Aristotle's thought, and *much less* influenced by Plato's. Now I've come to think that it depends on what facets of Peirce's work one is focusing on.
Again, I read all the mentions of Plato In the CP and EP2 and selected a few, adding a summary along with occasional brief commentary, of those I found especially relevant. I wasn't at all interested undertaking a deep investigation as to what Plato actually wrote compared to what Peirce said about what he'd read of Plato (although I know that I am not alone in thinking that comparing the inquiry methods of Peirce and Plato -- which Jeff and Mike suggested -- would be both an interesting and valuable project one, however, which I think may be too ambitions to attempt on the List. But go for it if you think it's feasible. I also wasn't at all interested in the secondary literature on the topic, nor did I initially mean to suggest that List members do anything more than themselves reflect on what Peirce wrote about Plato, perhaps suggesting that there might be a greater influence than what we -- or at least, I -- had internalized about the latter's impact on Peirce's thought. Again, I have come to the tentative conclusion that Plato had a stronger influence on some facets of Peirce's work (e.g. his cosmology), Aristotle on others (e.g. his critical logic). Here are the last of the Peirce excerpts and my summaries. I won't say that I exactly saved the best for the last (I found the early excerpts equally interesting), but as the second of the excerpts below is most relevant to Peirce's early cosmology -- which has been discussed here in some depth over the years and even recently -- I had hoped that some forum members would look at the quotations to discover if anything in them suggested that Plato had even a larger role in the development of at least some parts of Peirce's philosophy than even Aristotle had. I have already stated my tentative conclusion. In any event, I'm glad there's appeared some interest in the topic and hope that List members will further pursue the inquiry into Plato-Peirce however they see fit. Here is the last group of the quotations. *As late as 'A Neglected Argument', in discussing 1ns Peirce appeals to Plato's ιδέα "whose Being consists in its mere capacity for getting fully represented." But note: his definition of "Idea" is not exactly, but "nearer Plato's idea of ιδέα" (emphasis added).* Some words shall herein be capitalized when used, not as vernacular, but as terms defined. Thus, an "idea" is the substance of an actual unitary thought or fancy; but "Idea,"—nearer Plato's idea of ιδέα,—denotes anything whose Being consists in its mere capacity for getting fully represented, regardless of any person's faculty or impotence to represent it. EP 2:434 *CP 6.191 - 197 The proto-universe is viewed by Peirce as "a world of ideas, a Platonic world" beginning in "the utter vagueness of completely undetermined and dimensionless potentiality," then develops through what Peirce calls an "evolutionary process" before the evolution of the actual universe. Regarding continuity in that proto-cosmos, Peirce writes that "we must suppose that. . . the continuum has been derived from a more general continuum, a continuum of higher generality (what I've referred to here and elsewhere as an ur-continuum). * *The following snippet has always suggested to me that Peirce might even be seen as suggesting a many worlds cosmology: "We need not suppose that every form needs for its evolution to emerge into this world, but only that it needs to enter into some theatre of reactions, of which this is one (emphasis added). * *Be that as it may, "The evolution of forms begins [. . . as] a vague potentiality; and that either is or is followed by a continuum of forms having a multitude of dimensions too great for the individual dimensions to be distinct. It must be by a contraction of the vagueness of that potentiality of everything in general, but of nothing in particular, that the world of forms comes about (emphasis added). * *Peirce concludes by remarking that "the cosmos of sense-qualities, which I would have you to suppose in some early stage of being was as real as your personal life is this minute, had in an antecedent stage of development a vaguer being, before the relations of its dimensions became definite and contracted." So, or at least it seems to me, that Platonic ideas and forms played a particularly central role in Peirce's development of the proto-cosmos before the existent world came into being.* Looking upon the course of logic as a whole we see that it proceeds from the question to the answer -- from the vague to the definite. And so likewise all the evolution we know of proceeds from the vague to the definite. The indeterminate future becomes the irrevocable past. In Spencer's phrase the undifferentiated differentiates itself. The homogeneous puts on heterogeneity. However it may be in special cases, then, we must suppose that as a rule the continuum has been derived from a more general continuum, a continuum of higher generality. From this point of view we must suppose that the existing universe, with all its arbitrary secondness, is an offshoot from, or an arbitrary determination of, *a world of ideas, a Platonic world*; not that our superior logic has enabled us to reach up to *a world of forms* to which the real universe, with its feebler logic, was inadequate (emphasis added). If this be correct, we cannot suppose the process of derivation, a process which extends from before time and from before logic, we cannot suppose that it began elsewhere than in *the utter vagueness of completely undetermined and dimensionless potentiality *(emphasis added). The evolutionary process is, therefore, not a mere evolution of the existing universe, but rather *a process by which the very Platonic forms themselves have become or are becoming developed* (emphasis added We shall naturally suppose, of course, that existence is a stage of evolution. This existence is presumably but a special existence. *We need not suppose that every form needs for its evolution to emerge into this world, but only that it needs to enter into some theatre of reactions, of which this is one *(emphasis added)*.* The evolution of forms begins or, at any rate, has for an early stage of it, *a vague potentiality; and that either is or is followed by a continuum of forms having a multitude of dimensions too great for the individual dimensions to be distinct. It must be by a contraction of the vagueness of that potentiality of everything in general, but of nothing in particular, that the world of forms comes about* (emphasis added). We can hardly but suppose that those sense-qualities that we now experience, colors, odors, sounds, feelings of every description, loves, griefs, surprise, are but the relics of *an ancient ruined continuum of qualities*, like a few columns standing here and there in testimony that here some old-world forum with its basilica and temples had once made a magnificent ensemble. And just as that forum, before it was actually built, had had a vague underexistence in the mind of him who planned its construction, so too the cosmos of sense-qualities, which I would have you to suppose in some early stage of being was as real as your personal life is this minute, had in an antecedent stage of development a vaguer being, before the relations of its dimensions became definite and contracted. CP 6.197 Best, Gary R On Wed, Nov 6, 2024 at 1:56 AM Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Gary, Edwina, Jon S, all, > > For those interested in the influence of Plato's Platonism (as compared to > some form of modern "nominalistic" Platonism) on Peirce's pragmatism, here > is a helpful dissertation on the topic written by David O'Hara under the > direction of Doug Anderson: > > https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/files/final_submissions/1459 > > Edwina, I agree that Peirce's metaphysics is thoroughly evolutionary. > Plato is typically interpreted as hold that the forms are timeless and > unchanging. I appreciate the fact that there are a number of important > differences between the Plato's methods and the conclusions he draws as > parts of his ongoing inquiries, and the theories Peirce is developing. In > my own attempts to interpret Peirce's works, I find it helpful to think of > how various presuppositions, argumentative strategies, and central themes, > appear to draw on ideas that Plato developed in the dialogues. > > For instance, Plato explicitly articulates the account of the form of the > good, beautiful and true as a hypothesis. In my interpretation of Peirce's > inquiries in the normative sciences, I take aesthetics, ethics and > semiotics to involve three ideals that, taken together, form a unified > ideal for the conduct inquiry--and for the conduct of life generally. I > find it helpful to trace the development of these ideas through the > writings that Peirce was reading from early to late, including Schiller's > *Letters*, Kant's *Critiques*, Plotinus's *Enneads* and Plato's * > dialogues.* > > Peirce notes an apparent shift in Plato's views from the early to the > middle and later dialogues. In the *Cratylus* and *Theaetetus*, for > example, Plato appears to draw an analogy between the highest form (i.e., > the ideal of the good, beautiful and true) and certain mathematical forms > taken to be fundamental. On this account, the highest forms appear to have > a metaphysical status akin to idealized* possibilities* with the > character of ordered relations. > > --Jeff > > > > > > > T > > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Sunday, November 3, 2024 9:54 PM > *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Cc:* Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]>; Jon Alan Schmidt < > [email protected]> > *Subject:* Peirce on Plato > > List, > > I very much appreciate Jeff bringing up the topic of the influence of > Plato on Peirce. Perhaps, like many Peirce scholars,I've been led (rightly > or wrongly is the investigatory question) to think of Peirce as much more > akin to Aristotle than to Plato and in some matters of logic he certainly > does seem closer to Aristotle; and by his own admission. So I decided to do > a keyword search of the EP and CP of 'Plato' (not Platonism, which I think > is a very different matter with a strikingly different emphasis) in an > attempt to discover for myself what he actually thought about Plato. I'm > going to offer some of the passages I found to be helpful in my review -- > and subsequent partial reconsideration of -- Plato's influence on Peirce.. > > Rather than present all the passages at once, I'm going to post two or > three a day and, if I have the time this week, I'll send all my succinct > summaries and sources of the quotations to come so that interested folk can > read them in advance and in context should they wish to. > > Remembering reading philosophy texts in my 20's and 30's in libraries or > used book stores, in old editions which occasionally had a short precis in > boldface small print on the upper left side of each item, sometimes each > paragraph, I've included my own succinct summary of each quotation so that > forum members can quickly decide if they want to read that particular item. > I have little doubt that some of my summaries may miss the mark and need > correcting. Nonetheless, here are today's quotations preceded by my summary. > > ***** > > *Summary of **EP 2:35: Peirce argues that in Plato's later works he > shifts from a Theory of Ideas to view eternal essences as mathematical, > not as things with 'Actual Existence' but as having 'Potential Being'. > Plato’s philosophy evolves to view ideas as mathematical forms with > relationships akin to numbers, thus perhaps moving in the direction of > seeing them as continuous.* > > The dialogue of the Sophistes, lately shown to belong to Plato's last > period,— when he had, as Aristotle tells us, abandoned Ideas and put > Numbers in place of them,—this dialogue, I say, gives reasons for > abandoning the Theory of Ideas which imply that Plato himself had come to > see, if not that the Eternal Essences are continuous, at least, that there > is an order of affinity among them, such as there is among Numbers. Thus, > at last, the Platonic Ideas became Mathematical Essences, not possessed of > Actual Existence but only of a Potential Being quite as Real, and his > maturest philosophy became welded into mathematics. EP 2:35 > > * Summary of EP 2:37-38: Peirce highly praises Plato’s vision of science, > especially in so far as he corrected the Heraclitan error of "holding the > Continuous to be Transitory and . . . making the Being of the Idea > potential." But he also criticizes him for overlooking two types of > causation and for making Matter a negative, "a mere non-Being." Plato > focused only on internal causes (form and matter) while Aristotle pointed > out the need to consider external causes (efficient and final), and Peirce > slightly modifies Aristotle's assessment. Peirce suggests Plato’s > philosophy is fundamentally about relationship (3ns), but Plato > misunderstood his own ideas by focusing on duality and dichotomy. But > neglecting external causes he is also actually overlooking 2ns.* > > [I]n regard to the general conception of what the ultimate purpose and > importance of science consists in, no philosopher who ever lived, ever > brought that out more clearly than this early scientific philosopher [viz. > Plato]. Aristotle justly finds fault with Plato in many respects. But all > his criticisms leave unscathed Plato's definitive philosophy, which results > from the correction of that error of Heraclitus which consisted in holding > the Continuous to be Transitory and also from making the Being of the Idea > potential. Aristotle for example justly complains that of the four kinds of > causes Plato only recognizes the two internal ones., Form and Matter, and > loses sight of the two external ones, the Efficient Cause and the > End.Though in regard to final causes this is scarcely just, it is more than > just, in another respect. For not only does Plato only recognize internal > causes, but he does not even recognize Matter as anything positive. He > makes it mere negation, mere non-Being, or Emptiness, forgetting or perhaps > not knowing that that which produces positive effects must have a positive > nature. Although Plato's whole philosophy is a philosophy of > Thirdness,—that is to say, it is a philosophy which attributes everything > to an action which rightly analyzed has Thirdness for its capital and chief > constituent,—he himself only recognizes duality, and makes himself an > apostle of Dichotomy,— which is a misunderstanding of himself. To overlook > second causes is only a special case of the common fault of all > metaphysicians that they overlook the Logic of Relatives. But when he > neglects external causes, it is Secondness itself that he is overlooking. > This self-misunderstanding, this failure to recognize his own conceptions, > marks Plato throughout. It is a characteristic of the man that he sees much > deeper into the nature of things than he does into the nature of his own > philosophy, and it is a trait to which we cannot altogether refuse our > esteem. > EP 2: 37-38 > > *Commentary: In his introduction to "The Seven Systems of Metaphysics" in > the 1903 Harvard Lecture Series, Nathan Houser writes: "Peirce aligns > himself with the seventh system, arguing for the reality of all three > categories. . ." EP 2:179 Note: Both Plato and Aristotle are included in > this system, Aristotelianism being characterized as "a special development" > of the Platonic philosophy.* > > The metaphysics that recognizes all the categories may need at once to be > subdivided. But I shall not stop to consider its subdivision. It embraces > Kantism,—Reid's philosophy and the Platonic philosophy of which > Aristotelianism is a special development. > EP 2:180 > > Best, > > Gary R > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
