Typically, Wikipedia defines simultaneity in binary terms.  We should fight
back.

All things happen in the present http://ping.fm/H1Ofo


*ShortFormContent at Blogger* <http://shortformcontent.blogspot.com/>



On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 6:26 AM, Eduardo Forastieri <e...@coqui.net> wrote:

>  Ben, list:
> Thank you for these references on Firstness, Ben, and for reminding us of
> Gary Richmond’s posts; specially for the notion of a “triadic moment”.  It
> does not seem to me as an acquiescence to Kant’s time intuition. I am not
> familiar with Schelling’s ideas on time, yet these Peircean references on
> the *ego*, consciousness and Firstness (with a definite exclusion of the
> notion of the Self) reminds me of some references I gathered on this
> subject long time ago before CD-ROM and hypertext, but that I cherished
> immensely while transcribing: 1.306 and following;  1. 324 and following;
> 5.265 and following [mostly from *Concerning Certain Faculties*] 5.289;
> 5.44; 5. 462; 7.364 and following;  7.531; 7.540; and many others.
> I am most grateful for your recent inklings on this subject and Gary’s,
> and if there is more of Peirce to it (the “triadic moment”), it would be
> more than inklings. Great insights.
> Eduardo Forastieri-Braschi
>
>
> On 3/17/12 1:00 PM, "Benjamin Udell" <bud...@nyc.rr.com> wrote:
>
> Jason, list,
>
> That's a good question. In the relevant paragraph (CP 7.536, of which I
> quoted only the last part), Peirce begins by saying: "It remains to be
> shown that this element is the third Kainopythagorean category. All flow of
> time involves learning; and all learning involves the flow of time." The
> element that he was discussing was a "continuity" which he had just called
> a "direct experience" (CP 7.535). (This is also another 'score' for Gary
> Richmond in his April 8, 2011 post
> http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/6995 to
> peirce-l, in which he said "It seems to me that for Peirce being present
> means being present to the flow, which flow implies all three modalities:
> past, present, and future....")
>
> I'm kind of reluctant to go out on a limb right now, having misinterpreted
> Peirce's Oct. 12, 1904 letter to Lady Welby and spent a number of posts
> cleaning up after myself. My guess is that, in virtue of their triadic
> parts in the flow of learning, inference, and representation and
> interpretation, all three times are Thirds, with Secondness, Firstness, and
> Thirdness strong but not overwhelmingly so in past, present, and future,
> respectively. In other words, learning-past as Secundan Third,
> learning-present as Priman Third, and learning-future as Tertian Third. But
> I have no strong opinion at this point!
>
> Best, Ben
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> *From:* Khadimir
> *To:* PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
> *Sent:* Saturday, March 17, 2012 12:29 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [peirce-l] a question
>
> Would it not be fair to say that the conscious experience of the immediate
> present must always be at least a second?  That is the view I hold.
>
> Jason H.
>
> On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 at 11:24 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
>
>
>
>
> Claudio, Eduardo, Diane, Gary R., list,
>
>
> I've found more of Peirce on the present-past-future trichotomy. This
> time,  from Chapter 1 of the _*Minute Logic*_ (1902) manuscript, in  CP
> 2.84 (on the past as Second), 2.85 (on the present as First), and 2.86  (on
> the future as Third). From CP 2.85:
>
>
> Let us now consider what could appear as being in the present  instant
> were it utterly cut off from past and future. We can only guess; for
>  nothing is more occult than the absolute present. There plainly could be
> no  action; and without the possibility of action, to talk of binarity
> would be  to utter words without meaning. There might be a sort of
> consciousness, or  feeling, with no self; and this feeling might have its
> tone. Notwithstanding  what William James has said, I do not think there
> could be any continuity  like space, which, though it may perhaps appear in
> an instant in an educated  mind, I cannot think could do so if it had no
> time at all; and without  continuity parts of the feeling could not be
> synthetized; and therefore  there would be no recognizable parts. There
> could not even be a degree of  vividness of the feeling; for this [the
> degree of vividness] is the  comparative amount of disturbance of general
> consciousness by a feeling. At  any rate, such shall be our hypothesis, and
> whether it is psychologically  true or not is of no consequence. The world
> would be reduced to a quality of  unanalyzed feeling. Here would be an
> utter absence of binarity. I cannot  call it unity; for even unity supposes
> plurality. I may call its form  Firstness, Orience, or Originality. It
> would be something _*which is what  it is without reference to anything
> else*_ within it or without it,  regardless of all force and of all
> reason. Now the world is full of this  element of irresponsible, free,
> Originality. Why should the middle part of  the spectrum look green rather
> than violet? There is no conceivable reason  for it nor compulsion in it.
> [...]
>
>
>
> Note that there he discusses "what could appear as being in the present
>  instant were it utterly cut off from past and future. We can only guess;
> for  nothing is more occult than the absolute present."
>
>
> Elsewhere, at the end of CP 7.536 in an undated manuscript, he says "The
>  consciousness of the present, as the boundary between past and future,
>  involves them both.":
>
>
>
>
> Thus, every reasoning involves another reasoning, which in its turn
>  involves another, and so on _*ad infinitum*_. Every reasoning  connects
> something that has just been learned with knowledge already  acquired so
> that we thereby learn what has been unknown. It is thus that the  present
> is so welded to what is just past as to render what is just coming  about
> inevitable. The consciousness of the present, as the boundary between  past
> and future, involves them both. Reasoning is a new experience which
>  involves something old and something hitherto unknown. The past as above
>  remarked is the _*ego*_. My recent past is my uppermost  _*ego*_; my
> distant past is my more generalized _*ego*_. The  past of the community
> is _*our ego*_. In attributing a flow of time  to unknown events we
> impute a quasi-_*ego*_ to the universe. The  present is the immediate
> representation we are just learning that brings the  future, or non-ego, to
> be assimilated into the _*ego*_. It is thus  seen that learning, or
> representation, is the third Kainopythagorean  category.
>
>
>
> So that _*consciousness of*_ the present seems to match that which  Gary
> Richmond said at peirce-l on April 8, 2011 about the present  "moment" as
> distinguished from the present "instant," the present moment  as a "triadic
> moment" http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/6995
>
>
> I also find that, in Peirce's letter of Oct. 12, 1904 to Lady Welby, if I
>  had looked at what he had written in the same (long) paragraph (CP 8.330)
>  before the excerpt that I sent, I would have seen Peirce discusses
>  Firstness of the quiet and Firstness of a shrill piercing whistle, and
> does so  in a way that supports the idea of the present as a First. For it
> is the  breaking of the quiet by the shrill whistle that he says involves
> Secondness,  and that is the breaking of one moment by another, though each
> moment, taken  apart, simply has its quality, its Firstness.
>
>
> Bet, Ben
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> *From:* Benjamin Udell
> *To:* PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
>
> *Sent:* Friday, March 16, 2012 7:10 PM
> *Subject:*  Re: [peirce-l] a question
>
>
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