Gary,
It's a good thing for Peirce's consistency, that he makes metaphysics sound
like cenoscopy. It's good for his consistency because, generally, Peirce
equates cenoscopy with philosophy. I.e., generally the things which Peirce says
about cenoscopy are things which he means to say about philosophy. Below, he's
talking about how metaphysics differs from math & the special sciences in terms
of how not only metaphysics, but the rest of philosophy (i.e., cenoscopy) as
well, differ from math & special sciences. What is it in the piece on
Pragmatism soonest after Kaina Stoicheia in EP2, or in pieces on Pragmatism or
Pragmaticism elsewhere, that sounds inconsistent with that which Peirce says
about metaphysics in Kaina Stoicheia?
Best, Ben Udell
----- Original Message -----
From: "gnusystems" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu>
Sent: Monday, February 06, 2006 9:03 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
What intrigues me about the passage quoted by Bernard (below) is that it
makes "metaphysics" sound very much like what Peirce elsewhere called
"cenoscopy". This does not seem typical of Peirce's references to
"metaphysics" elsewhere -- for instance in the piece on Pragmatism which
follows Kaina Stoicheia in EP2. In the case of KS itself, it's difficult
(for me anyway) to tell whether Peirce's usage of the word there is entirely
compatible with his usage here:
-------------------------------------Quote Peirce-----------------------
Metaphysicians have always taken mathematics as their exemplar in
reasoning, without remarking the essential difference between that
science and their own. Mathematical reasoning has for its object to
ascertain what would be true in a hypothetical world which the
mathematician has created for himself, -- not altogether arbitrarily, it
is true, but nevertheless, so that it can contain no element which he
has not himself deliberately introduced into it. All that his sort of
reasoning, therefore, has to do is to develop a preconceived idea; and
it never reaches any conclusion at all as to what is or is not true of
the world of existences. The metaphysician, on the other hand, is
engaged in the investigation of matters of fact, and the only way to
matters of fact is the way of experience. The only essential difference
between metaphysics and meteorology, linguistics, or chemistry, is that
it does not avail itself of microscopes, telescopes, voyages, or other
means of acquiring recondite experiences, but contents itself with
ascertaining all that can be ascertained from such experience as every
man undergoes every day and hour of his life. All other differences
between philosophy and the special sciences are mere consequences of
this one. It follows, that deductive, or mathematical, reasoning,
although in metaphysics it may oftener "take the stage" than in the
drama of special research, yet after all, has precisely the same role to
enact, and nothing more. All genuine advance must come from real
observation and inductive reasoning.
-------------------------------------------End Quote------------------------
gary F.
}Emancipate yourselves from mental slavery -- none but ourselves can free
our minds. [Bob Marley]{
gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson & Gary Fuhrman }{ Manitoulin University
}{ [EMAIL PROTECTED] }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/ }{
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