Jim,
>[Jim Willgoose] You say,
"The question is WHETHER the stove is black -- yes, no, novelly,
probably, optimally, if & only if..., etc. What is required for assertion or
proposition or judging or even conceiving the situation is that the mind can
apprehend whether the stove
is, isn't, may be, might be, is 57%-probably, is if-&-only-if-it's-Thursday, would feasibly be, would most simply be, is, oddly enough, etc., etc., etc., black. " (end) >[Jim] I would say as I previously did that most of these can be handled
by treating the subject as a proposition. Otherwise, you predicate
"possible blackness" of this stove rather than the proposition "this stove
is black." This might not be so bad if only identification didn't break down.
"this stove" is definite but "this is a possible black thing" suffers.
I don't see what's wrong with it. In real life we do in fact talk about
possibilities involving actual things. You can break it into two interlocked
propositions if you wish, one affirming the actual existence of the stove
and the other affirming a possibility about it. Just make sure that their
subjects are somehow equated. And I don't see what's wrong with making the
possibility sentence into a one-place predicate "Ex(x={this
stove} & x[possibly(Ey y{y is black} &
y=x)])" which can be rephrased to "This stove is possibly black." Of
course, one is more likely to say something like, "This stove is possibly
malfunctioning a bit."
"This stove is possibly black" and "this stove is possibly not-black" are
not inconsistent in any logic whose treatment of the word "possibly" is within
shouting distance of ordinary English usage. In fact their conjunction makes for
at least one sense of the word "contingent," as in _it is a
*contingent* question whether the stove is black or
non-black._ Usually "possibly..." and "possibly not..." are taken in a
sense parallel to that of "consistent" and "non-valid." Any truth-functional
sentence is either (a) valid or (b) inconsistent or (c) both consistent and
non-valid.
>[Jim] I might even go so far as to say that "this stove is possibly
black" fails to assert anything and thus fails the test of
cognition.
Tell that to the man who's just been told, in regard to his wife, "She is
possibly pregnant," and, in regard to his finances, "You are possibly bankrupt,"
and so on -- all definitely existent things around which possibilities
range.
>[Jim] It also runs up potentially against contradiction since
"this" refers to a definite, individual object and the two
propositions "this stove is possibly black" and "this stove is possibly not
black" are inconsistent.
It potentially runs up against contradictions? I think you'll need to spell
them out. They may be the fault of an inadequate logical formalism since
obviously we deal with such things every day. And, again, "possibly black" and
"possibly not black" are consistent, not inconsistent, unless one's formalism
constrains one to signify something quite deviative from normal English usage of
words like "possibly."
>[Jim] But 'It is possible that "this stove is black"' seems to work
better. What is the deal about supposing the identity of the predicate and then
assessing the modality of the proposition? Peirce gives the example of "it
rains" in the gamma graphs. He doesn't consider possible rain but whether the
proposition "it rains" is possibly true (false)
If your possibilitative propositions are incapable of transformation into
one-or-more-place predicates, then they seem strangely limited. Anyway, I've
gone on at some length about deductive formalisms, philosophical inquiry, and
the difference between finding a convenient and smooth way to "encode"
or represent something for a given general kind of guiding research interest,
and a specifically philosophical exploration of the conceptions involved in
those things represented. I certainly haven't exhausted the subject, but I leave
it to you to respond by argument to the arguments which I've already started in
http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/1377 (my
second September 6, 2006 post to peirce-l).
Ben Udell
---Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com |
- [peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New Li... Jim Piat
- [peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the N... jwillgoose
- [peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in t... Benjamin Udell
- [peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory ... jwillgoose
- [peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act the... Benjamin Udell
- [peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-ac... jwillgoose
- [peirce-l] Re: The roots of speec... Benjamin Udell
- [peirce-l] Re: The roots of s... Benjamin Udell
- [peirce-l] Re: The roots of s... jwillgoose
- [peirce-l] Re: The roots of s... Benjamin Udell
- [peirce-l] Re: The roots of s... jwillgoose
- [peirce-l] Re: The roots of s... Benjamin Udell
- [peirce-l] Re: The roots of s... jwillgoose
- [peirce-l] Re: The roots of s... Benjamin Udell
- [peirce-l] Re: The roots of s... Benjamin Udell