Dear Joe,
Thanks for your informal and very helpful
response. I think I was misunderstanding the introductory passage in the
New List. So I have a few more questions. First some
background. My understanding is that signs refer to and stand for the
meaning of objects. In standing for objects signs can
be useful tools for communicating about objects as well as for conducting
thought experiments about objects. But it is their function of referring
to objects that I want to focus upon and ask you about. It seems to
me that in defining signs as referring to objects part of what this
definition implies is that the sign user is in the position of standing
outside (or perhaps above and beyond) the mere reactive world of the object
being referred to and observed. IOWs the sign user has a POV with respect
to the object that is beyond a mere indexical relationship. That
being an "observor" or spectator requires a level or dimension of detachment
that goes beyond the level or dimension of attachment that is involved in
"participation with" or reacting to an object. And so I'm thinking that an
indexical representation is more than just a tool for indexing an object or
giving voice to one's sub or pre-representational understanding of an
object. I'm thinking that representation is also (and perhaps most
importantly) the process by which one achieves the observational stance.
Or, to put it another way, that the capacity to step back from the world of
objects and observe them as existing is one and the same as the capacity to
represent objects. That, in effect, the ability to represent
is the foundation of being an observor in a world of existing objects
as opposed to being merely a reactive participant in
existence. . Actually, as I think about this a bit more,
maybe it is not simply the sign's function of "referring" but
also the signs function of "standing for" that creates, presumes or makes
possible the "observor" POV. But however one cuts it I don't see how
a sign can represent without there being an observor role which is
functionally distinct from the role of mere participant. So anyway
that's my question -- is Peirce's theory of representation and the sign
meant to imply or address this issue of an observor or am I just misreading
something into it that is not there. I will be greatly dissapointed if
such a notion or something akin to it is not part of what is intended by the
idea of a triadic relation as being above and beyond that of a mere dyadic
relation. But then there are those Peirce comments about consciousness
being a mere quality or firstness so I'm not so sure. OK
-- I hope I have made clear the nature of my concern and look forward to any
comments you might have. I realize I'm drifting a bit from the initial
question that started this exchnage but I for me the questions are very
much related. I'm trying to get at and understand the relation of the sign as
carrier of meaning and as that which gives rise to the feeling we have of
being not simply participants in a world (like colliding billiard balls) but of
also being observors of this participation -- aware of our nakedness and so on. The notion that in the
beginning (of awareness) was the word.
Thanks again -- I look forward to any
comments, advice and suggestions you or others might have. I am very
eager to get clear on this point. So drop whatever you are doing ...
Best wishes,
Jim Piat
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